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I. INTRODUCTION

S

INCE 1926, when the United States Supreme Court upheld the
validity of zoning schemes,' communities have used zoning
ordinances to prevent unwanted development. An effect of typical
suburban zoning practices, whether intended or not, has been the
2
exclusion of outsiders along racial, social, and economic lines.
Only in relatively recent years have some courts begun to invalidate
"exclusionary zoning." 3 And only very recently have these courts
come to realize that mere judicial invalidation of an exclusionary
zoning ordinance is not an adequate remedy.4 In Pennsylvania,
the courts have focused upon exclusionary zoning challenges by
landowners 1 and have sought to devise an adequate remedy for a
landowner who successfully contends that a challenged zoning
ordinance is unconstitutionally exclusionary.
Act 249 of 1978 6 is an attempt by the Pennsylvania
Legislature to redefine the remedial rights of landowners who
1. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
2. See 2 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 8.01 (2d ed. 1976);
Developments in the Law - Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1427, 1624 (1978).
3. The term "exclusionary zoning" has been applied to many different
types of zoning practices, including minimum lot size, building size, and frontage requirements as well as prohibitions of apartments, townhouses and mobile
homes. 1 P. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS §2.01, at 7-9 (1978);
2 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW §§ 62.01-65.04, at 607-86 (1974);
Williams & Norman, Exclusionary Land Use Controls: The Case of NorthEastern New Jersey, 22 SYRACUSE L. REv. 475, 481-84 (1971). Other devices
include limits on the number of bedrooms, age restrictions, regulations on cohabitation by unrelated persons, and prohibition of social welfare facilities,
such as group homes. 1 P. ROHAN, supra, § 2.01, at 9-11.
There are many legal grounds for challenging such exclusionary zoning
practices. See D. MOSKOWiTZ, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING LITIGATION 81-178 (1977);
Developments in the Law - Zoning, supra note 2, at 1624-94. 1 do not intend,
in this article, to discuss the relative merits of the various legal arguments
upon which courts have relied in discussing the validity of exclusionary zoning.
Instead, this discussion will be limited to the question of the appropriate
remedy once a court has determined, on whatever ground, that a zoning ordinance is unlawfully exclusionary.
4. See, e.g., Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J.
481, 371 A.2d 1192 (1977). In Oakwood at Madison, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey began to struggle with the problem of how to fashion an appropriate remedy once a court has determined that a zoning ordinance is unlawfully exclusionary. Id. at 552-54, 371 A.2d at 1227-28. The remedy issue was
all but ignored in the court's earlier landmark decision in Southern Burlington
County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, cert.

denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
5. In Pennsylvania, only landowners may bring exclusionary zoning challenges. See notes 7, 14 &e313-14 and accompanying text infra.

6. Act of Oct. 5, 1978, Pub. L. No. 249, 1978 Pa. Laws 1067 (codified at
STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 10101-11012 (Purdon Supp. 1980-81)) (amending
various sections of the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code, PA. STAT.

PA.
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challenge exclusionary zoning ordinances.7 These rights had preANN. tit. 53, §§ 10101-11012 (Purdon 1972 & Supp. 1980-81).

The Municipalities
Planning Code [hereinafter "MPC"] contains the zoning enabling legislation
for Pennsylvania municipalities other than the cities of Philadelphia and
Pittsburgh and the County of Allegheny. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10107(13)
(Purdon Supp. 1980-81).
7. In Pennsylvania, only persons who have an interest in property located
in the zoning municipality may challenge exclusionary zoning legislation. Such
challenges may not be brought by non-residents of the zoning municipality.
See, e.g., Lightcap v. Wrightstown Twp. Bd. of Supervisors, 25 Bucks County
L. Rep. 145 (C.P. 1974); aff'd per curiam, No. 1625 C.D. 1973, Oct. 18, 1974
(Pa. Commw. Ct.); Commonwealth v. Bucks County, 22 Bucks County L. Rep.
179 (C.P. 1972), afJ'd per curiam, 8 Pa. Commw. Ct. 295, 302 A.2d 897 (1973),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1130 (1974). In Bucks County, the commonwealth court,
adopting the opinion of the lower court, dismissed, in a per curiam decision,
an action in which non-residents of Bucks County challenged the validity of
the zoning ordinances of all 54 municipalities in Bucks County. 8 Pa. Commw.
Ct. at 298, 302 A.2d at 899. The apparent basis for the dismissal was the
court's agreement with the lower court that the relief sought by the plaintiffs
would require the court to undertake a nonjusticiable task. Id. In dismissing
the sweeping challenge, President Judge Satterthwaite of the Bucks County
Court of Common Pleas asserted:
In order to meet and resolve the problems posed by plaintiffs in their
presently hypothetical, far-ranging and totally unparticularized context, the Court itself, directly, or indirectly through the requested mandates to and oversight of the County planning commission and the
governing bodies of the fifty-four separate municipalities, would be
required to assume the awesome task of becoming a superplanning
agency, with no expertise in the field; and as such the Court would
be required to make immediate and basic "initial policy determinations of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion," and to carry out
this tremendous responsibility with an entire "lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it," . . . . This
responsibility we do not believe we are required to assume, and we
therefore decline to do so.
302 A.2d 904-05 (lower court opinion reprinted in unofficial reporter), quoting
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). Bucks County thus seems to have been
decided on constitutional grounds - i.e., that non-resident challenges are to be
dismissed because they are nonjusticiable.
In Lightcap, a non-resident plaintiff submitted his challenge to the township's zoning hearing board in purported compliance with the procedures set
forth in Art. X of the MPC. 25 Bucks County L. Rep. at 145. See PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 53, §§ 11001-012 (Purdon 1972 9c Supp. 1980-81). The zoning hearing
board rejected the non-resident's challenge on the ground that he had no
"standing." 25 Bucks County L. Rep. at 145. On appeal, the court of common
pleas affirmed, holding that 1) Article X of the MPC sets forth the exclusive
procedures for challenging the validity of an ordinance; 2) such validity challenges can be brought only in accordance with either § 11004 or § 11005 of the
MPC; 3) § 11004 was not available to the challenger because he was not a
"landowner"; and 4) § 11005 was not available to the challenger because he was
not a "person aggrieved". Id. at 146-47. Thus, Lightcap was decided on the
ground that a non-resident lacks statutory "standing" under the MPC. For a
critique of the lower court decision in Bucks County and the interpretation of
Article X of the MPC adopted in Lightcap, see Krasnowiecki, Zoning Litigation
and the New Pennsylvania Procedure, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 1029, 1101-03 (1972).
For a discussion of non-resident challenges to exclusionary zoning laws, see
D. MosKowITz, supra note 3, at 17-63; Hyson, The Problem of Relief in
Developer-Initiated Exclusionary Litigation, 12 URk. L. ANN. 21, 23-24 (1976);
notes 313-33 and accompanying text infra.
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viously been defined by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in
Casey v. Zoning Hearing Board.8 There are three important
aspects to the Casey decision. First, the supreme court adopted a
"pending ordinance doctrine" for exclusionary zoning litigation
under which a zoning amendment adopted subsequent to an exclusionary zoning challenge was to be disregarded unless the
amendment had been publicly advertised prior to the commencement of the challenge. 9 Second, the supreme court held that
Pennsylvania courts had the power to grant "definitive" or "sitespecific" relief 10 to a developer-challenger who had persuaded a
court that a challenged zoning ordinance was exclusionary." Third,
the supreme court defined, at least indirectly, the circumstances in
which the award of site-specific relief to a successful challenger
2
would be appropriate.'
8. 459 Pa. 219, 328 A.2d 464 (1974).
9. Id. at 226, 328 A.2d at 466-67. The Casey court stated: "While the
facts presented herein distinguish the instant case from the typical 'pending
ordinance' case, in that there existed no permissive zoning ordinance subsequently amended to effectively deny the application for the building permit,
the same approach will be followed." Id.
The "pending ordinance doctrine" in Pennsylvania exclusionary zoning
litigation, referred to variously as the "Casey pending ordinance doctrine" or
"Casey doctrine," is the chief focus of this article. For a discussion of the
nature, development and possible legal basis for this doctrine, see notes 42-142
and accompanying text infra.
10. 459 Pa. at 230, 328 A.2d at 469. The court used the term "definitive
relief" which it borrowed from Professor Krasnowiecki. See id. See also
Krasnowiecki, supra note 7, at 1059. See generally Comment, Judicial Relief
in Exclusionary Zoning Cases: Pennsylvania's Definitive Relief Approach, 21
VILL. L. REv. 701 (1976).
Throughout this article, I use the term "site-specific relief" to describe
judicial relief which, in one form or another, is directed to and benefits the
land of the zoning ordinance challenger. See Hyson, supra note 7, at 21-22.
See also Developments in the Law - Zoning, supra note 2, at 1695-99. I believe
that the term "site-specific relief" is preferable to "definitive relief" because of
its usefulness in indicating that the relief is directed to a particular parcel
of land.
11. 459 Pa. at 230, 328 A.2d at 469. For a criticism of the rationale advanced by the Casey court in support of this holding, see Hyson, supra note 7,
at 37-41. See also Comment, supra note 10.
Although the 1972 amendments to the MPC had specifically conferred
upon Pennsylvania courts the power to grant site-specific relief, see PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 53, § 11011(2) (Purdon 1972), these amendments were not applicable
in Casey because the landowner's challenge had been initiated prior to the
effective date of the amendments. 459 Pa. at 227 n.6, 328 A.2d at 467 n.6.
12. 459 Pa. at 230-31, 328 A.2d at 469-70. The Casey court seemed to hold
that, once a court has determined that a municipality's ordinance is unlawfully exclusionary, the court should order the municipality to allow the challenger to proceed with his proposed development to the extent that the developer's proposal complies with all unchallenged "administrative requirements
of the zoning ordinance in effect on the date of the original application
Id. at 231, 328 A.2d at 469-70.
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The Casey decision, and the pending ordinance doctrine in
particular, forced much unwanted new construction upon suburban
municipalities.' Developers quickly discovered the three-step secret
to success under Casey: 1) find a municipality with an exclusionary
zoning ordinance; 2) acquire an interest in land located in the
municipality; 14 and 3) file a challenge to the municipality's zoning
ordinance 15 before the municipality has an opportunity to advertise
While the 1972 amendments to the MPC specifically conferred upon
Pennsylvania courts the power to grant site-specific relief, see note 11 supra,
they provided no guidance to the courts as to when such relief would be appropriate. However, in Ellick v. Board of Supervisors, 17 Pa. Commw. Ct.
404, 333 A.2d 239 (1975), the commonwealth court attempted to articulate
guidelines for the granting of site-specific relief. This court stated:
If the court of common pleas determines that an ordinance is invalid as a matter of law, then it is the court's duty to review the
governing body's action, if any, with respect to the "plans and other
materials" submitted with the landowner's challenge. As the Supreme
Court noted in Casey,. ..the courts must go beyond mere invalidation
and grant definitive relief ....
The court may order the plans submitted by the landowner approved as to all of its "elements", or
order it approved as to some of them. It may refer some of the
elements of the plans to the governing body and it may even disapprove the plan entirely. The court may even refer the "plans and
other materials," or parts thereof back to the governing body for disposition; but it may not remand .... the challenge to the legality of
the ordinance or the curative amendment. ...
[I]t is not the responsibility of the courts of common pleas to
modify or redesign landowners' plans, but rather only to rule upon
what is presented to the court .... [T]he function of the court is to
pass upon the reasonableness of the restrictions present in the record,
including both the restrictions contained in the landowner's plans
and the restrictions present in the ordinance which are applicable to
the same class of usage or construction.
Id. at 415-16, 333 A.2d at 24647. The commonwealth court further authorized
the lower courts to impose otherwise legal zoning regulations on landowners'
proposals as would be applicable. Id., 333 A.2d at 247. For a general discussion of circumstances in which site-specific relief would be appropriate, see
Hyson, supra note 7,at 41-48.
13. See, e.g., Board of Supervisors v. Barness, 33 Pa. Commw. Ct. 364, 382
A.2d 140 (1978).
14. In Pennsylvania, only a "landowner" may challenge an exclusionary
zoning ordinance. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11004(1) (Purdon 1972). Under
the MPC, a "landowner" is defined as "the legal or beneficial owner . . . of
land including the holder of an option or contract to purchase . .. , a lessee
if he is authorized under the lease to exercise the rights of the landowner, or
other person having a proprietary interest in land .... " Id. § 10107(12).
See notes 5 & 7 supra. The terms "landowner" and "developer" will be used
interchangeably throughout this article.
15. The MPC gives to a "landowner" the option of submitting his challenge to either the municipality's zoning hearing board or its governing body.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11004(1). For a general discussion of these procedures as they operated prior to the amendments contained in Act 249, See
Henszey & Novak, Substantive Validity Challenges Under the Pennsylvania
Municipalities Planning Code: The Practitioner and the New Procedures, 21
VILL. L. Rv. 187 (1976); Rosenzweig, The Curative Amendment Procedure
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a proposed "curative" amendment which would eliminate the impermissible exclusionary character of the existing ordinance.' 6 This
last step was crucial. If the developer filed his challenge before the
advertisement of a proposed curative amendment, his challenge
would be determined on the basis of the vulnerable ordinance in
existence at the time of his challenge. 17 If, however, the developer
filed his challenge after the advertisement of a proposed curative
amendment, his challenge would be reviewed on the basis of the
usually invulnerable amended ordinance.1 8
Casey, in short, set up a race between developers and municipalities with exclusionary zoning ordinances. The outcome of
the race, strictly speaking, decided only the appropriate focal point
for resolution of the developer's challenge: the clearly exclusionary
ordinance in effect at the time of the challenge or the amended
ordinance if publicly advertised before the challenge. If, however,
a court determined that the developer had won the race and that,
under the Casey pending ordinance doctrine, it would look to the
unamended ordinance for the purpose of determining the merits of
a challenge, the court tended not only to declare the ordinance
invalid, but also, almost as a matter of course, to grant site-specific
relief to the challenger. For example, in Board of Supervisors v.
Barness,19 the commonwealth court, after ruling that a postchallenge amendment was to be disregarded (because it had not
been advertised prior to the filing of the challenges), 20 held that
seven separate developer-challengers were entitled to develop thousands of residential units in a rural Bucks County community. 21
in Pennsylvania: The Landowner's Challenge to the Substantive Validity of

Zoning Restrictions, 80 Dicx. L. REv. 43 (1975).
16. See notes 3-4 and accompanying text supra.
17. Casey v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 459 Pa. at 225, 328 A.2d at 466.
18. Id.
19. 33 Pa. Commw. Ct. 364, 382 A.2d 140 (1978).
20. Id. at 369-72, 382 A.2d at 142-44. In Barness, seven different de.
velopers, who wished to develop some type of high-density residential use on
seven separate parcels of land in the municipality, filed individual challenges
(within a short period of time) to the municipality's zoning ordinance. Id. at
366-67, 382 A.2d at 141-42. At the time the challenges were filed, the municipality was considering amendments to its comprehensive land development
plan which, if adopted and implemented by corresponding changes in the
zoning ordinance, would cure most, if not all, of the defects in the existing
exclusionary' zoning ordinance. There was, however, no publicly advertised
proposed amendment to the ordinance. Id. at 370-71, 382 A.2d at 143. A
curative zoning amendment was adopted after the filing of the challenges. Id.
at 371, 382 A.2d at 143.
21. Id. at 371-72, 382 A.2d at 144. The principal issue in Barness was
whether a post-challenge zoning amendment should be considered in ruling
upon the merits of seven separate exclusionary zoning challenges. Id. The
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The Barness case was the high water mark of developers', triumphs'
under Casey 22 and set the stage for the enactment of Act 249.
There is no question but that Act 249 seeks to overturn, or at
least modify, each of the three aspects of Casey 28 and, thereby, to
commonwealth court, relying upon the pending ordinance 'doctrine as developed in Casey and Appeal of Carr, 30 Pa.. Commw. Ct. 342, 374 A.2d 735
(1977), held that the post-challenge amendment should be disregarded because there was not "sufficient public declaration of ant intent to amend the
existing ordinance" at the time the various challenges were 'filed. 33 Pa.
Commw. Ct. at 371, 382 A.2d at 144, quoting Casey v. Zoning Hearing Bd.,
459 Pa. at 226, 328 A.2d at 467. The court in Barness concluded'that "[t]hey
[the seven challengers to the municipality's zoning ordinance] must: therefore
prevail and [they] must, upon their compliance with other appropriate township regulations, be issued permits to do what their plans and other materials
filed proposed." Id.
With this language, the Barness court seems to have improperly, blended
together two separate questions: 1) whether, under the Casey. pending ordinance
doctrine, the post-challenge amendment was to be disregarded in ruling upon
the merits of the seven challenges; and 2) whether, if the chiallengers prevailed
on the merits of their exclusionary zoning challenge, site-specific relief should
be awarded to each of the challengers. The failure to disinguish these' two
questions was improper because, although the court in Barness concluded that
application of the Casey pending ordinance doctrine precluded consideration
of the municipality's post-challenge amendment, it did not riecessarily follow
that any or all of the challengers should be awarded site-specific relief. '
The language of Casey, however, affords some discretion to a court faced
with the question of whether to grant site-6pecific relief. The Casey court
observed: "To forsake a challenger's reasonable development plans. after all
the time, effort and capital invested in such a challenge is grossly inequitable."
459 Pa. at 230, 328 A.2d at 469 (emphasis 'added). Moreover,' the apparently
automatic award of site-specific relief in Barness seems to be inconsistent with
the carefully articulated criteria for the award of site-specific relief which were
set forth in Ellick v. Board of Supervisors, 17 Pa. Commw. Ct. 404, 333 'A.2d
239 (1975). The Ellick court stated that courts should review the challeinger's
proposed plans for reasonableness before approving them. Id. at 415-16, 333
A.2d at 246-47, citing Casey v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 459 Pa. 219, 328 A.2d 464
(1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11011 (Purdon 1972). See note 12 supra.
22. According to one newspaper account, the plans of the challengers called
for 9,000 housing units which, if developed and occupied, would quadruple the
population of .the municipality. Phila. Inquirer, Nov. 1, 1976, § B,. at 1, c0l. 2.
23. For a discussion of the extent to which Act 249 purports to overturn
the pending ordinance doctrine, see notes 143-284 and accompanying text infra.
That Act 249 also attempts to overturn, or at least modify, the other'two
aspects of the Casey decision is apparent from the language added to§ 1011 of
the MPC by Act 249. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11011 (Purdon Supp. 198081). Indeed § 1011(2), as amended by Act 249, purports to dictate to the Pennsylvania courts when they may declare an ordinance invalid. Id. § 11011(1).
Its constitutionality is dubious. Section 1011(2), as amended by the Act, lists
various factors which the court shall consider in issuing any relief to a successful
challenge. Id. § 11011(2). Finally, § 1011(4) precludes the award of judicial
relief if the certification required by § 1004(2)(a) has not been made or is not
"true and correct." Id. § 11011(4). See id. § 11004(2)(a). For a discussion of
the certification requirement, see notes 242-84 and accompanying text infra.
Although beyond the scope of this article, it is at least questionable whether
the Pennsylvania Legislature may, without infringing upon the inherent equity
powers of the court, limit the circumstances in which a court may award sitespecific relief once the court has determined that a challenged zoning ordinance
is unconstitutionally exclusionary. In holding that Pennsylvania courts may
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provide greater protection to Pennsylvania municipalities against the
perceived ravages of court-imposed site-specific relief in exclusionary zoning litigation.2 4 In this article I will consider only the impact of Act 249 upon the first of these three aspects - the pending
ordinance doctrine. The pending ordinance doctrine is, in my
view, the most significant of the three aspects of Casey because it
increases the likelihood that a challenger will be successful with
respect to the merits of his challenge.2
Only if a challenger is
successful on the merits is a court then required to deal with the
issues treated in the other two aspects of Casey: whether the court
has power to grant site-specific relief to a successful challenger and
whether site-specific relief is appropriate in the particular case. In
short, if Act 249 has effectively abolished the pending ordinance
doctrine in exclusionary zoning litigation, making it less likely
that developer-challengers will succeed on the merits of their challenges, it makes little or no difference whether and when a Pennsylvania court may grant site-specific relief.26
award site-specific relief, the Casey court must have relied implicitly upon
constitutional notions of the equity power of courts because the applicable
zoning enabling legislation did not confer upon Pennsylvania courts the power
to award site-specific relief. See note 11 supra. Section 1011 of the MPC,
added by the 1972 amendments, conferred such power but, because the challenge in Casey was filed prior to the effective date of the 1972 amendments, the
Casey court held that the 1972 amendments were not applicable. 459 Pa. at
227 n.6, 328 A.2d at 467 n.6. Thus, though I have previously criticized the
Casey court's failure to articulate a satisfactory basis for its holding that Pennsylvania courts have the power to award site-specific relief, see Hyson, supra
note 7, at 37-41, the fact remains that the supreme court did hold that, even
absent legislative authorization, the Pennsylvania courts had the power to grant
site-specific relief.
Did the court in Casey implicitly hold that site-specific relief was necessary
in order to remedy adequately the constitutional violation - i.e., the exclusionary character of the zoning ordinance? And if the Casey court did so hold,
may the legislature limit the power of Pennsylvania courts to grant site-specific
relief without, contrary to separation of powers concepts, infringing upon the
inherent equity powers of the courts? These questions are similar to those
which were raised when the Congress of the United States considered proposed
legislation which would have prohibited federal courts from ordering busing
in school desegregation cases. See generally G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW

50-56, 773-74 (10th ed. 1980).

For a discussion of the

court's power to go beyond a declaration of invalidity and order site-specific
relief, see Krasnowiecki, supra note 7, at 1060-65; Note, Beyond Invalidation:
The Judicial Power to Zone, 9 URB. L. ANN. 159 (1975).
24. See notes 13-22 and accompanying text supra.

25. See notes 12 & 21 supra. Under Casey, the developer need not fear
that a post-challenge amendment will moot his original challenge by requiring
him to redirect his attack to the zoning ordinance as amended. See notes 17-18
and accompanying text supra.
26. Of course, a favorable determination on the merits is not worth much
to a developer-challenger if it does not result in the award of site-specific
relief. Nevertheless, a determination on the merits is sequentially prior to a
determination of appropriate relief and, therefore, a favorable decision on the
merits is a precondition to the award of any relief to the challenger.
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In this article, I intend to describe first a conceptual difficulty
which underlies the development of the pending ordinance doctrine
in developer-initiated exclusionary zoning litigation. 27 Second, the
origins of the pending ordinance doctrine in Pennsylvania exclusionary zoning litigation will be closely examined for the purpose
of determining the legal basis for the doctrine.28 Third, I will
consider whether Act 249 purports to modify the Casey doctrine
and, to the extent it does, whether such modification is constitutional.2 9 Finally, I will suggest possible legislative solutions to
the problem which gave rise to the Casey pending ordinance
doctrine - the problem of post-challenge amendments in developerinitiated challenges.30
II. A

BASIC CONCEPTUAL DIFFICULTY IN DEVELOPER-INITIATED
EXCLUSIONARY ZONING LITIGATION

Conceptual confusion in developer-initiated exclusionary zoning litigation arises from the fact that a developer-challenger seeks
relief which, though consistent with his economic interest, is inconsistent with the legal theory which underlies his substantive
challenge. A developer who brings an exclusionary zoning challenge in Pennsylvania contends that a municipality's zoning ordinance is invalid on its face; he does not contend that the zoning is
invalid as applied to his land.3 l Nevertheless, because of the chal27. See notes 31-41 and accompanying text infra.
28. See notes 42-142 and accompanying text infra.
29. See notes 143-284 and accompanying text infra.
30. See notes 285-351 and accompanying text infra.
31. Although a comprehensive treatment of Pennsylvania substantive exclusionary zoning law is beyond the scope of this article, a brief review of the
major Pennsylvania exclusionary zoning decisions is necessary in order to explain the relationship between the two types of challenges.
In its first exclusionary zoning decision, National Land and Inv. Co. v.
Easttown Twp. Bd. of Adj., 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965), the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania held that a municipality's zoning ordinance was invalid
because it imposed large minimum lot-size requirements upon a substantial
amount of acreage in the municipality. Id. at 533, 215 A.2d at 613. The
plurality opinion by Justice Roberts set forth various grounds for holding the
zoning ordinance invalid, including the effect of the large minimum lot-size
restrictions upon the value and marketability of the challenger's land. Id. at
523-25, 215 A.2d at 608. Thus, this first exclusionary zoning decision appeared
to suggest that a landowner-challenger must demonstrate, at least to some extent, that the challenged ordinance is invalid in its application to him.
This suggestion, if ever intended, has been laid to rest by the subsequent
exclusionary zoning decisions of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. In Concord
Twp. Appeal, 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970), the supreme court again invalidated a zoning ordinance because it imposed large minimum lot-size requirements upon a substantial amount of acreage in the municipality. Id. at
478, 268 A.2d at 770. However, the plurality opinion by Justice Roberts did
not even mention the impact of the zoning ordinance upon the challenger's
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lenger's economic interest in a particular parcel of land, -he is not
content with a simple .judicial declaration that the challenged ordinance is invalid - the traditional and clearly authorized form of
judicial relief when legislation is held..to be facially invalid. Such
2
relief is unlikely to result in any benefit to the challenger.4 -Instead, the developer-challenger seeks a judicial order, directed to
his land - site-specific relief .- a form of relief which would
seem to be more appropriate, to a challenge, grounded upon a contention that the municipality's zoning is invalid only as applied
34
to the challenger's land.
land. 'Similarly, in Girsh Appeal, 437 Pa.' 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970), the supreme
court invalidated a municipal zoning ordinance which made no provision for
apartments. Id. at 240-42, 263 A.2d at 396-97. As in Concord Township Appeal, the supreme court, in yet another plurality opinion by Justice Roberts,
did not consider the impact of the challenged ordinance as applied, to the
challenger's land.' Finally, in two of its recent "fair share" decisions, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court invalidated zoning ordinances which did not provide a "fair share" of the municipality's acreage for apartments. See Surrick
v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 476 Pa. 182, 382 A.2d 105 (1977); Township of Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 462 Pa. 445, 341 A.2d 466 (1975). In neither
case did the supreme court consider the impact of the challenged ordinance as
applied to the challenger's land.
The Casey decision provides explicit support for the proposition that an
exclusionary zoning challenge is a'challenge to the facial validity of a' zoning
ordinance. In Casey, the challenger contended that a municipality's zoning
ordinance was invalid because,, contrary to Girsh Appeal, the ordinance made
no provision for apartments. '459 Pa.' at 225, 328 A.2d at 466. Commenting on
I
'
the nature of this challenge, the court in Casey stated:
Once a zoning ordinance is found to be constitutionally defective, the
judgment invalidates the entire ordinance, not merely the zoning on a
particular tract of land.

This case must be distinguished from the' case in which a chal.
lenger is merely contesting the zoning of his own tract of land' and
only seeking to have the court declare the zoning of his tract invalid.
Id. at 229 & n.ll, 328 A.2d at 468 & n.1l.
32. See D. MosKowrrz, supra note 3, at 275-88. If the court simply declares
the challenged ordinance to be invalid, the end 'result *may be subsequent
municipal adoption of an amended zoning ordinance Which cures the original
invalidity, but, which does not rezone the challenger's land.. This is what
happened in the Girsh controversy. See Girsh Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d
395 (1970). After the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had declared in Girsh that
the zoning ordinance of Nether Providence Township was invalid because it
made no provision for apartments, the township amended its ordinance to provide for apartments but did not rezone the challenger's land to permit apartment development. D.,MoSKOW1TZ,' supra, at 363. Dissatisfied with this out.
come, the challenger sought an order requiring the township to permit
apartment development on' his property. Id. 'at 363-64. Although the court
issued the requested order, it did not advance any legal rationale to support
the proposition that a court had the power to order such site-specific relief.
Id. It was not until its decision in 'Casey that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
articulated such a rationale. See notes' 10-12 and accompanynig text 'supra.
33. See note 10 and accompanying text supra.
34. I am simply suggesting that if a court may ever grant site-specific relief,
it would seem that such relief would be more appropriate where there has been
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This inconsistency between a developer's economic interest in
particular land and the legal theory underlying his exclusionary
challenge broughtabout the development of the "pending Ordinance
doctrine" :of Casey.85 When a person challenges legislation on the
ground of alleged facial invalidity, he will, in 'the usual case, be
pleased with a post-challenge amendment to the legislation which
cures the alleged invalidity.! The post-challenge cure will usually
result. in' the voluntary dismissal of the challenge because, in the
usual case, the challenger's objective is simply to eliminate the alleged invalidity in the challenged legislation. If the alleged invalidity is eliminated by a post-challenge amendment, the challenger
is spared the time and expense of pursuing the challenge to a final
judicial resolution. Indeed, again in the usual case, the post-challenge amendment moots the original challenge. A challenger faced
with a post-challenge amendment must, if he wishes to continue to
litigate, redirect his challenge to the legislation as amended. s6
The developer-initiated exclusionary zoning challenge, however, does not possess the theoretical consistency of the normal
case.8 7 Although a post-challenge, amendment may cure the ina site-specific challenge - that i , a challenge to zoning as applied to a particular parcel of land. But even when 'there -is a site-specific challenge, it is
not clear that a court has the power to go ,beyond a declaration of invalidity
and'order site-specific relief. See Krasnowiecki, supra note 7, at 1060-65; Note,
supra note 23.
35. See note 9 supra.
36. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrTUTIONAL LAW § 3-14, at 62-68 (1978).
The mootness doctrine, which precludes courts from considering matters no
longer in dispute, is based ultimately upon'the perceived scope of judicial
power. Once there has been an amendment to ch-allenged legislation, the
challenger must, in order to maintain a justiciable controversy, shift his attack
to the amended legislation because'a court lacks power to consider the validity
of legislation which' is no longer in effect. Id.
37. See notes 35-36 and accompanying text supra. Such consistency is
present in nonresident-initiated exclusionary, zoning litigation. In such cases,
the nonresident plaintiff who challenges a zoning ordinance is content with
relief which simply eliminates the alleged invalidity - i.e., a judicial declaration
of invalidity followed by municipal adoption of an amended zoning ordinance
which does not have the same defect. Because the nonresident, by definition,
does not have an interest in particular land in the defendant municipality, the
nonresident is not interested in a form of relief'which benefits particular land.
For the same reason, a nonresident plaintiff is content with a post-challenge
amendment which cures the alleged invalidity irrespective of the particular land
which benefits from the amendment.
Although nonresident-initiated exclusionary zoning litigation does not suffer
from the conceptual difficulty described in the text, it presents significant
problems in fashioning an effective judicial remedy. If a court, in non-residentinitiated litigation, merely declares that a challenged ordinance is invalid, the
municipality will have an opportunity to amend its ordinance in order to bring
the ordinance into conformity with the substantive criteria of constitutionality
articulated by the court. ' But what if the' amended ordinance is challenged on
exclusionary grounds and held to be unconstitutional? After the municipality
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validity alleged by the developer, it will not necessarily satisfy his
interest in developing his parcel of land. 8s For this reason, the
developer-challenger

in Casey asked the Pennsylvania Supreme

Court to disregard the post-challenge amendment to the municipality's zoning ordinance.3 9 The supreme court granted the developer's request by extending the pending ordinance doctrine to
exclusionary zoning litigation. 40 In doing so, the supreme court
took upon itself the unusual, if not unique, task of determining
41
the validity of legislation which was no longer in effect.
III.

JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PENDING ORDINANCE DOCTRINE

IN PENNSYLVANIA EXCLUSIONARY ZONING LITIGATION

A. The Problem

Although the legal basis for the Casey pending ordinance doctrine is uncertain, 42 the policy basis for its adoption is clear. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted the pending ordinance doctrine in exclusionary zoning litigation because it did not wish, on
the one hand, to discourage developer-initiated exclusionary zoning
challenges and, on the other, to encourage municipalities to continue exclusionary zoning practices. Because of the inconsistency
between the legal basis for a developer's challenge and his interest
has been given an opportunity to cure the invalidity, should the court go beyond a simple declaration that the amended ordinance is invalid and impose a
court-devised scheme of zoning upon the municipality? The Supreme Court
of New Jersey, which upheld nonresident-initiated exclusionary zoning challenges in Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel,
67 N.J. 151, 159 n.3, 336 A.2d 713, 717 n.3, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975),
has begun to cope with this problem. See Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 552-54, 371 A.2d 1192, 1227-28 (1977). Pennsylvania courts, however, will not have to deal with these issues as long as they
continue to hold that nonresidents may not initiate exclusionary zoning challenges. See note 7 supra. Thus, though developer-initiated challenges present
conceptual difficulties, there is a tradeoff - developer-initiated challenges do not
present the awesome remedial problems of nonresident-initiated challenges.
See Hyson, supra note 7, at 22-27; Developments in the Law - Zoning, supra
note 2, at 1700-07.
38. See notes 31-34 and accompanying text supra. Indeed, a municipality
which wishes to discourage developer-initiated exclusionary challenges would
never adopt a post-challenge amendment which benefited the challenger. See
text accompanying notes 46-47 infra.
39. See 459 Pa. at 225-29, 328 A.2d at 466-69. For a discussion of the facts
in Casey, see notes 48-64 and accompanying text infra.
40. See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
41. See note 36 and accompanying text supra.
42. For a discussion of the legal basis for the Casey pending ordinance
doctrine, see notes 48-124 and accompanying text infra.
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in a particular parcel of land, 43 a developer is usually not satisfied
with a post-challenge amendment which cures the facial invalidity
of the challenged ordinance. Indeed, the developer-challenger will
be satisfied with a post-challenge amendment only if, in addition
to curing the facial invalidity, it also benefits the parcel in which
the developer has an interest.
In Casey, the supreme court was faced with a post-challenge
amendment which did not benefit the challenger. 4 If the court
had held that such a post-challenge amendment may not be disregarded in ruling upon the merits of a developer's challenge, a developer would be required either to accept the dismissal of his
original challenge on grounds of mootness, 45 or shift his challenge
from the ordinance in existence at the time of the challenge to the
ordinance as amended. Such a shift in the focus of the challenge
could be quite burdensome to a challenger because, though the
burden in establishing the invalidity of the unamended ordinance
may be slight, the burden in establishing the invalidity of an
amended ordinance may be great.4 6 Thus, if a developer-challenger
can be required, by virtue of a post-challenge amendment, to assume a heavy burden in establishing invalidity, such challenges
will clearly be discouraged.

47

43. For a discussion of the inconsistency between the legal basis for a
developer's challenge and his interest in particular land, see notes 31-41 and
accompanying text supra.
44. 459 Pa. at 224, 328 A.2d at 466.
45. See Hall v. Bealls, 396 U.S. 45 (1969) (amendment of voter residency
statute mooted appellants' case); note 36 and accompanying text supra.
46. For example, the original unamended ordinance may have been patently
invalid under Girsh Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970), because it made
no provision for apartments. See note 31 supra. A post-challenge amendment
might cure this patent de jure invalidity by amending the zoning ordinance
and zoning map to permit apartment development on particular land, other
than that of the challenger, within the municipality. But where it is arguable
that apartments could not, as a practical matter, be developed on the parcels
which have been rezoned for apartment development by the post-challenge
amendment, the challenger might assert that the ordinance as amended continued to be invalid because there was still a de facto prohibition of apartments. Alternatively, the challenger might argue that the amended ordinance
continued to be invalid because, though the amendment had cured the total
prohibition of apartments (which is invalid under Girsh), the amended ordinance still failed to provide a "fair share" of acreage for apartment development as required by Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 476 Pa. 182, 382 A.2d 105
(1977), and Township of Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 462 Pa. 445,
341 A.2d 466 (1975). See note 31 supra. Both the de facto prohibition and
lack of fair share contention are much more difficult to prove than the de jure
prohibition argument which could have been directed against the unamended
ordinance. See Benham v. Board of Supervisors, 22 Pa. Commw. Ct. 245, 349
A.2d 484 (1975).
47. Since, in Pennsylvania, only developers may challenge zoning ordi.
nances on exclusionary grounds, see notes 7 & 14 supra, to discourage developer.
challengers is to discourage all potential challengers.
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Judicial consideration of post-challenge amendments would
also encourage municipalities to maintain even patently invalid
zoning ordinances. Municipalities could wait to cure invalid ordinances until such time as they might be challenged by a developer.
At that time, after the filing of a challenge, the municipality could
amend its ordinance so as to eliminate any patent invalidity. Further, if municipalities regularly adopted post-challenge amendments which did not benefit the challenger, there would soon be
few, if any, developer challenges and thus no incentive for a
municipality to cure patently invalid ordinances by amendment.
This, then, was the problem faced by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in Casey.
B. The Legal Basis for the Pending Ordinance Doctrine in
Exclusionary Zoning Litigation
i. The Casey Decision
Though I have referred generally to the problem which the
supreme court faced in Casey,48 any analysis of the Casey pending ordinance doctrine must begin with a description of the particular facts underlying the decision.
In 1967, the Board of Supervisors of Warwick Township
(Board)49 entered into an agreement with a firm of planning and
development consultants under which the consulting firm was to
prepare a comprehensive land use plan for the township.5 0 In
September of 1969, the Board adopted the comprehensive plan after
deleting from it a section which provided for the development of
multi-family housing in the township. 5 On February 13, 1970,
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania handed down its opinion in
Girsh Appeal5 2 in which the court held that a zoning ordinance
which made no provision for apartments was unconstitutional.58
On April 11, 1970, Casey's predecessor in interest to the relevant
48. See text accompanying notes 42-47 supra.
49. The Board is the governing body of Warwick Township.

The MPC

defines a governing body as "the board of supervisors in townships of the
second class.... ."PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10107(10) (Purdon 1972). The
governing body "may enact, amend and repeal zoning ordinances to implement
comprehensive plans and to accomplish any of the purposes of [the MPC].'
Id. § 10601.
50. 459 Pa. at 223-25, 328 A.2d at 465-66.
51. Id. at 223, 328 A.2d at 465.
52. 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
53. Id. at 243, 263 A.2d at 398.
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property applied to the Board for authorization to introduce multifamily housing into the township 54 and, relying on Girsh, contended that the township's zoning ordinance, was invalid because
it did not provide for multifamily: dwellings.55
On the same date that the challenge to the township's ordinance
was commenced, the Board referred to the Township Planning
Commission, for its recommendation; a proposed amendment to the
zoning ordinance which -provided for multi-family housing. 6 The
amendment; however, did not rezone Casey's land to permit apartment development.5 7 Two days after the township's referral, the
Planning Commission submitted to'the Ba6rd a positive recommendation on the proposed amendment. 58 Public notice of this
proposed amendment ' was' made on May 1 and May 8, 1970, and
the amendment was adopted on May 25, 1970.59
The initial issue before the supreme court in Casey was
whether, in ruling upon the merits of.the challenge, it should consider the post-challenge amendment adopted on May 25, 1970.60
With respect to this issue, the supreme court held that Pennsylvania
coirts, in deciding the merits of a developer-initiated exclusionary
zoning challenge, must disregard a post-challenge amendment unless the Amendment had been publicly advertised prior to the
commencement of the challenge.6 1 The entirety of the court's
54. 459 Pa. at 223, 328 A.2d at 465. Since Casey's predecessor in interest
filed its challenge in 1970, the challenge was subject to the procedures set forth
in the original version of the MPC. Id. at 230 n.12, '328 A.2d at 469 n.12.
For a discussion of these procedures, see Krasnowiecki, supra note 7, at 1084-93.
In 1972, the MPC was amended to provide the alternative methods for instituting a 'challenge, now set forth in § 1004(1). See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53,

§ 11004(l) (Purdon 1972).

55. 459 Pa. at 223, 328 A.2d at 465-66. Casey's predecessor in interest also
challenged the township's ordinance on the ground that it required a two-acre
minimum lot-size for residential housing. Id., 328 A.2d at 466. However, because of its disposition of the Girsh-based contention, the supreme court did
not reach the minimum lot size contention. Id. at 231 n.17, 328 A.2d at 470

n.17....
56. Id. at 233, 328 A.2d at 466. The proposed amendment was based upon
the provisions in the consultant's comprehensive plan which the governing
body had previously rejected. Id.

57. Id. at 223-24, 328 A.2d at 466.
58. Id.

59. Id. at 224, 328 A.2d at 466.
60. Id. at 225, 328 A.2d at 466. The other two issues in Casey related to
the power of a court to grant site-specific relief and, assuming such power, the
circumstances in which site-specific relief was appropriate. Id, at 227, 230, 328

A.2d at 467, 469. For a brief discussion of these issues, see notes 23-26 and
accompanying text supra.

61. 459 Pa. at 226, 328 A.2d at 467. Although the reference in the text
focuses on whether "courts" must disregard post-challenge amendments, exclusionary challenges in Pennsylvania are initially commenced either before the
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rationale in support of this holding is set forth in the following
language:
The "pending ordinance doctrine" has been most
carefully defined in cases involving zoning modifications
vis-a-vis applications for building permits. It is well settled
in this Commonwealth that a building permit may be
refused if at the time of application for such permit there
is pending an amendment to a previously permissive zoning
ordinance which would prohibit the use of the land for
which such permit is sought. . . . When there has been
a "sufficient public declaration" of an intent to amend
the existing zoning ordinance, it is the pending amendment which governs the issuance of such permits ...
While the facts presented herein distinguish the instant
case from the typical "pending ordinance" case, in that
there existed no permissive zoning ordinance subsequently
amended to effectively deny the application for the build2
ing permit, the same approach will be followed.6
The Casey court then found that the amendment adopted on May
25 was not pending at the time of the developer's challenge since
the township had not "publicly advertised its intentions [to rezone]
prior to the filing of the [challenge]." 63 Therefore, the court concluded that the amendment should be ignored.64
zoning municipality's governing body or its zoning hearing board. See note 15
supra. Thus, the Casey pending ordinance doctrine mandates that not only
courts but also governing bodies and zoning hearing boards are to disregard
post-challenge amendments which have not been previously advertised. For
the sake of brevity, however, I will refer to the Casey pending ordinance doctrine as imposing a mandate upon Pennsylvania's "courts."
62. 459 Pa. at 225-26, 328 A.2d at 466-67 (citations omitted). This language is the only affirmative support which the Casey court advances in support of its adoption of the pending ordinance doctrine. Later in its opinion,
the Casey court rejected the argument that § 1009(2)(ii) of the MPC, since repealed, "would allow the [post-challenge] amendment to cure the constitutional
defect [in the unamended ordinance]." Id. at 227, 328 A.2d at 467. See Act
of July 31, 1968, Pub. L. No. 805, 1968 Pa. Laws 805 (repealed 1972). For a
discussion of the supreme court's analysis of § 1009(2)(ii), see notes 75 & 77-79
and accompanying text infra. In looking to see whether § 1009(2)(ii) provided
for consideration of a curative post-challenge amendment, the Casey court
seemed to assume that it had already set forth sufficient affirmative support
for the proposition that a post-challenge amendment must be disregarded and
that, in analyzing the applicability of § 1009(2)(ii), it was simply considering
whether the affirmative support was rebutted by a provision in the MPC which
allowed for judicial consideration of a post-challenge amendment. See 459
Pa. at 227, 229, 828 A.2d at 467-69.
63. 459 Pa. at 227, 328 A.2d at 467. This conclusion rested pivotally upon
the court's finding that the Board had not publicly advertised its intention to
adopt the amendment until three weeks after the initiation of the challenge
by Casey's predecessor in interest. Id.
64. Id.
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2. The Inadequacy of the Casey Rationale6
a. Reliance Upon the Pending Ordinance Doctrine
The holding in Casey that a court must disregard a previously
unadvertised post-challenge amendment is grounded entirely upon
the court's decision to apply the "approach" of the "pending ordinance doctrine" to the situation before it. The Casey court recognized that the pending ordinance doctrine was developed to deal
with circumstances totally dissimilar to those before it - i.e., "cases
involving zoning modifications vis-a-vis applications for building
permits." 66 In other words, the pending ordinance doctrine developed in the context of a situation in which 1) a landowner had
applied for a building permit; 2) his application was consistent
with existing zoning; but 3) his application was inconsistent with
a proposed amendment to the zoning ordinance. In this context,
Pennsylvania courts have articulated the "pending ordinance doctrine" which provides, as the supreme court stated in Casey, "that
a building permit may be refused if at the time of application for
such permit there is pending an amendment to a previously permissive zoning ordinance which would prohibit the use of the land for
which such permit is sought." 67 In Casey, however, the landowner had not applied for a permit which was consistent with the
zoning applicable to his land at the time of the application. 8 On
the contrary, the landowner sought to avoid compliance with the
zoning applicable to his land by obtaining judicial invalidation of
the municipality's zoning ordinance. 69 In spite of the fundamental
difference between the situation in which the pending ordinance
doctrine developed and the situation before the court in Casey,
the supreme court, though specifically recognizing this difference,70
applied the doctrine without reviewing the considerations which
gave rise to the development of the pending ordinance doctrine or
65. This analysis is an amplification of the views set forth in Hyson, supra
mote 7, at 30-31.
66. 459 Pa. at 225, 328 A.2d at 466.
67. Id., 328 A.2d at 467, citing Boron Oil Co. v. Kimple, 445 Pa. 328, 284
A.2d 744 (1971); Hertrick Appeal, 391 Pa. 148, 137 A.2d 310 (1958).
68. 459 Pa. at 230, 328 A.2d at 469.
69. Id. at 225-27, 328 A.2d at 465-66.
70. Id. at 226, 328 A.2d at 467. The Casey court stated explicitly that "the
facts presented herein distinguish the instant case from the typical 'pending
ordinance' case .... " I'd.
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determining whether the application of the doctrine to a different
7
situation would be consistent with those considerations. '
If the court in Casey had examined closely the difference between the typical situation in which the pending ordinance doctrine was developed and the situation before it, it is unlikely that
the supreme court would have reached the same result.7

2

In the

typical case, the pending ordinance doctrine prevents the establish3
ment of vested rights even before a zoning ordinance is amended.
Rather than serving to protect developers, the pending ordinance
doctrine, in the typical situation, is protective of a municipality's
power to amend its zoning ordinance by preventing development
of land which is inconsistent with a proposed amendment. 74 In
71. Althdugh recognizing the difference between the "typical" pending

ordinance case and the situation before it, see note 9 supra, the court in Casey

stated simply that "the same approach will be followed." 459 Pa. at 226, 328
A.2d at 467.
72. See Hyson, supra note 7, at 30-31.
173.
See id.

74. See id. . The accuracy of this statement might be questioned on the

ground that the typical situation in which the pending ordinance doctrine

developed actually consisted of two distinct situations, only one of which cor.

responds to the statement in the text. Specifically, the "typical" pending
ordinance situation is one in which a landowner's application for a building
permit has been denied because, even though the application was consistent
with the existing zoning at the time of the application, it was inconsistent with
a proposed amendment. If the landowner seeks judicial review of the denial
of the permit, the crucial issue will be whether the proposed amendment was
pending at the time of the landowner's application for a permit. Obviously
there are two possible outcomes in such an action: 1) the court may hold that
the proposed amendment was pending at the time of the permit application
and rely on the pending ordinance doctrine to uphold the denial of the permit
(assuming that the proposed amendment was subsequently enacted); or 2) the
court may hold that the proposed amendment was not pending at the time of
the permit application and, thus, overturn the denial of the permit and direct
that the permit be issued. Both of these situations are represented in the
decisions referred to by the Casey court. See 459 Pa. at 225-26, 328 A.2d at
467, eiting'Boron Oil Co. v. Kimple, 445 Pa. 327, 284 A.2d 744 (1971) (denial
of -permit upheld); Lhormer v. Bowen, 410 Pa. 508, 188 A.2d 747 (1963)
(issuance of permit ordered); Hertrick Appeal, 391 Pa. 148, 137 A.2d 310 (1958)
(issuance of permit ordered).
In the former situation, the application of the pending ordinance doctrine
protects the effectiveness of a municipality's power to amend. In the latter
situation, the court, in ordering the issuance of the permit, might be viewed
as relying upon the pending ordinance doctrine to undercut the effectiveness
of the subsequently enacted amendment. The usual rule, however, is that an
application for a permit is to be evaluated in light of the law in existence at
tle time of the application. See Lhormer v. Bowen, 410 Pa. 508, 188 A.2d
747 (1963); Shapiro v. Zoning Bd. of Adj.,. 377 Pa. 621, 105 A.2d 299 (1954).
The pending ordinance doctrine is a unique exception to that usual rule.
Thus, when a court orders that a permit issue in the second situation, the
court is not relying on the pending ordinance doctrine to justify such an order;
rather, the court is relying upon the usual rule and is implicitly holding that
the circumstances do not fall within the pending ordinance exception to that
rule. It is only in the first situation that the court, in upholding the denial
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the Casey situation, however, application of the pending ordinance
doctrine is destructive of the municipality's power to amend its
ordinance since, under the doctrine, courts must disregard a properly enacted zoning amendment. In. short, the decisions which
mandate application of the pending ordinance doctrine in the typical situation provide no support for the Casey court's holding.
b. Failure to Explain Judicial Power to Disregard a PostChallenge Amendment
The major flaw in the Casey opinion is that the court fails
to explain how a Pennsylvania court has the power to disregard
a properly enacted zoning amendment.7 5 Under section 601 of the
Municipalities Planning Code (MPC), the township in Casey had
the power to "enact, amend, and repeal" zoning ordinances.7 6 In
spite of this explicit grant of power, the court in Casey held that
a Pennsylvania court not only may, but must, disregard a postchallenge amendment unless previously advertised.
of a permit because of its inconsistency with a pending amendment, relies
upon the pending ordinance doctrine. The court in Casey recognizes this
point when, in its articulation of the pending ordinance doctrine, it states
that it is "well settled" that "a building permit may be refused if the application is inconsistent with a pending amendment." 459 Pa. at' 225, 382 A.2d
at 467 (emphasis added).
75. The Casey pending ordinance doctrine provides that a Pennsylvania
court has the obligation to disregard a previously advertised post-challenge
amendment. See note 9 and accompanying text supra. To say that a court
has such an obligation, however, presupposes that it has the power to carry out
the obligation. The Casey court made an oblique reference to the power
issue after discussing the stay provision of former § 1009 of the MPC. See PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11009 (Purdon 1968) (repealed). The court stated:
Future applicants must contend with the amended ordinance as it is
now written. However, we cannot allow a municipality to thwart a
valid challenge to its zoning ordinance by adopting a curative provision, which was not considered or advertised prior to the time of the
challenger's application. Therefore, we will not permit this provision
for multi-family housing, . . . , to deny appellee's rights.
459 Pa. at 229, 328 A.2d at 469. The Casey court, in stating that future applicants "must contend" with the ordinance as amended, seemed to recognize
that it must generally accept the validity of the amendment, so long as the
amendment did not "thwart a valid challenge" or "deny appellee's rights." Id.
But the court failed to explain what "rights" of the challenger would be
thwarted by consideration of the post-challenge amendment. The Casey court,
in other words, did not explain from whence it derived the power to disregard the post-challenge amendment.
76. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10601 (Purdon 1972) (emphasis added). Section
601 was not modified by amendments to the MPC in 1972 and 1978. It provides that "[t]he governing body of each municipality, in accordance with the
conditions and procedures set forth in this act, may enact, amend and, repeal
zoning ordinances to implement comprehensive plans and to accomplish any
of the purposes of this act." Id.
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Strange as it may seem, the Casey opinion does not refer to
section 601. This oversight occurred presumably because counsel
and the trial court had diverted the supreme court's attention away
from section 601 and directed it instead toward the then applicable
section 1009(2)(ii), 77 arguing that the latter section gave a municipality the power to adopt a post-challenge amendment which a
court must consider."' The Casey court's rejection of this argument
is persuasive
- but not dispositive. Even though section
77. Brief for Appellant at 19-25, Casey v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 459 Pa. 219,
See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11009(2) (Purdon 1968) (repealed 1972). Section 1109(2), which related to zoning appeals to a court from
a decision by a zoning hearing board, provided:
(2) Where the appeal involves a challenge to the validity of any ordinance or map the court shall have power to declare the ordinance,
map or any provisions thereof invalid and, in addition thereto, shall
have power to:
(i) enter judgment in favor of the landowner as provided in
section 802, or (ii) stay the effect of its judgment for a limited time to
give the local governing body an opportunity to modify or amend the
ordinance or map in accordance with the opinion of the court.
Id. At no point in its brief, however, did the township rely upon the general
power to amend contained in § 601. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10601 (Purdon
1972). A significant portion of the township's brief in Casey was devoted to
the argument that the post-challenge amendment was pending at the time of
the challenge. Brief for Appellant at 8-15, Casey v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 459
Pa. 219, 328 A.2d 464 (1974). This argument assumes, of course, the applicability of the pending ordinance doctrine to the Casey situation.
78. 459 Pa. at 227, 328 A.2d at 467-68. More specifically, the township
contended that the trial court was correct in holding that § 1009(2)(ii) permitted
the township to adopt an effective post-challenge amendment. Brief for Appellant at 19-25, Casey v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 459 Pa. 219, 328 A.2d 464 (1974).
See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11009(2) (Purdon 1968) (repealed 1972). The trial
court had reasoned that since § 1009(2)(ii) granted the municipality an "opportunity to cure the ordinance deficiency after judgment, a fortiori it may be
given the opportunity to cure the deficiency before judgment." 459 Pa. at 227,
328 A.2d at 468 (emphasis supplied by court). In other words, the trial court
had looked to § 1009(2)(ii) as support for the proposition that a municipality
could adopt a post-challenge amendment which must be given consideration by
a court. The township in Casey relied on this argument in seeking to reinstate
the trial court decision which had been overturned by the commonwealth court.
See Casey v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 8 Pa. Commw. Ct. 473, 303 A.2d 535 (1973),
aff'd, 459 Pa. 219, 328 A.2d 464 (1974).
79. 459 Pa. at 228-29, 328 A.2d at 468-69. The supreme court held that
§ 1009(2)(ii) was intended to deal with the situation where there had been a
judicial declaration that a municipality's zoning ordinance was invalid. id.
In the court's view, § 1009(2)(ii), in authorizing a court to "stay the effect" of
the declaration of invalidity (during which stay the municipality could amend
its zoning ordinance so as to cure the declared defect), was intended to "avoid
the chaotic situation which would arise if the municipality remained temporarily
unzoned." 459 Pa. at 229, 328 A.2d at 468. A "chaotic situation" would arise
because, in the absence of a § 1009(2)(ii) stay, landowners in the municipality
would not be subject to any zoning restrictions until such time as it adopted a
new zoning ordinance to replace the ordinance declared to be invalid. See
Davis v. Board of Supervisors, 32 Pa. Commw. Ct. 343, 379 A.2d 645 (1977).
The court in Casey stated that the "stay" provisions of § 1009(2)(ii) were intended to effectuate "a moratorium . . . upon the challenging of the zoning

328 A.2d 464 (1974).
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1009(2)(ii) might not have given a municipality the power to adopt
a post-challenge amendment, section 601 conferred upon municipalities the power to amend zoning ordinances 80 - a power that
ordinance and the application for building permits until an amended, constitutionally permissible ordinance would be enacted." 459 Pa. at 229, 328 A.2d
at 468-69.
Having thus identified the legislative intent with respect to § 1009(2)(ii),
the Casey court concluded that it was inapplicable in the situation in which
the municipality had already adopted a post-challenge amendment to its challenged zoning ordinance. Id. If the challenged ordinance were declared to
be invalid, as in Casey, the ordinance as modified by the post-challenge amendment would still be in existence and effective against landowners in the
municipality. Thus, the "chaotic situation" which § 1009(2)(ii) was designed
to eliminate would not arise. Id. However, in the majority's view, § 1009(2)(ii)
was not intended to require that a post-challenge amendment be considered
either in resolving the merits of a developer's challenge or in awarding relief
to the challenger. See id. Indeed, the court might have said, more simply,
that § 1009(2)(ii) afforded an opportunity to a municipality to adopt a new
zoning ordinance, effective against all landowners except the challenger, after
a declaration that a challenged ordinance was invalid, and furthermore, that
§ 1009(2)(ii) did not deal with the effectiveness of a zoning amendment which
was adopted subsequent to a challenge but prior to a declaration of invalidity.
80. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10601 (Purdon 1972). It might be argued
that § 601 could be interpreted as not authorizing a previously unadvertised
post-challenge amendment. The argument would be that § 601 authorizes only
amendments "to implement comprehensive plans and to accomplish any of the
purposes of this act;" see id., that previously unadvertised post-challenge
amendments are adopted for the purpose of frustrating the challenger; and
that previously unadvertised post-challenge amendments are thus not authorized
by § 601.
Assuming that this argument has merit, the fact remains that the supreme
court in Casey did not consider the impact of § 601 and that it is at least
arguable that § 601 empowers a municipality to adopt a previously unadvertised
post-challenge amendment. See note 77 supra; note 81 and accompanying text
infra. The argument that § 601 does not authorize such amendments is based
upon a less than obvious and fairly restrictive interpretation of that section. If
the court in Casey based its holding upon such an interpretation of § 601, one
would have expected the court to say so.
In any event, the argument that § 601 does not authorize the adoption of
previously unadvertised post-challenge amendments is faulty because there is
no basis for the assertion that such amendments are adopted in order to frustrate the challenger and not to implement a comprehensive plan and accomplish
any of the purposes of the MPC. The purpose which lies behind a particular
post-challenge amendment would seem to be a question of fact. See Comment,
The Doctrine of Special Legislation in Pennsylvania Zoning Law, 22 VILL. L.
While some post-challenge amendments may be
REv. 106, 119-20 (1977).
adopted for the purpose of frustrating the challenger, it is not difficult to conceive of a situation in which a municipality might adopt a post-challenge
amendment which did not benefit the challenger, because it believed in good
faith that the amendment best furthered the welfare of the municipality. For
example, if a landowner challenged the validity of a municipal ordinance under
Girsh Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970), see note 53 and accompanying
text supra, the municipality might, by way of post-challenge amendment, zone
land other than the challenger's for apartment development because of its belief
that such land was the best place for apartment development. In this situation,
can it be said that the purpose of such an amendment is to frustrate the challenger and not to "implement [a] comprehensive plan and . . . accomplish
any of the purposes of [the] act"?
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at least on its face includes the authority to adopt post-challenge
amendments. 8 1'
3. The Implicit Constitutional Basis for the Casey Pending
Ordinance Doctrine
a. The Necessity of a Constitutional Basis
Although the articulated basis for the Casey pending ordinance
doctrine is inadequate because of the supreme court's failure to
state a rationale in support of its conclusion that Pennsylvania
courts may disregard a properly enacted post-challenge amendment, 2 the decision could not have been reached without an
implicit determination that the .courts have such power. It is useful, therefore, to examine the possible unarticulated grounds for
asserting the existence of judicial power to disregard a postchallenge amendment in developer-initiated exclusionary zoning
litigation.
81. See note 80 supra. The rule applicable in most jurisdictions is that
"[t]he power of a municipal legislative body to amend the zoning regulations
is not suspended by the filing of legal proceedings to determine the validity of
a related ordinance." 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 2, § 4.29, at 243. Thus, in
those jurisdictions, the municipality may adopt a post-challenge amendment
which effectively moots a challenge to the unamended ordinance. See note 45
and accompanying text supra. This rule does not exist in Pennsylvania because of the unique Casey pending ordinance doctrine. See 4 R. ANDERSON,
supra, § 25.31, at 280-82.
The strength and general acceptance of this rule is reflected in the history
of the lengthy litigation in Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison,
72 N.J. 481, 371 A.2d 1192 (1977). The named plaintiff in Oakwood at Madison
was a developer who had an interest in particular land in Madison Township.
Id. at 492, 371 A.2d at 1196-97. Six low-income persons who resided outside of
Madison Township were joined as co-plaintiffs. Id., 371 A.2d at 1197. In
November of 1970, the plaintiffs filed a judicial challenge to the township's
zoning ordinance, which had been adopted two months previously. Id. at 491,
371 A.2d at 1196. This challenge was litigated all the way to the Supreme
Court of New Jersey. Id. In October of 1973, after oral argument before the
Supreme Court of New Jersey, the township adopted an amendment to its
zoning ordinance. Id. As a result, the supreme court "remanded the action
to the trial court for a trial and ruling on the ordinance as amended. .. ."
Id. at 492, 371 A.2d at 1196. The amendment in Oakwood at Madison was
adopted after almost three years of litigation directed to the unamended ordinance. Id. at 491, 371 A.2d at 1196. Yet, in spite of the challenger's substantial investments in the challenge to the unamended ordinance, the New Jersey
Supreme Court apparently assumed that the amendment mooted the challenge
to the unamended ordinance. Since the amendment apparently did not benefit
the challengers, they continued to challenge the township's amended ordinance.
Id. at 492, 371 A.2d at 1196. However there is no suggestion either that the
challengers had a right to continue with their challenge to the original ordinance or that the challengers contended that they had such a right. In short,
in Oakwood at Madison, the Casey pending ordinance doctrine was not even
mentioned.
82. See notes 75-81 and accompanying text supra.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1981

23

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [1981], Art. 2

1980-81]

THE IMPACT OF ACT

249

OF

1978

The court in Casey did. not suggest that there was statutory
support for its application of the pending ordinance doctrine to
developer-initiated exclusionary zoning challenges.8 3 The Pennsylvania Legislature could, of course, authorize judicial disregard
of post-challenge amendments by adopting legislation which limits
84
the power of a municipality to amend its zoning ordinance.
Specifically, the legislature could deny to a municipality the power
to adopt, after institution of a developer's challenge, a previously
unadvertised zoning amendment which would be effective against
the challenge. 85 But no such statutory provision was applicable
in Casey.
Similarly, the Casey court did not draw on precedent to.supports its holding. Instead, the supreme court relied implicitly upon
its notions of wisdom, and fairness so as not to "thwart a valid
challenge" or "deny appellee's rights." 80 However, a court may
not override the legislative decision to grant to municipalities the
power to amend its zoning ordinances 87 simply because the court
believes that the recognition of such power, in the context of a
developer-initiated exclusionary zoning challenge, is unwise or
unfair. To put it simply, the Casey pending ordinance doctrine is
not rendered valid merely because, in the opinion of the justices,
8
it is a good idea.
But to say that there is no valid statutory or common law basis
for the Casey pending ordinance doctrine is not to suggest that
there could not be some other valid legal justification for judicial
83. The Casey court did not mention § 601 of the MPC, see note 77
supra, which does not, in any event, provide support for the Casey pending
ordinance doctrine. See notes 80-81 supra. The Casey court did analyze
§ 1009(2)(ii) of the MPC. See notes 75 & 77-79 supra. However, the court
did not suggest that § 1009 (2)(ii) supported the proposition that a court may
disregard a post-challenge amendment; instead the court held that § 1009(2)(ii)
was not inconsistent with judicial power to disregard a post-challenge amendment. 459 Pa. at 229, 328 A.2d at 468-69.
84. Specifically, such a provision, if included in the MPC, would limit the
general power to amend conferred by § 601. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10601
(Purdon 1972); notes 75-81 and accompanying text supra.
85. Under the Casey doctrine, a post-challenge amendment is effective
against everyone except the challengers. See 459 Pa. at 229, 328 A.2d at 469.
As the supreme court noted, "[fluture applicants must contend with the
amended ordinance as it is now written." Id.
86. 459 Pa. at 229, 328 A.2d at 469. See note 75 supra.
87. The power to adopt and amend a zoning ordinance is part of a state's
inherent police power. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365,
387 (1926). In the absence of a state constitutional provision to the contrary,
the state may, by zoning enabling legislation, delegate the zoning 'power to
local governments. 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 2, § 2.19, at 58-59.
88. Indeed, my position is that the Casey pending ordinance doctrine is
ill-conceived. See notes 279-310 and accompanying text infra.
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disregard of a post-challenge amendment in exclusionary zoning
litigation. Though it might seem improper for a court to ignore
an amendment and focus on an ordinance which is no longer in
effect, the court might properly do so (and would be obligated to
do so) if it concluded that the post-challenge amendment to the
ordinance was itself unconstitutional and, therefore, ineffective.
The Casey situation is one in which a developer contends that the
ordinance in effect at the time of his challenge is unconstitutional.
Subsequent to the challenge, the municipality amends its ordinance
and thereby creates a new zoning ordinance for the municipality.
This subsequently enacted ordinance may, and should, be disregarded in resolving the initial constitutional challenge if the subsequently enacted ordinance is itself unconstitutional. Thus, if one
can devise a colorable ground for concluding that a previously unadvertised post-challenge amendment is unconstitutional, then one
can provide a legal basis for the Casey pending ordinance doctrine.
The conclusion that the only valid legal basis for the Casey
pending ordinance doctrine is a constitutional basis has important
implications. If the Casey pending ordinance doctrine has been
erected upon an implicit judicial holding that a previously unadvertised post-challenge amendment is unconstitutional, the doctrine cannot be overturned by the Pennsylvania Legislature. It is,
of course, axiomatic that a legislature cannot overturn a constitutional decision by a court.8 9
b. Possible Constitutional Bases for the Casey Doctrine
I believe that one can begin to formulate some constitutional
theories which might support the Casey doctrine by examining the
concerns which led to the development of the doctrine. 90 First,
there is a concern about the impact of a post-challenge amendment
upon the developer-challenger. If the post-challenge amendment
is considered in resolving the challenge, the challenger must shift
the challenge to the ordinance as amended, thereby losing whatever
time and effort has been expended in challenging the unamended
ordinance. 9 1 Second, there is a concern about the municipality's
motivation in adopting a post-challenge amendment. Has the municipality adopted the particular amendment following an objective
and dispassionate assessment of the public interest or is the amend89. E.g., Hetherington v. McHale, 10 Pa. Commw. Ct. 501, 510, 311 A.2d
162, 167 (1973), rev'd on other grounds, 458 Pa. 479, 329 A.2d 250 (1974).
90. See notes 42-47 and accompanying text supra.
91. See notes 44-47 and accompanying text supra.
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ment simply an attempt by the governing body to frustrate the
challenger? 92
Although these two concerns do not, in themselves, provide a
basis for adopting the Casey doctrine, 93 each suggests a constitutional analysis which might provide a proper legal foundation for
the doctrine. For example, the former concern invites an inquiry
into whether "vested rights" theory, though developed in a different
context, might be used to justify the Casey doctrine. 94 The latter
concern suggests that "special legislation" theory, also developed in
another context, might be used to justify the Casey doctrine9
i. A "Vested Rights" Basis for the Casey Doctrine
The vested rights doctrine has developed to protect good faith
expenditures in accordance with applicable zoning laws.96 In the
typical vested rights case, a landowner procures a permit and
expends certain sums for the purpose of developing his land in
accordance with existing zoning restrictions.9 7 Subsequent to these
expenditures, the municipality passes an amendment which rezones
the developer's land in such a way that his proposed development
is no longer an authorized use. If the developer has incurred good
98
faith expenditures in reliance upon the preamendment zoning,
92. See text following note 47 supra. See also notes 115-17 and accompanying text infra.
93. See note 88 and accompanying text supra.
94. For a description of the "vested rights" theory and the context in
which it developed, see notes 96-110 and accompanying text infra.
95. For a description of the "special legislation" theory and the context
in which it developed, see notes 111-20 and accompanying text infra.
96. For a thorough treatment of the vested rights doctrine, see Cunningham & Kremer, Vested Rights, Estoppel, and the Land Development Process,
29 HASTINGS L.J. 625 (1978). For a critical treatment of the development
of the vested rights doctrine in Pennsylvania, see Comment, Emerging from
the Confusion: Zoning and Vested Rights in Pennsylvania, 83 DICK. L. REV.
515 (1979).
97. See, e.g., Herskovits v. Irwin, 299 Pa. 155, 149 A. 195 (1930) (landowner engaged contractor and built foundation after obtaining building

permit).
98. There appears to be some disagreement among commentators over the
requirement of expenditures in vested rights cases in Pennsylvania. Compare
Comment, supra note 80, at 108 n.16 (finding that the requirement of good
faith expenditures exists) with R. RYAN, PENNSYLVANIA ZONING LAW AND PRACTicE § 8.2.3, at 5-7 (1970) (finding that it does not).

The problem springs from
the case of Gallagher v. Building Inspector, 432 Pa. 301, 247 A.2d 572 (1968).
In Gallagher, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held, in a context in which
there was no zoning amendment under consideration when a permit was issued, that a validly issued building permit cannot be revoked whether or not
expenditures have been made in reliance upon it. Id. at 304-07, 247 A.2d
at 573-74. However, the Gallagher court was faced with a situation in which
a zoning amendment was aimed directly at the landowner - a common special
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then constitutionally protected "property" rights, called "vested
rights," which cannot be destroyed by a subsequently adopted zoning- amendment, accrue to him. 9
The typical vested rights situation differs markedly from the
Casey situation. Use of a vested rights analysis in the Casey situation is awkward because the developer-challenger must argue for a
vested right to proceed with his challenge to the unamended ordinance. 10 0 The expenditures by the landowner in the'Casey situalegislation case. See Comment, supra, at 112-18. For a discussion of special
legislation, see notes 111-20 and accompanying text infra. Additionally, the
court in Gallagher relied heavily upon the decision in Shapiro v. Zoning Bd.
of Adj., 377 Pa. 621, 105 A.2d 299 (1954), the leading special legislation case
in Pennsylvania. 432 Pa. at 304-05, 247 A.2d at 573-74. See Comment, supra,
at 112. Subsequent cases have maintained the expenditure requirement. See,
e.g., Petrosky v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 485 Pa. 501, 402 A.2d 1385 (1979); Commonwealth Dept. of Environment Resources v. Flynn, 21 Pa. Commw. Ct. 264,
344 A.2d 720 (1975). It is unlikely, therefore, that the Gallagher case is controlling in the typical vested rights situation. See Comment, supra note 96,
at 517-19.
99. See Herskovits v. Irwin, 299 Pa. 155, 160-61, 149 A. 195, 197 (1930).
It has been noted that "[j]udicial reliance upon the vested rights doctrine ...
is unfortunately characterized by inconsistent application and confused ration[TJhe rationale applied by a particular court in [the typical vested
ales ....
rights situation] might be based on rigid concepts of private property rights,
theories of equitable estoppel, generalized prohibitions against retroactive application of new laws, or vague concepts of fairness." Cunningham & Kremer,
supra note 96, at 626.
I equate "vested rights" with "constitutionally protected 'property' rights"
because it is my view that the only valid conceptual basis for a vested right
is constitutional. See Herskovits v. Irwin, 299 Pa. at 160-61, 149 A. at 197.
In the typical vested rights situation, a court may hold that the landowner has
acquired a vested right to develop in accordance with prior zoning 'only if
it concludes that the application of the existing zoning would violate "property"
rights of the landowner protected by either the federal or state constitutions.
Non-constitutional conceptions of "fairness" are not, I believe, a sufficient conceptual basis upon which a court may grant an exemption from a zoning restriction. See id.; note 88 and accompanying text supra. But see Gallagher
v. Building Inspector, 432 Pa. 301, 304, 247 A.2d 572, 573 (1968) (permit issued
on basis of fairness).
100. See Colonial Park for Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 5
Pa. Commw. Ct. 594, 601, 290 A.2d 719, 723 (1972). In Colonial Park, a landowner contended that a municipality's zoning ordinance was unconstitutional
because it prohibited mobile home parks anywhere in the municipality., Id.
at 599, 290 A.2d at 719. After the filing of the landowner's challenge, New
Britain Borough adopted a new zoning ordinance which removed the prohibition against mobile home parks. Id. at 597, 290 A.2d at 721. The challenger
in Colonial Park contended that its challenge had to be resolved in light of
the ordinance in existence at the time it filed its challenge. Id. at 601-02,
290 A.2d at 723. The commonwealth court characterized the challenger's argument as follows: "Its contention, . . . is that it acquired a vested right in
an unconstitutional ordinance [in effect at the time it filed its challenge], of
which it might not be dispossessed by curative action of the Borough taken
subsequent to the filing of its action." Id. at 601, 290 A.2d at 723. Noting
that the challenger's substantive claim of invalidity was based upon very recent
judicial decisions, the court stated that "the challenger would have to make
out a case of extraordinary appeal to induce us to hold that a municipality
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tion are not made in accordance with the unamended zoning
ordinance; on the contrary, they are expenditures incurred in challenging the unamended ordinance. If a court were to conclude
that such expenditures established a constitutionally based "property" right to proceed with the challenge to the unamended ordinance, then there is, arguably, a constitutional basis for disregarding
a post-challenge amendment. 101
However, if vested rights theory is to be carried over and applied to developer-initiated zoning challenges, the components of
vested rights theory must also be recognized. In the typical situation, only good faith expenditures in accordance with existing
zoning will give rise to a vested right. 10 2 Expenditures incurred
with an awareness of an impending amendment would not be made
may keep apace of shifting and changing zoning principles only at the pain
of suffering unwanted uses sought by those seeking advantage of the latest
judicially discovered imperfection." Id. at 602, 290 A.2d at 723. In short,
the court held that it would not disregard the post-challenge amendment in
ruling upon the merits of the challenge. Id.
Writing prior to the supreme court's decision in Casey, Robert S. Ryan
commented favorably upon the Colonial Park decision: "[I]t is difficult to
argue that an owner has a 'right' to rely on the fact that a zoning ordinance
contains an invalid. provision, and ask that the Courts maintain that invalidity
[by disregarding a post-challenge amendment] so that he can take advantage
of it." R. RYAN, supra note 98, §8.2.7 (Supp. 1972), quoted in Brief for
Appellant at 18, Casey v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 459 Pa. 219, 328 A.2d 464
(1974).
Both the Colonial Park decision and the commentary by Mr. Ryan express
great difficulty in applying "vested right" concepts to the Casey situation. In
its brief to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Casey, the municipality relied
upon both Colonial Park and the Ryan commentary. Brief for Appellant at
15-19, Casey v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 459 Pa. 219, 328 A.2d 464 (1974). However, neither was mentioned in the majority opinion. Chief Justice Jones, in
his dissenting opinion, referred to Colonial Park. 459 Pa. at 232, 328 A.2d
at 470 (Jones, C.J., dissenting).
101. In recent decisions, the United States Supreme Court has suggested
that federal constitutional provisions which protect "property" are aimed at
providing a measure of security to "reasonable investment backed expectations."
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 100 S. Ct. 2035, 2041-42 (1980). See
also Agins v. City of Tiburon, 100 S. Ct. 2138, 2142 (1980); Penn Central
If "property" is
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 125 (1978).
construed to include "reasonable investment backed expectations," then it
might be argued that judicial consideration of a post-challenge amendment
would interfere with the developer's "property" interest in his challenge. The
Supreme Court has indicated, however, that the extent of the interference is
crucial in determining whether such expectations are unconstitutional deprivations of property. See, e.g., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438
U.S. at 130. It might be argued that, at some point, the amount of investment in a challenge becomes so great that the challenger has acquired a
'.property" right to proceed with the challenge - a right which may not con.
stitutionally be eliminated by judicial consideration of a post-challenge amendment. See notes 105-08 and accompanying text infra.
102. Penn Twp. v. Yecko Bros., 402 Pa. 386, 217 A.2d 171 (1966). See
generally Comment, supra note 96, at 525-26.
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in good faith. 03 By analogy, then, expenditures made in commencing and prosecuting a challenge after the challenger becomes
aware of an impending amendment should not be deemed to be
good faith expenditures. 1' 4
In addition, in the typical situation, the determination of
whether the landowner has secured a vested right will depend, at
least in part, upon the extent of the expenditures in accordance
with the preamendment zoning. 05 The greater the landowner's
expenditures, the more likely it is that a court will conclude that
the landowner has a vested right.0 6 Again, by analogy, the determination of whether a developer-challenger has acquired a vested
right to proceed with his challenge to the preamendment ordinance
would turn upon the extent of his investment in commencing and
prosecuting the challenge. Thus, a court should consider a postchallenge amendment if it is adopted within a short period of time
103. Penn Twp. v. Yecko Bros., 402 Pa. 386, 217 A.2d 171 (1966). If a
landowner seeks a building permit and his application is inconsistent with
a pending amendment which has been publicly advertised, then his application
may be denied under the pending ordinance doctrine. Lhormer v. Brown, 410
Pa. 508, 511, 188 A.2d 747, 487 (1963) (dictum). A denial precludes his development of a vested right because, in Pennsylvania, a vested right cannot be
asserted unless there is a validly issued permit. Dunlap Appeal, 370 Pa. 31,
87 A.2d 299 (1952).
Suppose, however, that a landowner seeks a building permit and his application is inconsistent with a pending amendment which has not been publicly advertised. For example, the landowner may be aware of contemplated
amendments to the zoning of his land which are being discussed by the municipality's planning commission but which have not yet been proposed to the
township's governing body. In this situation, the landowner may wish to
amendment,
contemplated
acquire, before the adoption of the with
have
as I right
zoning. aIf,vested
the existing
to develop his land in accordance
hypothesized, the contemplated amendment has not been publicly advertised
when the landowner files his application for a building permit, the landowner's
the permit,
But,
the pending
ordinance with
doctrine.
application may not be denied under
in accordance
expenditures
if the landowner proceeds to make
he will not acquire a vested right because his knowledge of the contemplated
amendment precludes a determination that such expenditures were made in
"good faith. " See A.J. Aberman, Inc. v. New Kensington, 377 Pa. 520, 105
A.2d 586 (1954). This analysis assumes, of course, that the contemplated
amendment is ultimately adopted.
104. Although it is not clear from the supreme court's statement of the
facts in Casey, it would appear that the challenger was aware, prior to the
filing of his challenge, that the municipality was contemplating an amendment
to its ordinance in order to comply with the then recently decided Girsh case.
Brief for Appellant at 8-19, Casey v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 459 Pa. 219, 328
A.2d 464 (1974). For a discussion of the Girsh case and its effect on the
Casey decision, see notes 52-53 & 55 and accompanying text supra. It is difficult, therefore, to view the challenger's expenditures as costs which he incurred in "good faith." See note 103 supra.
105. See Petrosky v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 485 Pa. 501, 510, 402 A.2d 1385,
1390 (1979). See also Comment, supra note 96, at 522-25.
106. Comment, supra note 96, at 522-25.
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after a developer has filed his challenge, but before the developer
has invested heavily in the challenge itself.107 Conversely, a court
should disregard a post-challenge amendment if it is adopted late
in the challenge process - for example, after the challenger has
litigated the challenge before a municipality's governing body or
zoning hearing board.1 08
This analysis suggests that the traditional vested rights doctrine
might be used by analogy to provide a constitutional basis for disregarding a post-challenge amendment in a situation where the
challenger has, before the adoption of the amendment, made a
substantial good faith investment in his challenge to the preamendment zoning ordinance. The Casey doctrine, however, goes beyond this fact sensitive analogy to traditional vested rights doctrine
by requiring that all previously unadvertised post-challenge amendments are to be disregarded irrespective of whether the challenger
has made a substantial good faith investment in his challenge to the
preamendment ordinance. 1 0 9 Thus, though traditional vested rights
theory might be used by analogy to support judicial disregard of
post-challenge amendments in some circumstances, 110 it cannot be
used to justify judicial disregard of post-challenge amendments in
all circumstances.
107. For example, if a landowner files a challenge and the municipality
adopts a proposed curative amendment within a few weeks of the filing of
the challenge, the landowner's investment in the challenge will most likely
be minimal. Application of vested rights principles by analogy would therefore preclude the landowner from acquiring a vested right to proceed with
his challenge to the unamended ordinance.
108. In Casey, the post-challenge amendment was not adopted until three
days after the township's zoning hearing board began hearings on the landowner's challenge to the unamended ordinance. 459 Pa. at 224, 328 A.2d at
466. The opinion in Casey, however, does not reveal whether the challenger
had incurred substantial expenditures in preparing for, and in participating
in, the board's hearings in the three days prior to the adoption of the aiendment. If such expenditures had been incurred, then, based upon the application by analogy of vested rights principles, it might be argued that the
challenger had acquired a vested right to proceed with his challenge to the
unamended ordinance. However, since traditional vested rights doctrine requires that expenditures be made in good faith, it is doubtful that any expenditures by the challenger in Casey would have satisfied the good faith
requirement.
By comparison, in Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison,
72 N.J. 481, 371 A.2d 1193 (1977), it would seem that the developer-challenger
had acquired a vested right to proceed with its challenge, since it had litigated
the challenge all the way to the Supreme Court of New Jersey. However, the
challenger in Oakwood at Madison apparently did not contend that its investment in the challenge warranted the acquisition of a vested right to proceed
with the challenge. See note 81 supra.
109. See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
110. For a discussion of the application of a vested rights theory to the

facts in Casey, see note 104 supra.
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ii. A "Special Legislation" Basis for the Casey Doctrine
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has developed the "special
legislation" doctrine "I to protect a landowner, who seeks to develop in accordance with applicable zoning, from a subsequently
enacted amendment adopted solely to frustrate the landowner's
proposed development.11 2 In the most common special legislation
situation, a landowner purchases land which is zoned to permit
high-density development."8 When it becomes known that the
landowner intends to develop his land in accordance with the highdensity zoning, there is public opposition to the proposed develop
ment and the municipality's governing body hastily enacts an
amendment which rezones the landowner's land to prohibit the
contemplated high-density development." 4 Pennsylvania courts
have invalidated such amendments as "special legislation" if the
amendment is "aimed directly" at preventing development on a
particular parcel of land." 5 The ground for invalidation in the
special legislation decisions is not the substantiality of a landowner's good faith investment in reliance upon particular zoning, 16
but the lack of a public welfare justification for the amendment." 7
The typical special legislation situation differs significantly
from the Casey situation. In a special legislation case, a landowner
desires to develop in a manner consistent with the zoning which
was applicable to his land prior to the "special legislation" amend299 (1954).
111. See Shapiro v. Zoning Bd. of Adj., 377 Pa. 621, 105 A.2d
The Shapiro case is considered to be the seminal decision on the special
legislation doctrine. See Comment, supra note 80, at 112. However, commentators are not in agreement with respect to the classification of cases arising
under Shapiro. Compare Comment, supra (special legislation) with R. RYAN,
supra note 98, §8.2.9, at 17-19 (abuse of legislative power) and Comment,
supra note 96, at 526-27 (requirement of good faith on part of municipality).
For a thorough and thoughtful analysis of the relationship of the special legislation doctrine to the vested rights and pending ordinance doctrines, see
Comment, supra note 80, at 112.
112. See, e.g., Commercial Properties, Inc. v. Peternel, 418 Pa. 304, 311, 211
A.2d 514, 518 (1965). See generally Comment, supra note 80, at 112.
113. See, e.g., Gallagher v. Building Inspector, 432 Pa. 301, 247 A.2d 572
(1968) (townhouses).
114. See id. (after neighbors complained, land was rezoned to exclude
townhouses).
115. Shapiro v. Zoning Bd. of Adj., 377 Pa. 621, 628, 105 A.2d 299, 302-03
(1954). See generally Comment, supra note 80.
116. On the other hand, this is the basis for invalidation and disregard of
the amendment under the vested rights doctrine. See notes 98-99 & 102-05
and accompanying text supra.
117. See Commercial Properties, Inc. v. Peternel, 418 Pa. 304, 312, 211
A.2d 514, 519 (1965) (amendment not enacted for health, safety, and general
or moral welfare of the community).
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ment. In the Casey situation, the landowner-challenger wishes to
develop in a way that is inconsistent with the zoning which is applicable to his land under either the preamendment ordinance or
the ordinance as amended by the. post-challenge amendment.
Nevertheless, the special legislation doctrine might be useful by
analogy in the Casey situation if it could be contended successfully
that post-challenge amendments ,are "aimed directly" at the challenger and thus have no public welfare justification.
, . There is, however, a difficulty in applying special legislation
theory to the Casey situation., An-amendment is invalid as "special
legislation" only if, on the particularfacts, it can be said that the
amendment was "aimed directly" at a particular landowner.1 18 It
cannot be said, in the Casey situation, that all post-challenge amendments are "aimed directly" at the challenger in, order to frustrate
his attack on the ordinance.
For example, one can easily imagine a situation in which, in
response to a developer's challenge, a governing body might 'conclude: 1) that a zoning ordinance violated Girsh because it did not
provide for apartments; 2) that the municipality should therefore
amend its zoning ordinance in order to provide for apartments; but
3) that it should not rezone so as to permit apartment development
on the challenger's, land because, in the governing body's view, the
challenger's land was not the most appropriate place f6r apartment
development. It may be apparent to any observer that the governing body did not wish to benefit the challenger. And it may even
be arguable that an objective assessment of the circumstances would
support the conclusion that the challenger's land was an appropriate place for apartment development. But these facts will not
support the finding which is necessary to invalidate the amendment under special legislation theory - that the only purpose of
the amendment was to frustrate the challenger. In order to establish that the sole purpose of the post-challenge amendment was to
frustrate him, a challenger would have to prove that not only was
his land an appropriate place for apartment development, but that
it was either the only appropriate place for such development or at
118. See note 115 and accompanying text supra. One commentator has

suggested that the 1972 amendments to Article X of the MPC made it more
difficult for a developer to prevail in a special legislation challenge to a zoning
amendment. Comment, supra note 80, at 123-29. A special legislation challenge to a zoning amendment must, in accordance with §§ 1001 & 1004(a) of
the MPC, be submitted either to the governing body or zoning hearing board.
Id. at 123. Neither body is likely to find that the amendment was "aimed
directly" at the challenger and, therefore, invalid as special legislation.
Id. at 124-26. For a discussion of the 1972 amendments to the MPC, see
notes 125-42 and accompanying text infra.
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least clearly more appropriate for apartment development than the
land rezoned by the post-challenge amendment. Only when armed
with such a demonstration could the challenger successfully contend
that there was no public welfare justification for the post-challenge
amendment. 1 9
In short, special legislation theory, like vested rights theory,
provides support for disregarding zoning amendments in particular
circumstances. The special legislation decisions might be used by
analogy to justify judicial disregard of a post-challenge amendment
when, from an evaluation of the particular circumstances, a court
finds that the amendment was enacted for the sole purpose of frustrating the challenger. But the Casey doctrine mandates that all
post-challenge amendments are to be disregarded - without judicial
inquiry into whether, in light of all the circumstances, the purpose
of the amendment was to frustrate the challenger. Therefore, while
special legislation theory might support judicial disregard of postchallenge amendments in some circumstances, it cannot be used to
justify judicial disregard of post-challenge amendments in all cir120
cumstances.
c. Conclusion
Although I believe that the only possible basis for the Casey
doctrine is a constitutional basis, 121 I am unable to imagine a constitutional theory which would support the doctrine as stated in the
Casey decision. I have, however, attempted to demonstrate that traditional Pennsylvania "vested rights" and "special legislation" doctrines might be judicially broadened to justify judicial disregard of
1 22
post-challenge amendments in some circumstances.
119. See Comment, supra note 80, at 112-18. This analysis is similar to
that applied to the question of whether a previously unadvertised post-challenge
amendment is authorized under § 601 of the MPC. See note 81 supra.
120. Special legislation theory would not support judicial disregard of the
post-challenge amendment in Casey itself. The Casey opinion reveals that the
post-challenge amendment was based upon a "Comprehensive Zoning Plan"
which had been prepared by a "firm of planning and development consultants."
459 Pa. at 223, 328 A.2d 465. The firm had formulated this plan and submitted it to the municipality's governing body months before the challenge was
initiated. Id. at 223-24, 328 A.2d at 465-66. The finn's plan called for rezoning for apartment use land other than that owned by the challenger. Id.
Since the post-challenge amendment in Casey was consistent with a professionally developed plan that had been prepared prior to the filing of the
challenge, it is difficult to conclude that the amendment was adopted solely
to frustrate the challenger.
121. See notes 82-120 and accompanying text supra.
122. I am not advocating judicial development of "vested rights" or "special legislation" doctrine in order to provide legal support (at least in part)
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Nevertheless, while the broad statement of the pending ordinance doctrine in Casey cannot be supported, the fact remains that
Casey does set forth a general requirement that, in developerinitiated exclusionary zoning litigation, all previously unadvertised
post-challenge amendments are to be disregarded. Furthermore,
because this requirement can only be explained as an implicit determination that all post-challenge amendments are unconstitutional, 123 the Casey doctrine cannot be set aside, or modified, by
the Pennsylvania Legislature. 12 4
C. The Casey Doctrine and the 1972 Amendments
to the MPC
In 1972, the Pennsylvania Legislature enacted extensive
amendments to the MPC, replacing the entire article relating to
appeal procedures. 25 In section 1004 of the new article (Article X),
the legislature established alternate procedures for landowner chal126
lenges to municipal zoning ordinances.
27
The commonwealth court, in Ellick v. Board of Supervisors,
attempted to provide a comprehensive explanation of the operation
of the landowner challenge procedures established by the 1972
amendments. 28 The Ellick case, however, did not present the
for disregarding post-challenge amendments in developer-initiated exclusionary
zoning challenges. A legislative solution is preferable. For a discussion of
possible legislative solutions to this problem, see notes 311-45 and accompanying text infra.
123. See notes 82-89 and accompanying text supra.
124. See note 89 and accompanying text supra.
125. Act of June 1,1972, Pub. L. No. 1972-93, 1972 Pa. Laws 333 (amending various sections of the MPC).
126. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11004 (1) (Purdon 1972). For an extensive
discussion of the appeals procedures contained in Article X of the 1972 amendments, see Krasnowiecki, supra note 7, at 1093-111. See also note 128 infra.
The 1972 amendments were not applicable to the Casey litigation because
they were adopted after the commencement of the Casey challenge. 459 Pa.
at 227 n.6, 328 A.2d at 467 n.6. The challenge in Casey was initiated on
April 11, 1970. Id. at 223, 328 A.2d at 465. The amendments were adopted
on June 1, 1972. See note 125 supra.
127. 17 Pa. Commw. Ct. 404, 333 A.2d 239 (1975).
128. See id. The 1972 amendments to the MPC made major changes
in Article X by consolidating, in that article, all of the procedures for "securing review of any ordinance, decision, determination or order of the governing body of the municipality, its agencies or officers adopted pursuant to
this act." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11001 (Purdon 1972). Article X sets up
separate procedures for "landowner" challenges, in which a person contests
the validity of restrictions applicable to his own land, and challenges by "persons aggrieved" by a use permitted on the land of another. See id. §§ 1100411005. For a comprehensive description and analysis of the Article X proEllick involved a
cedures, see Krasnowiecki, supra note 7, at 1093-111.
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court with an opportunity to consider the Casey issue.

The chal-

lenger in Ellick had filed his challenge under the curative amendment procedure authorized by the 1972 amendments, 129 contending

that the township unlawfully excluded townhouses. 130 Rather than
amend its ordinance in response to the challenge, the township denied relief on the ground that townhouses were allowed under the
ordinance.131 While the commonwealth court did find that town"landowner" challenge under § 1004 to the validity of a municipal ordinance.
See text accompanying note 129 infra. Section 1004(1) provides:
(1) A landowner who, on substantive grounds, desires to challenge
the validity of an ordinance or map or any provision thereof which
prohibits or restricts the use or development of land in which he has
an interest shall submit the challenge either:
(a) To the zoning hearing board for a report thereon under section 910 or 913.1; or
(b) To the governing body together with a request for a curative amendment under section 609.1.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 § 11004(1) (Purdon 1972).
Choosing the second of the two methods of challenge, the landowner in
Ellick submitted his challenge to the governing body together with a request
for a curative amendment. 17 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 406, 333 A.2d at 242. After
the request was denied, the challenger sought review in the appropriate court
of common pleas and ultimately in the commonwealth court. Id. at 407, 333
A.2d at 242.
The commonwealth court prefaced its discussion by noting that "[t]he
instant case is the first time this Court has dealt with a challenge to the validity of a zoning ordinance pursuant to section 1004(l)(b) of the MPC, as
amended in 1972 .... ." Id. at 408, 333 A.2d at 242 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). The court remarked further that "[b]ecause the 1972 amendments are somewhat complex, and we notice an increasing number of appeals
related thereto, we believe it will be helpful to all concerned to set forth
some guidelines to aid in the disposition of the type of case now facing us."
Id. at 409, 333 A.2d at 243.
For a discussion of the § 1004(1) landowner challenge procedures, see
Henszey & Novak, supra note 15, at 189.
129. 17 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 411, 333 A.2d at 244. Specifically, the challenger in Ellick elected to proceed under § 1004(l)(b) by submitting his
challenge to the governing body together with a request for a curative amendment under § 609.1. See note. 128 supra. Section 609.1 provides a procedure
to be followed when there is a request for a curative amendment under § 1004
(1)(b). See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10609.1 (Purdon 1972). Among other
things, § 609.1 provides that a challenger proceeding under § 1004(l)(b) "may
submit a curative amendment to the governing body." Id. In short, the
landowner who chooses the § 1004(l)(b) curative amendment procedure not
only challenges the validity of a municipal ordinance but may, and usually
will, submit a proposed amendment which cures the defect that underlies his
challenge. For a discussion of the use of the curative amendment procedure,
see generally Rosenzweig, supra note 15; note 128 supra.
130. 17 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 406, 333 A.2d at 242. The challenger argued
that the Worcester Township zoning ordinance violated the mandate of Girsh.
Id. at 407, 333 A.2d at 242, citing Girsh Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395
(1970). For a discussion of Girsh, see notes 52-53 and accompanying text
supra.
131. 17 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 407, 333 A.2d at 242. The challenger's proposal was "deemed to have been denied" due to the township's failure to act
upon it within the statutorily prescribed 30 days. Id. See note 133 infra.
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houses were excluded, 13 2 it was not faced with the necessity of
disregarding a post-challenge amendment in order to decide the
constitutionality of the original' ordinance. 13s Nonetheless, the
Ellick court recognized the possibility of a governing body adopting
a curative amendment different from the one proposed by the challenger.13 4 Though it disclaimed'making a decision on the issue, 18 5
the commonwealth court commented that the 1972 amendments
"do not . . . interfere with the governing body's power to amend
its zoning ordinance in a manner which the governing body believes will best further legally the public interest." 138 The court
further noted that governing bodies "may choose to cure the defect
by an amendment other than that -proposed by- the challenging
landowner," but cautioned that they "cannot adopt ... a curative
amendment [to] frustrate the challenging landowner ....," 137
Although Ellick was ambiguous with respect to the effect of
the 1972 amendments upon the Casey doctrine, 138 the issue was later
89 In Carr,
settled by the commonwealth court in Appeal of Carr.1
the intermediate court was faced with a previously unadvertised
post-challenge amendment and thus had to resolve the issue which
it had been able to avoid in Ellick. The court ruled that in considering a landowner's challenge under section 1004, a court must
40
disregard a previously unadvertised post-challenge amendment.1
132. 17 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 418-21, 333 A.2d at 247-49.
133. The Ellick court's comments ;about the effect of a post-challenge
amendment which does not benefit the challenger are dicta because there was
no post-challenge amendment. The governing body had failed to act on the
challenge and request for a curative amendment within, the 30-day period
prescribed by § 1004(4)(iii) and, therefore, the challenger's request "was deemed
to have been denied.". Id. at 407, 333 A.2d at 242. See note 131 supra; PA.
STAT. ANN. tit 53, § 11004(4)(iii) '(Purdon 1972).
134. 17 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 411, 333 A.2d at 244.
135. Id.
136. id.
137. Id.
138. If, as I have argued, the Casey doctrine is constitutionally based, see
notes 82-124 and accompanying text supra, the 1972 amendments to the MPG
could not overturn the doctrine. See note 89 and accompanying text supra.
139. 30 Pa. Commw. Ct. 342, 374 A.2d 735 (1977). Although Carr involved- a landowner validity challenge under § 1004 of the MPC, see note 128
supra, the challenge was not grounded upon alleged exclusionary zoning. Instead, the landowner in Carr, by way of a request for a curative amendment
under § 1004(l)(b), see id., challenged a municipal ordinance which limited
the expansion of a nonconforming use. 30 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 345, 374 A.2d
at 736. Nevertheless, the substantive basis of a challenge is irrelevant to the
question of what effect must be giveh',to a previously unadvertised postchallenge amendment.
140. 30 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 350, 374 A.2d at 739. The Carr court stated
that its holding was "required by the weight of existing authority, by fairness
to the landowner and by the practical consideration that the required appli-
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The Carr court grounded its conclusion on the Casey decision and
rejected the municipality's suggestion that the 1972 amendments
14
had overturned or modified the Casey doctrine. '
Thus, until the adoption of Act 249 of 1978,142 the Casey doctrine was a firmly entrenched part of the Pennsylvania procedure
for challenging exclusionary zoning ordinances.
IV. AcT 249 AND THE Casey DocrRINE
The overwhelming success of landowners' challenges to exclusionary zoning ordinances under the Casey pending ordinance doctrine 148 prompted Pennsylvania municipalities to seek legislative
modification of the Casey decision. 144 The Pennsylvania Legislature responded by adopting Act 249.' 45 I will now focus on the
extent to which the Act purports to overturn or modify the Casey
doctrine.1 46 Underpinning this discussion is the basic contention
of this article, that the Casey doctrine is constitutionally derived
cation of the governing body's amendment to the condemnor's proposal would
tend to introduce into the proceedings an ancillary suit over the validity of
the municipality's amendment." Id. The last basis for the court's holding is
particularly curious. The Carr court seems to be saying that, in order to
avoid "an ancillary suit over the validity of the municipality's [post-challenge]
amendment," it will simply treat the amendment as invalid - i.e., it will disregard it.
141. Id. at 350-52, 374 A.2d at 739. In both Ellick and Car', the commonwealth court was faced with landowner challenges submitted to a governing body in accordance with § 1004(l)(b). See notes 128 & 139 supra. In
this context, the Carr court held that a post-challenge amendment was to be
disregarded. See note 140 and accompanying text supra. Although neither
Ellick nor Carr involved a post-challenge amendment in the context of a challenge submitted to the zoning hearing board under § 1004(l)(a), the Casey
doctrine, adopted in Carr, would require that a post-challenge amendment in
this context should likewise be disregarded.
142. For a discussion of Act 249, see notes 6 : 23-24 and accompanying
text supra; notes 143-284 and accompanying text infra.
143. See notes 19-22 and accompanying text supra. The ease with which
developers can submit challenges under § 1004 of the MPC was viewed by one
commentator as contributing significantly to the success rate of developers in
exclusionary zoning cases. See Rosenzweig, supra note 15, at 44. He suggests
that the 1972 amendments to the MPC were intended to simplify the procedure for, and reduce the expense of, challenging municipal zoning ordinances. Id.
144. See R. RYAN, supra note 98, § 3.1.10, at 83-88 (Supp. 1979).
145. Id. See Act of Oct. 5, 1978, Pub. L. No. 249, 1978 Pa. Laws 1067
(codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 10101-11012 (Purdon Supp. 1980-81)
(amending various sections of the Pennsylvania Municipalities Code, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 53, §§ 10101-11012 (Purdon 1972 & Supp. 1980-81)).
146. The extent to which Act 249 overturns or modifies other aspects of
the Casey decision will not be considered. For a brief discussion of these issues, see note 23 supra.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1981

37

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [1981], Art. 2

1980-81]

THE IMPACT OF ACT

249

OF

1978

and, thus, may not be overturned by legislative action. 147 Therefore, to the extent that Act 249 attempts to overturn the Casey
doctrine, it is an unconstitutional attempt by the legislature to
48
negate a constitutional decision.1
A. The Section 609.2 "Self-Cure" Procedure and the
Casey Doctrine
The provision of Act 249 which appears most clearly to affect
the Casey doctrine is section 609.2, which creates a multi-step pro149
cedure by which a municipality may cure an invalid ordinance.
The first step in the procedure enables "[a] municipality, by formal
action" 150 to "declare its zoning ordinance or portions thereof substantially invalid and propose to prepare a curative amendment to
overcome such invalidity." 'l The second step of the procedure,
to take place within thirty days of the first, provides that a municipality shall "make specific findings setting forth the declared invalidity of the zoning ordinance" 152 and shall "[b]egin to prepare
and consider a curative amendment to the zoning ordinance to
correct the declared invalidity." 153 The final step of the procedure,
to be completed within 180 days from the date of the declaration
and proposal, provides that the municipality shall "enact a curative
amendment to ... its zoning ordinance pursuant to the provisions

required by section 609, to cure the declared invalidity of the zoning
ordinance." 154
The primary question, then, is the effect of this procedure and
any resulting curative amendment upon an exclusionary zoning
147.
148.
149.
150.

action."

See notes 82-124 and accompanying text supra.
Id.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10609.2 (Purdon Supp. 1980-81).
Id.
10609.2(1). The Act does not define what constitutes "formal

Presumably, the phrase refers to action which is the product of a

vote by the members of the governing body at a public meeting. Curiously, the
Act refers to formal action by a "municipality" rather than by a municipality's
"governing body." Id. Although the terms "governing body" and "municipality" are separately defined in the MPC, see id. §§ 10107(10) & 10107(13),
it would seem that the "formal action" contemplated by § 609.2(1) would have
to be action by a municipal governing body, since it is the governing body
which is empowered to "enact, amend and repeal zoning ordinances . . . to
accomplish any of the purposes of [the] act." Id. § 10601 (Purdon 1972).
151. Id. § 10609.2(1) (Purdon Supp. 1980-81).
152. Id. § 10609.2(1)(a).
153. Id. § 10609.2(1)(b).
154. Id. § 10609.2(2) (footnote omitted). Section 609, referred to in § 609.2
(2), describes the procedure for the enactment of a zoning ordinance amendment. See id. § 10609 (Purdon 1972).
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challenge which is filed prior to the initiation of the self-cure procedure. 155 The answer to this question lies in an examination of
subparagraph (3) of section 609.2.156
1.Section 609.2(3) and the Casey Doctrine

There are two sentences in subparagraph (3) of section
609.2.157 The first sentence defines the effect of the initiation of
the self-cure procedures upon the obligation of a governing body
or zoning hearing board 151 to consider challenges which are based

upon grounds similar to those specified by the municipality when
it initiated the self-cure procedures.15 9 The second sentence de155. For a discussion of this issue, see notes 157-214 and accompanying text
infra. For a discussion of the effect of the self-cure procedure on an exclusionary zoning challenge which is filed after the initiation of § 609.2 self-cure
procedure, see notes 215-22 and accompanying text infra.
156. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10609.2(3) (Purdon Supp. 1980-81) (footnotes
omitted). Section 609.2(3) provides:
Upon the initiation of the procedures set forth in subsection (1),
the governing body shall not be required to entertain or consider any
landowner's curative amendment filed under section 609.1 nor shall
the Zoning Hearing Board be required to give a report requested
under section 910 or 913.1 subsequent to the declaration and proposal
based upon the grounds identical to or substantially similar to those
specified in the resolution required by subsection (1)(a). Upon completion of the procedures as set forth in subsection (1) and (2) no
rights to a cure pursuant to the provisions of sections 609.1 and 1004
shall, from the date of the declaration and proposal, accrue to any
landowner on the basis of the substantive invalidity of the unamended
zoning ordinance for which there has been a curative amendment pursuant to this section.

Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. In referring to the obligations of the governing body or zoning
hearing board that arise upon the initiation of a self-cure procedure, § 609.2(3)
implicitly recognizes, and is consistent with, the alternate procedures for landowner validity challenges delineated in § 1004(1). Id. For a discussion of
the § 1004(1) procedures, see note 128 supra.
159. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10609.2(3) (Purdon Supp. 1980-81). The
"stay" authorized by the first sentence of § 609.2(3) is applicable only to challenges which are "based upon the grounds identical to or substantially similar
to those specified in the resolution required by subsection (1)(a)." Id. Thus,
for example, a municipal governing body, acting pursuant to § 609.2(l)(a),
might, by resolution, make a "specific finding" that its zoning ordinance is
invalid because it makes no provision for townhouses. See Camp Hill Dev.
Co. v. Zoning Bd.of Adj., 13 Pa. Commw. Ct. 519, 319 A.2d 197 (1974). Clearly,
this resolution authorizes the governing body or zoning board to stay or defer
consideration of a challenge which is based upon the ground, identical to that
specified in the resolution, that the municipality's ordinance is invalid because
it makes no provision for townhouses. However, the hypothesized resolution
does not authorize the governing body or zoning hearing board to stay, or
defer, consideration of any challenge based upon a ground totally different
from that specified in the resolution, such as a claim that the municipality's
zoning ordinance is invalid because of its minimum lot-size requirements. See
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fines the effect of completed self-cure procedures upon landowner
challenges.'"0
a. The First Sentence of Section 609.2(3)
The interpretation of section 609.2 (3) turns primarily on the
effect to be given to the last phrase in the sentence - the phrase
beginning with the word "subsequent." 161 Either of two inter16 2 If
pretations is possible and, as a matter of grammar, proper.
the "subsequent" phrase is viewed as modifying the infinitives "entertain or consider" and "give," then the initiation of the self-cure
procedures would relieve the governing body of the obligation to
"entertain or consider," subsequent to the initiation of the selfcure procedures, any application for a curative amendment, regardless of whether the challenge was commenced before or after
the initiation of self-cure proceedings. 163 Similarly, the initiation
of the self-cure procedures would relieve the zoning hearing board
National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Twp. Bd. of Adj., 419 Pa. 504, 215
A.2d 597 (1965).
But what is the effect of the hypothesized resolution upon a challenge
which concedes that the municipality's ordinance does not exclude townhouses
de jure, but contends that it excludes them de facto? See Benham v. Board
of Supervisors, 22 Pa. Commw. Ct. 245, 349 A.2d 484 (1975). Does a de facto
exclusion of use challenge rest upon grounds "substantially similar to" a de
jure resolution? See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10609.2(3) (Purdon Supp. 1980-81).
160. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10609.2(3) (Purdon Supp. 1980-81).
161. Id.
162. See Galbreath v. Northampton Twp. Bd. of Supervisors, 33 Bucks
County L. Rep. 363 (C.P. 1979), aff'd, - Pa. Commw. Ct. -, 423 A.2d 45
(1980). The analysis that follows in the text is similar to that employed by
Judge Bortner of the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County in Galbreath.
33 Bucks County L. Rep. at 366-67 & n.6. In Galbreath, judge Bortner was
faced with an appeal which required him to interpret § 609.2(3). Id. at 365-69.
After noting that "[t]he framers of new Section 609.2 have ... erected a monument to Ambiguity," id. at 366, Judge Botrner stated that either of two interpretations was possible and he doubted that "the solution to the problem
may be found in a book on grammer [sic]." Id. at 367 (footnote omitted).
Instead, judge Bortner, in a footnote, looked to the provisions of § 1104A of
the MPC for guidance in interpreting the first sentence of § 609.2(3) and
construed that provision to mean that "[t]he governing body shall not be required to entertain or consider any landowner's curative amendment filed
* * * subsequent to the advertisement." Id. at 367 n.6 (emphasis by the
court). The commonwealth court, in affirming the lower court's decision,
adopted Judge Bortner's reasoning. See - Pa. Commw. Ct. at -, 423 A.2d at
46-48.
163. See Galbreath v. Northampton Twp. Bd. of Supervisors, 33 Bucks
County L. Rep. 363, 366-67 & n.6 (C.P. 1979), afl'd, - Pa. Commw. Ct. -, 423
A.2d 45 (1980). See also PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10609.2(3) (Purdon Supp.
1980-81). The obligations of a municipal governing body with respect to an
application for a curative amendment are set forth in various provisions of
§ 1004. Id. § 11004 (Purdon 1972 & Supp. 1980-81). Under § 1004(2) (f), the
governing body must "hold a hearing upon the landowner's request [for a cura-
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of the obligation "to give a report" subsequent to the initiation of
the self-cure procedures with respect to any request for a report. 64
A different interpretation of section 609.2 (3) arises, however,
if the "subsequent" phrase is deemed to modify the participles
"filed" and "requested." 165 Under this interpretation, the initiation
of the self-cure procedures would relieve the governing body of any
obligation to "entertain or consider any landowner's curative amendment" filed subsequent to the initiation of the self-cure procedures. 166 Likewise, the initiation of the self-cure procedures would
relieve the zoning hearing board of any obligation "to give a report" requested subsequent to the initiation of the self-cure procedures. 167
Although either of these interpretations is grammatically
sound,1 68 neither affects the Casey doctrine issue. Under the first
interpretation, the initiation of the self-cure procedures has the
tive amendment] . . .not later than sixty days after the request is filed unless
the landowner requests or consents to an extension of time." Id. § 11004(2)(f)
(Purdon 1972). The same requirement exists under § 609.1. See id. § 609.1.
Section 1004(4) provides further that if a governing body fails to act on a
request for a curative amendment, the request is deemed to be denied as of
the thirtieth day after the close of the last hearing on the request. Id.
§ 11004(4). Such a deemed denial triggers the right to appeal to a court of
common pleas. Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code, Pub. L. No.
53-202, § 2(a) [1421] (Purdon Supp. 1980-81) (amending PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53,
§ 11004 (Purdon 1972 & Supp. 1980-81)).
The effect of the first sentence of § 609.2(3), therefore, is to stay the operation and effect of these time limitations. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. § 53,
§ 10609.2(3) (Purdon Supp. 1980-81).
164. See Galbreath v. Northampton Twp. Bd. of Supervisors, 33 Bucks
County L. Rep. 363, 366-67 & n.6 (1979), aff'd, - Pa. Commw. Ct. -, 423 A.2d
45 (1980). See also PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10609.2(3) (Purdon Supp. 1980-81).
The obligations of a zoning hearing board with respect to a § 910 request for
a report are set forth in various provisions of the MPC. Under § 1004(2)(f),
the board must hold a hearing on a § 910 request not later than 60 days after
the request is filed. Id. § 11004(2)(f) (Purdon 1972). Under § 908(9), if the
board does not render a decision on a § 910 request within 45 days after the
last hearing, the decision is deemed to have been rendered in favor of the
applicant. Id. § 10908(9) (Purdon Supp. 1980-81). The timely denial of a
§ 910 request triggers the right to appeal to a court of common pleas. Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code, Pub. L. No. 53-202, § 2(a) [1421)
(Purdon Supp. 1980-81) (amending PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11004 (Purdon
1972 SeSupp. 1980-81)).
The effect of the first sentence of § 609.2(3), then, is to stay the operation
and effect of these time limitations. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10609.2(3)
(Purdon Supp. 1980-81).
165. See Galbreath v. Northampton Twp. Bd. of Supervisors, 33 Bucks
County L. Rep. 363, 367 & n.6 (1979), afl'd, - Pa. Commw. Ct. -, 423 A.2d 45

(1980).

166. See id.
167. See id.
168. See note 162 and accompanying text supra.
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effect of authorizing the governing body and the zoning hearing
board to delay considerationof any pre-existing challenges, but does
not, however, address the question of the effect of a self-cure curative amendment upon the resolution of a challenge which predates
the initiation of the self-cure procedures. Even if section 609.2 (3)
is interpreted as authorizing a delay in the consideration of challenges which predate the self-cure procedures, it could still be
argued that when such challenges are finally resolved, following the
completion of the self-cure procedures, they are to be resolved with
reference to the original ordinance. 16 9
The first sentence of section 609.2 (3), then, does not address
itself to the Casey doctrine issue. The issue is addressed, however,
by the second sentence.
b. The Second Sentence of Section 609.2(3)
The second sentence of section 609.2 (3), less complex than the
first, limits the accrual of "rights to a cure" by providing that no
such rights are to accrue "from the date of the declaration and proposal." 170 This language leaves open the possibility that rights to
169. I do not mean to suggest that this approach is logical. Specifically,
it is difficult to imagine why the Pennsylvania Legislature would provide in
the first sentence of § 609.2(3) that the initiation of the self-cure procedures
stays the obligation to consider a pre-declaration challenge until such time as
the municipality adopts a self-cure amendment; and then provide in the second sentence that the self-cure amendment was to be disregarded in resolving
the merits of the pre-declaration challenge. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53,
§ 10609.2(3) (Purdon Supp. 1980-81). The first and second sentences of
§ 609.2(3) should be interpreted in such a way that the two sentences, considered together, set forth an approach which makes sense. My point is
simply that the first sentence, considered by itself, does not address the Casey
doctrine issue. I will suggest an interpretation of the two sentences of
§ 609.2(3) after I have examined the language of the second sentence. See
notes 170-241 and accompanying text infra.
170. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10609.2(3) (Purdon Supp. 1980-81). Section
609.2(3) provides in relevant part that upon completion of the self-cure procedures, "no rights to a cure pursuant to the provisions of §§ 609.1 and 1004
shall, from the date of the declaration and proposal, accrue to any landowner
on the basis of the substantive invalidity of the unamended zoning ordinance
for which there has been a curative amendment pursuant to this section." Id.
(emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). Due to the specific reference to § 609.1,
it might be argued that, irrespective of whether the second sentence of
§ 609.2(3) affects challenges filed prior to the initiation of the § 609.2 self-cure
procedure, § 609.2(3) has no impact on "rights to a cure" sought by a request
for a report from a zoning hearing board. This argument is grounded upon
a close interpretation of the second sentence of § 609.2(3) which reads that
sentence as limiting "rights to a cure" only insofar as such rights are sought,
pursuant to §§ 609.1 and 1004, by a request to a governing body for a curative
amendment. See id. Under this reading, rights to a cure sought pursuant
to §§ 910 and 1004 are not limited by the second sentence of § 609.2(3).
This argument finds support in the language of the second sentence of
§ 609.2(3), since the legislature did choose to refer to § 609.1, and not § 910.
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a cure can accrue prior to the date of the declaration and proposal.
The only apparent circumstance in which a pre-declaration right
might accrue is when there has been a pre-declaration challenge.
In that situation, the rights that would accrue would be those based
upon the invalidity of the pre-declaration zoning ordinance. Thus,
there is nothing in the second sentence of section 609.2 (3) which
purports to contradict or overturn the Casey doctrine by denying
to a pre-declaration challenger the right to have his challenge assessed against the ordinance which was in existence at the time he
filed his challenge.
In his treatise on the law of zoning in Pennsylvania,"' Robert
S. Ryan takes a contrary position with respect to the interpretation
of section 609.2 (3).172 Mr. Ryan addresses the issue of whether a
landowner, who has filed a challenge prior to the initiation of section 609.2 self-cure procedures has a right to have the challenge
determined with respect to the ordinance in existence when the
challenge was filed. In resolving this issue, Mr. Ryan sets forth 173
However, it is difficult to conceive of why the legislature might decide to limit
rights to a cure sought by one method of challenge under § 1004 (a request to
a governing body for a curative amendment), and, at the same time, decide not
to limit those rights when sought by the second method of challenge under
§ 1004 (a request to a zoning hearing board for a report). For a general
description of the two § 1004 methods of challenge, see note 128 supra. I
would conclude, therefore, that the reference to § 609.1 in the second sentence
of § 609.2(3) was inadvertent and that the legislature intended in that sentence to limit rights to a cure pursuant to either method of challenge under

§ 1004.

171. R.

RYAN,

supra note 98.

172. Id. § 3.1.10, at 83-88 (Supp. 1979).
173. Id. at 85.

Mr. Ryan outlines the "landowner's argument" as follows:

The last sentence of § 609.2(3) provides that "no rights to a cure
pursuant to the provisions of sections 609.1 and 1004 shall, from
the date of the declaration and proposal, accrue to any landowner on
the basis of the substantive invalidity of the unamended zoning ordinance." Does this indicate an intent to preserve any rights which
had accrued prior to September 1, the "date of the declaration and
proposal" in the hypothetical? The landowner would urge: "(1) I
filed my challenge on August 1, when no curative amendment was
pending; (2) as of that date, I had a right to have my challenge decided
under the unamended ordinance and to have my project approved
if the challenge was upheld; (3) the municipality's declaration on September 1, came too late because my right had 'accrued' prior to September 1; (4) under the Casey decision and its progeny, the rezoning
of someone else's land cannot be used to defeat my application.
Id. Mr. Ryan's "landowner's argument" relies explicitly upon the authority
of Casey. Id. The "landowner's argument" advanced in this discussion, however, relies upon the precise language of the second sentence of § 609.2(3). For
a discussion of the latter "landowner's argument," see note 170 and accompanying text supra.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1981

43

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [1981], Art. 2

1980-81]

THE IMPACT OF ACT

249

OF

1978

and rejects 174 the "landowner's argument" advanced earlier in this
discussion. 176
Mr. Ryan's rejection of the landowner's argument is grounded
in large measure upon a perceived inconsistency between the landowner's argument and the "stay" provisions in the first sentence
of section 609.2 (3).176 In his view, the "stay" provisions "are not
limited to challenges filed after the date the municipality declares
its ordinance invalid," but are also applicable to challenges filed
before the initiation of the self-cure procedures. 177 If this were
the only possible interpretation of the "stay" provisions set forth
in the first sentence of section 609.2 (3), then Mr. Ryan's assertion
that the landowner's argument "would make no sense" is justifiable
for the reason he states.1 78 But Mr. Ryan's interpretation of the
174. R. RYAN, supra note 98, § 3.1.10, at 85 (Supp. 1979). Mr. Ryan asserts that
[tihe landowner's argument ought to fail, because it frustrates the
essential purpose of Code § 609.2. It seems clear from the first portions of § 609.2(3) that the governing body is not obligated to hear a
challenge while it is reviewing a curative amendment under the procedures established in that section and that a zoning board need not
make its report within the same period. These "stays" are not limited to challenges filed after the date the municipality declares its
ordinance invalid. It would make no sense for the Legislature to
have said "you need not hear the landowner's challenge while you
are reviewing your ordinance, but after you have cured your ordinance you must decide the challenge as though the ordinance had
not been cured." The problem can be eliminated by reading the
word "accrue" in § 609.2(3) as meaning "shall be available," expressing
the idea that "from and after the date of declaration and proposal"
no definitive relief can be granted to a landowner on the basis of the
invalidity of the unamended ordinance, so long as the municipality
cures its ordinance in a timely fashion under § 609.2. If this is done,
then § 602.(3) can be read, consistently, as applying to all challenges
which have not reached the stage where they had been decided by
the governing body or the zoning hearing board, as staying all such
proceedings during the 180-day "turn-around" period, and as denying
to the landowner challenging the ordinance the right to obtain definitive relief under his challenge unless the municipality fails to amend
its ordinance to cure its prior error. If § 609.2 is not read in this
fashion, then the section will have practical application only in the
relatively rare instance where a municipality anticipates a challenge
and manages to get its declaration of invalidity issued before the challenge is filed.
Id.
175. For a discussion of the landowner's argument, see note 170 and
accompanying text supra.
176. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10609.2(3) (Purdon Supp. 1980-81).
177. R. RYAN, supra note 98, § 3.1.10, at 85 (Supp. 1979).
178. Id. See note 174 supra. It would be illogical to interpret the first
sentence of § 609.2(3) as authorizing a stay in the consideration of a predeclaration challenge until such time as the municipality adopts a self-cure
amendment and, at the same time, to interpret the second sentence of § 609.2(3)
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"stay" provisions of section 609.2(3) is not the only reasonable interpretation which those provisions will bear. 7 9 The "stay" provisions can be interpreted as being applicable only to challenges
filed after the date the municipality declares its ordinance invalid. 80
If the "stay" provisions are interpreted in this way, the perceived
incongruity between the landowner's argument and the "stay" provisions disappears.' 5 '
If, contrary to Mr. Ryan's analysis, the "stay" provisions of
section 609.2 (3) are interpreted as restricted to challenges filed
after the initiation of the self-cure procedures, then the second sentence of section 609.2 (3) can be interpreted in a way that does not
do violence to its plain language. In order to eliminate the incongruity between the landowner's argument and his interpretation
of the "stay" provisions, 182 it is necessary for Mr. Ryan to read the
word "accrue" as meaning "shall be available." 183 Quite simply,
the word "accrue" does not mean "shall be available," but rather,
"to come into existence as an enforceable claim: vest as a right." 184
If the word "accrue" is given its normal meaning, then the second
sentence of section 609.2 (3), reads constructively that from the
date of declaration and proposal no rights to a cure shall "come
into existence" or "vest" in any landowner on the basis of the
substantive invalidity of the unamended ordinance. 1' 5 But, under
this construction, section 609.2(3) implicitly recognizes that rights
may come into existence or vest before the declaration and proposal.
In short, by according the word "accrue" its normal meaning, the
second sentence of section 609.2(3) does not deny to a pre-declaration challenger the right to have his challenge considered in light
as allowing such a self-cure amendment to be regarded in resolving the merits

of the pre-declaration challenge. See id.
179. See notes 149-70 and accompanying text supra.
180. See notes 163-64 and accompanying text supra.

181. In order to eliminate any inconsistency between the first and second
sentences of § 609.2(3), I believe that the first sentence should be interpreted
as authorizing a governing body or board to defer consideration of only those
challenges which are filed subsequent to the initiation of a declaration invoking the § 609.2 self-cure procedures. Id. Under this interpretation, the first
sentence of § 609.2(3) cannot be relied upon to defer consideration of predeclaration challenges. Id. Such challenges must be heard and resolved in
accordance with the time requirements previously described.

See notes 163-64

supra.
182. See notes 176-78 and accompanying text supra.
183. See R. RYAN, supra note 98, § 3.1.10, at 85 (Supp. 1979).
184. WEBSTER'S THiRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY

185. See

PA. STAT. ANN. tit.

13 (1976).

53, § 10609.2(3) (Purdon Supp. 1980-81).
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of the ordinance in effect at the time he filed his challenge and,
therefore, remains consonant with the Casey doctrine. 88
Mr. Ryan also bases his construction of section 609.2 (3) upon
his fear that the section, if interpreted differently, would then apply as a practical matter only "in the relatively rare instance where
a municipality anticipates a challenge and manages to get its declaration of invalidity issued before the challenge is filed." 187 Implicit
in this assertion is a policy judgment that section 609.2(3), construed in accordance with the landowner's argument, is not sound
legislation because it does not protect municipalities against a
challenger who races to file his challenge before the municipality
initiates the section 609.2 self-cure process. Whatever the merits of
such a policy judgment,'8 8 it is simply inconsistent with the plain
language of section 609.2 (3), which supports the landowner's
argument. 189
Furthermore, I question the accuracy of Mr. Ryan's assertion
that, if section 609.2 (3) is not interpreted as he suggests, it has an
insignificant practical effect. 190 If section 609.2 (3) is construed
as consistent with the landowner's argument, it still affords municipalities an advantage which they did not enjoy under pre-existing
law. Under section 609.2 (3), a simple declaration and proposal in
accordance with 609.2 (1) will operate to foreclose any further accrual of rights with respect to challenges directed to the unamended
ordinance,"9 whereas under Casey, a municipality had to advertise
186. Since the Pennsylvania Legislature may not overturn the constitutionally-based Casey doctrine, see notes 82-124 and accompanying text supra,
it follows that, if there are two interpretations of § 609.2(3) - one of which
is inconsistent with Casey and, therefore, unconstitutional; and the other is
consistent with Casey and, thus, constitutional - a court should construe
§ 609.2(3) in a way that preserves its constitutionality.
187. R. RYAN, supra note 98, § 3.1.10, at 86 (Supp. 1979).
188. Mr. Ryan is apparently concerned about the operation of § 609.2(3)
in the situation where a decision by the supreme court or commonwealth court
establishes a new basis for holding that a municipal ordinance is unconstitutionally exclusionary. Immediately after this decision, a developer might
challenge a municipal zoning ordinance before the municipality has had an
opportunity under § 609.2(1) to declare its own ordinance unconstitutional on
the ground that it is not in compliance with the requirements of the recent deci.
sion. I agree that a municipality in this circumstance should have a reasonable
time to amend its ordinance to comply with the requirements of the recent decision and that a developer-challenger should not be able to acquire a "right" to
challenge the existing, admittedly invalid, ordinance during this period of
time. See note 205 infra. This is, however, not the law as stated in the
second sentence of § 609.2(3). See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10609.2(3) (Purdon
Supp. 1980-81).
189. See text following note 170 supra.
190. See note 174 supra.
191. See note 170 and accompanying text supra.' This proposition assumes
the constitutionality of § 609.2(3) insofar as it shuts off any post-declaration
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publicly a specific proposed amendment in order to terminate the
accrual of rights as against the unamended ordinance. 192 Admittedly, as Mr. Ryan argues, a municipality must issue its section
609.2 (1) declaration of invalidity before a challenge is filed if it
wishes to cut off the accrual of rights as against the unamended
ordinance. 1 93 It is easier and faster, however, to issue a section
609.2 (1) declaration of invalidity than to advertise publicly a proposed amendment. 1 94 Thus, while section 609.2 (3) does not afford
accrual of rights with respect to challenges directed to the existing unamended
ordinance. But see notes 215-22 and accompanying text infra.
192. See note 61 and accompanying text supra.
193. R. RYAN, supra note 98, § 3.1.10, at 85 (Supp. 1979).
194. See note 61 and accompanying text supra. The process which culminates in the public announcement of a proposed amendment under Casey is
time-consuming. In order to come within the protection of the Casey pending
ordinance doctrine, a municipality's governing body must have "'resolved to
consider a particular scheme of rezoning and . . . advertised to the public
its intention to hold public hearings on the rezoning.'" 459 Pa. at 226, 328
A.2d at 467, quoting Boron Oil Co. v. Kimple, 445 Pa. 327, 331, 284 A.2d 744,
747 (1971). Such a resolution presumably must occur at a meeting of the
governing body and, in order for the resolution to relate to a "particular
scheme of rezoning," the meeting cannot take place until a proposed amendment has been drafted. The task of preparing a proposed amendment may
take some time. If, for example, a municipality's existing ordinance is invalid
because it fails to provide for apartment development as required by Girsh, see
notes 52-53 and accompanying text supra, any amendment remedying this defect would have to include textual provisions which describe in some detail
the circumstances in which apartment development would be permitted. In
addition, an amendment to the zoning map would be required in order to
indicate where the newly authorized apartment development would be permitted. The preparation of such provisions would require additional time.
Only when decisions had been made and the required documents had been
drafted could there be a "particular scheme of rezoning" which the governing
body could "resolve to adopt." Id.
However, before this "particular scheme of rezoning" can become "pending," the governing body must "advertise to the public its intention to hold
public hearings on the rezoning." Id. This advertisement requirement is
consistent with the procedure for the enactment of ordinance amendments set
forth in §§ 609, 610 Sc 107(18) of the MPC. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53,
§§ 10609, 10610 & 10107(18) (Purdon 1972). Section 609 requires "public notice" of a public hearing on a proposed amendment. Id. § 10609. Section
610 provides that "public notices of proposed zoning . . . amendments shall
include either the full text thereof, or a brief summary setting forth the principal provisions in reasonable detail." Id. § 10610. Section 107(18) defines
"public notice" as requiring, among other things, publication in a "newspaper
of general circulation in the municipality." Id. § 10107(18). In short, the
actions which trigger the Casey pending ordinance doctrine require considerable time as well as concerted effort.
In contrast, under § 609.2 a municipality is protected against challenges
to its defective ordinance as soon as it issues a declaration of invalidity under
§609.2(1). See notes 150-51 and accompanying text supra. It is not necessary, in order to issue a § 609.2(1) declaration, that the municipality have a
particular self-cure amendment in mind. Indeed, the various provisions of
§§ 609.2(1) and (2), which expressly impose no obligation upon the municipality
to enact a curative amendment until 180 days after the § 609.2(1) declaration
of invalidity, allow the municipality a better opportunity to forestall chal-
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municipalities as much protection as Mr. Ryan deems advisable,
it does provide them with a benefit that they did not previously
have.
Mr. Ryan's interpretation of section 609.2 (3) also does not
seem to comport with the certification requirement of section
1004 (2) (a) 95 and the related limitation upon judicial relief embodied in section 1011 (4).106 Under section 1004 (2) (a), a landowner who submits a challenge to either the governing body or
the zoning hearing board must include in his submission a certification that he is unaware of the municipality's resolution to consider a proposed scheme of zoning or of any inconsistency between
that scheme and his proposed use.19 7 Under section 1011 (4), judicial relief in an exclusionary zoning challenge is precluded unless
the court finds as a matter of fact that the landowner's certification
is "true and correct." 198
The provisions of sections 1004(2)(a) and 1011(4) are not
without ambiguity. 99 Their basic purpose, however, seems clear:
to deny site-specific relief to a landowner who, knowing that a
municipality is contemplating amendments to its zoning ordinances,
races to submit a challenge before the amendments are adopted or
advertised. There would be no purpose to these provisions if Mr.
Ryan's interpretation of section 609.2 (3) was accepted. Under his
interpretation, a municipality could effectively thwart the landowner's challenge by initiating the self-cure procedures after the
"racer" has filed his challenge and then adopting a self-cure amendment which did not benefit the challenger. 200 If the challenger
was dissatisfied with this result, he would have no right, under Mr.
Ryan's view of section 609.2 (3), to a determination of his chal20
lenge to the unamended ordinance. '
lenges to its existing ordinance than it has under the Casey doctrine. See

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 609.2(1)-(2) (Purdon Supp. 1980-81). For a discussion
of the § 609.2 self-cure procedure, see notes 149-54 and accompanying text
supra.
195. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11004(2)(a) (Purdon Supp. 1980-81).
196. id. § 11011(4).
197. Id. § 11004(2)(a).
198. Id. § 11011(4).
199. For a discussion of the ambiguity inherent in the interrelationship

between §§ 1004(2)(a) and 11011(4), see notes 242-84 and accompanying text
infra.
200. See R. RYAN, supra note 98, § 3.1.10, at 85 (Supp. 1979).
201. See Galbreath v. Northampton Twp. Bd. of Supervisors, 33 Bucks
County L. Rep. 363, 370 (C.P. 1979), aff'd, - Pa. Commw. Ct. -, 423 A.2d 45
(1980).
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Significantly, Mr. Ryan recognizes that "[ilt may be argued
that the new § 609.2 [as he interprets it] is itself unconstitutional.

' 20 2

His response to this argument is succinct:

[T]he decision of the Legislature to give the municipal
governing body a short time within which to correct its ordinance is not such a clog on the ability of a landowner to
challenge zoning ordinances as to itself transcend the
boundaries of constitutional law. This is particularly so
when one considers that under the terms of Code
§ 1004....

a landowner may initiate a challenge without

incurring the cost of developing the full plans necessary
for preliminary, tentative or final approval of his project,
and that the § 609.2 procedures must be invoked by the
municipality early in a proceeding, before larger legal
2 03
costs have been incurred.
It is difficult to comment upon Mr. Ryan's response to the
argument that section 609.2 is unconstitutional because the precise
constitutional basis for the argument is not set forth. Presumably,
the argument is that: 1) the Casey doctrine is a constitutionally
based doctrine; 2) the legislature may not, consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, overturn a judicially created doctrine
which is constitutionally based; 3) section 609.2 (3) is legislation
which purports to overturn the Casey doctrine; and 4) section
2 °4
609.2 (3) is therefore unconstitutional.
Assuming that this is the argument against the constitutionality of section 609.2 (3) which Mr. Ryan addresses, 20 5 he maintains
that even though a self-cure amendment enacted pursuant to section 609.2 may, in his view, moot a pre-declaration challenge to
the unamended ordinance, the impact upon the challenger is mini202. R. RYAN, supra note 98, § 3.1.10, at 86 (Supp. 1979).
203. Id.
204. For an expanded articulation of this argument, see notes 82-148 and
accompanying text supra, notes 220-22 and accompanying and following text
infra.
205. It may be, however, that the constitutional argument which Mr. Ryan
rejects is one of procedural due process. Basic to this argument would be the
assertion that the "short time" provided by § 609.2 within which a municipality
may correct its ordinance authorizes such a delay in the determination of a
developer's challenge that the delay itself constitutes a violation of due process.
See R. RYAN, supra note 98, § 3.1.10, at 86 (Supp. 1979). However, the major
impact of the § 609.2(3) procedure, as interpreted by Mr. Ryan, is substantive,
not procedural, because that section can be used, not merely to delay the
resolution of a pre-declaration challenge, but to quash a developer's right under
the Casey doctrine to have his pre-declaration challenge determined on the
basis of the ordinance in existence at the time he filed his challenge. See id.
at 85.
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mal because a section 1004 challenge can be initiated without significant cost and the section 609.2 self-cure procedures cannot
26
negate a challenge after substantial legal costs have been incurred.
These observations reflect a belief that the Casey doctrine is
grounded upon a judicial concern for protecting substantial good
faith expenditures in commencing and prosecuting a challenge what I have identified previously as "vested rights" concerns 207 and that the section 609.2 self-cure procedures do not violate the
208
Casey doctrine because they do not interfere with these concerns.
The Casey doctrine, however, is not based upon vested rights
considerations. 20 9 It requires, instead, that courts disregard a
post-challenge amendment irrespective of the extent of the chal210
lenger's investment in his challenge to the unamended ordinance.
Even accepting the correctness of Mr. Ryan's contention that the
section 609.2 procedures cannot negate a pre-declaration challenge
for which substantial legal costs have been incurred, 21 1 his assertion
implicitly concedes that the section 609.2 procedures can negate a
pre-declaration challenge for which substantial legal costs have not
been incurred. Such a result, however, is inconsistent with Casey.
In summary, then, the plain language of the second sentence of
section 609.2 (3) is consistent with the Casey doctrine because it
206. Id. at 86. Although Mr. Ryan is clearly correct in asserting that a
§ 1004 challenge can be initiated inexpensively, see id. at 85, his assertion
that "the 609.2 procedures [as he views them] must be invoked by the municipality early in a proceeding, before larger legal costs have been incurred," id.
at 86, is open to question. Mr. Ryan interprets the first sentence of § 609.2(3)
to authorize a delay in the consideration of a pre-declaration challenge and
the second sentence of § 609.2(3) to negate the right of a pre-declaration challenger to have his challenge resolved on the basis of the ordinance in existence
at the time he initiated his challenge. Id. See notes 172-94 and accompanying
text supra. Assuming the validity of this interpretation, there is nevertheless
no provision in § 609.2 which suggests that, if the § 609.2 procedures are to
have any effect upon a pre-declaration challenge, they "must be invoked by
the municipality early in a proceeding, before larger legal costs have been
incurred." See R. RYAN, supra note 98, § 3.1.10, at 86. On the contrary, under Mr. Ryan's view, a § 609.2 self-cure amendment could conceivably extinguish a pre-declaration challenge even if, prior to the initiation of the
§ 609.2 self-cure procedures, there had been extensive hearings on the challenge
before the governing body or zoning hearing board. For an opposing view
of the impact of § 609.2 self-cure procedures upon pre-declaration challenges,
see text following note 170 supra.
207. See notes 97-99 and accompanying text supra.
208, This argument assumes that the § 609.2 procedures, as interpreted by
Mr. Ryan, cannot be used to negate a pre-declaration challenge for which the
challenger has incurred substantial good faith expenditures. But see note
206 supra.
209. For a discussion of the applicability of the vested rights theory to
Casey, see notes 96-110 and accompanying text supra.
210. See note 61 and accompanying text supra.
211. For a critical analysis of this position, see note 206 supra.
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does not negate the right of a pre-declaration challenger to have the
challenge determined on the basis of the ordinance which was in
existence at the time the challenge was filed. 21 2 Although the first
sentence of section 609.2 (3), considered by itself, could be interpreted in two ways,2 13 once it is determined that the second sentence of section 609.2 (3) contemplates that a pre-declaration
challenge will be decided on the basis of the ordinance in existence
at the time the challenge was filed, the only construction of the
first sentence which is consistent with that of the second is one
that authorizes a delay in the consideration of only those chal214
lenges initiated subsequent to a section 609.2 (1) declaration.
2. Section 609.2 and the Post-Declaration Challenge
Up to this point, discussion has focused upon the effect of

the section 609.2 self-cure procedures upon a challenge that is filed
before the initiation of the first step in that process - the declaration of invalidity by the municipality's governing body. 215 The
question of the impact of the section 609.2 self-cure procedures upon
a challenge filed after a declaration of validity remains to be considered.
Section 609.2 (3) provides that, upon the completion of the
three-step self-cure process, 216 "no rights to a cure . . . shall, from

the date of the declaration and proposal, accrue to any landowner
on the basis of the substantive invalidity of the unamended zoning
ordinance for which there has been a curative amendment pursuant to this section." 217 This language indicates quite clearly that,
once there has been a declaration and proposal, any "rights to a
cure" under the original unamended zoning ordinance are terminated, assuming of course that the self-cure process produces a
curative amendment to the original ordinance. 218 In other words,
a challenge filed after a section 609.2 (1) self-cure declaration is to
be adjudicated in light of the municipality's zoning ordinance as
amended by any curative amendment produced by the self-cure
process.
212. See note 186 and accompanying text supra.
213. See notes 161-69 and accompanying text supra.
214. See notes 179-94 and accompanying text supra.
215. See notes 155-214 and accompanying text supra.

216. For a description of the § 609.2 self-cure process, see notes 149-54 and
accompanying text supra.
217. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10609.2(3) (Purdon Supp. 1980-81) (emphasis added); note 156 supra.
218. Id.
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This reading of section 609.2 (3) contradicts the Casey doctrine.
Under Casey, a post-challenge amendment affects a challenge only
if there has been "sufficient public declaration" of the amendment
prior to the initiation of the challenge. 219 Section 609.2, on the
other hand, dispenses with the public advertisement requirement
of Casey and provides that a self-cure amendment affects a challenge
if the section 609.2(1) declaration has been made prior to the
initiation of the challenge.220 Since the Casey doctrine embodies an
implicit determination that a previously unadvertised post-challenge amendment is unconstitutional, 221 the doctrine cannot be
overturned by the legislature. 222 Thus, to the extent that section
609.2 purports to authorize consideration of post-challenge amendments which were not advertised prior to the challenge, section
609.2 is itself unconstitutional.
3. Section 609.2 as a Limitation Upon Municipal Authority Under
the Casey Doctrine
Thus far, the Casey doctrine and Act 249 have been discussed
from the perspective of a landowner-challenger. Using that perspective, I have argued that the Casey doctrine implicitly states that
a landowner-challenger has a constitutionally based right to have
his challenge decided without regard to any previously unadvertised
post-challenge amendment. 223 I have further contended that this
constitutionally based right of a developer-challenger cannot be
overturned by the Pennsylvania Legislature. 224 If, however, the
Casey doctrine is viewed from the perspective of a municipality,
it becomes evident that the doctrine upholds a municipality's authority to adopt an effective post-challenge amendment so long as
the post-challenge amendment is publicly advertised prior to the
initiation of a developer's challenge. 22 5 This authority is, like any
authority of a municipality, subject to modification or outright
219. See note 61 and accompanying text supra.
220. See notes 149-56 and accompanying text supra.
221. See note 123 and accompanying text supra.
222. See notes 89 8: 124 and accompanying text supra.
223. See notes 82-122 and accompanying text supra.
224. See notes 89 & 124 and accompanying text supra.
225. This limited municipal authority to adopt an effective post-challenge
amendment is upheld and not conferred by Casey. The source of a Pennsylvania municipality's authority to adopt zoning amendments is § 601 of the
MPC. See notes 49, 76 & 80 supra. Casey overrides this authority with respect
to post-challenge amendments except when such amendments have been advertised prior to the initiation of the challenge. Thus, in recognizing the effect
of such previously advertised post-challenge amendments, Casey simply upholds
(to a limited extent) the amendment power conferred by § 601.
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elimination by the state legislature. 226 I believe that section 609.2
modifies a Pennsylvania municipality's authority under the Casey
doctrine.
Under the Casey doctrine, if a municipality concluded that
its existing ordinance was exclusionary and contemplated a challenge to that ordinance in the near future by a particular developer, it had only to advertise publicly an amendment prior to the
developer's challenge to insure that the challenge would be measured
against the ordinance as amended, and not against the constitutionally vulnerable existing ordinance. 227 Moreover, Pennsylvania
courts did not limit the number of times that a municipality could
publicly advertise a proposed amendment in order to invoke the
benefits of the Casey doctrine against possible challengers.
In contrast, section 609.2 (4) 228 limits the frequency with which
a municipality may use the section 609.2 self-cure procedures by
providing that, once a municipality has used the section 609.2
process, it may not, except in limited circumstances, use the process
again within a thirty-six month period following the date on which
it enacts a curative amendment.2 29 This frequency limitation raises
a question with respect to the interrelationship of the section 609.2
self-cure process and a municipality's power under the Casey doctrine: may a municipality, after adopting a self-cure amendment
in accordance with section 609.2 procedures, thereafter take advantage of the Casey doctrine by publicly advertising a new amendment within the section 609.2 (4) waiting period?
Suppose, for example, that a municipality has an ordinance
which makes no provision for apartments and, therefore, is invalid under Girsh.2 0 The municipality invokes the procedures of
section 609.2 and ultimately adopts an amendment which authorizes
apartment uses and designates particular locations for such uses
on the municipality's zoning map. Shortly after the enactment of
this self-cure amendment and within the thirty-six month waiting
period of section 609.2 (4), the municipality learns that a particular
226. A state legislature may not, of course, modify or eliminate municipal
power which is constitutionally based - for example, municipal power under
a "home rule" provision in the state constitution.
227. See note 61 and accompanying text supra.
228. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10609.2(4) (Purdon Supp. 1980-81).

229. Id. Section 609.2(4) provides that the § 609.2 self-cure procedure may
be used again within the 36-month waiting period if "a substantially new duty

or obligation [is] imposed upon the municipality by virtue of a change in
statute or by virtue of a Pennsylvania Appellate Court decision." Id.
230. See 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970). For a discussion of Girsh, see
notes 52-53 and accompanying text supra.
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landowner believes that the amended ordinance is still exclusionary because, though there is no longer a de jure exclusion of apartments, the amended ordinance and zoning may still embody a de
facto exclusion of apartments. 231 The municipality then attempts
to invoke the benefits of the Casey doctrine by advertising a proposed amendment to remedy the defect before it can become the
basis for the anticipated challenge.
The basic question raised by this hypothetical is whether section 609.2 should be interpreted as setting forth the only circumstances in which a post-challenge amendment is to be considered
in ruling upon the merits of an exclusionary challenge. There are
a number of reasons for suggesting an affirmative answer to this
question. First, the continued recognition of municipal power under the Casey doctrine after use of section 609.2 self-cure procedures would undercut the thirty-six month waiting period
established by section 609.2 (4).232 If a municipality could invoke
the Casey self-cure process as often as it wished, the waiting period
provision of section 609.2 (4) would be rendered useless.
Second, the section 609.2 process reflects a legislative aware2
ness and treatment of problems which the Casey doctrine creates. 3
Under the Casey doctrine, it is not clear how long an advertised
amendment may be "pending" - that is, it is not clear how long
a municipality may "study" an advertised proposed amendment and
thereby preclude a challenger from acquiring "rights" under the
existing ordinance. 234 Similarly, it is unclear under the Casey doctrine how frequently a municipality may advertise proposed amendments and thereby preclude a challenger from acquiring "rights"
under the existing ordinance.2 35 Section 609.2 treats both these
231. For an explanation of the distinction between de jure and de facto
exclusions, see note 46 supra.
232. For a discussion of the waiting period provision of § 609.2(4), see
notes 228-29 and accompanying text supra.
233. See notes 42-47 and accompanying text supra.
234. Suppose, for example, that a municipality has a zoning ordinance
which is clearly invalid under Girsh because it makes no provision for apart.
ments. See notes 52-53 and accompanying text supra. May a municipality
protect itself against exclusionary zoning challenges by advertising a proposed
amendment which would cure this defect and then "studying" the proposed
amendment for months on end? Casey provides no answer to this question.
235. For example, fearing that it cannot "study" this proposed amendment
forever, see note 234 supra, the municipality decides not to adopt it but
simultaneously advertises a new proposed amendment which, if adopted, would
cure the Girsh defect. This process of advertisement followed by rejection and
simultaneous advertisement of a new proposed amendment might be carried
on indefinitely. Casey provides no guidance as to whether such dilatory tactics
are permissible.
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problems by requiring that any curative amendment under section
609.2 be enacted within 180 days of the section 609.2 (1) declaration of invalidity 236 and by imposing a three year moratorium on
reuse of the section 609.2 process. 23 7 The purpose of these solutions would be negated if section 609.2 were not the exclusive pro-

cedure for subjecting exclusionary challenges to post-challenge
amendments.
Third, the self-cure process of section 609.2 is buttressed by

the certification requirements of section 1004 (2).2 3

Even in the

absence of municipal invocation of the section 609.2 process, land-

owners challenging a municipal ordinance can obtain relief only if
they comply with the certification provisions of section 1004 (2).239
These requirements are designed to remedy the evil which gave
rise to the Casey doctrine - the race by a challenger to file his
challenge while the municipality is considering an amendment
which would not benefit him. Under Casey, such a challenger
would, of course, have his challenge evaluated against any subsequently adopted amendment only if the amendment had been
publicly advertised at the time of the challenge. The certification

requirement of section 1004 (2) goes further in protecting a municipality against the "racing" challenger. 240 Legislative enactment
of the certification requirement suggests that the legislature intended
that this requirement, together with the section 609.2 self-cure
procedure, would serve to protect a municipality against a racing
236. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10609.2(2) (Purdon Supp. 1980-81). For a
discussion of this provision, see note 154 and accompanying text supra.
237. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10609.2(4) (Purdon Supp. 1980-81). For a
discussion of this provision, see notes 228-29 & 232 and accompanying text supra.
238. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11004(2)(a) (Purdon Supp. 1980-81). For
an in-depth discussion of the certification requirements, see notes 242-57 and
accompanying text infra.
239. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11011(4) (Purdon Supp. 1980-81). Section 1011(4) of the MPC provides that "[n]o court shall grant or enforce relief
with respect to a substantive challenge without first making an affirmative
finding of fact that the landowner's certification required by section 1004(2)(a)
has in fact been made and is true and correct." Id. For a detailed discussion
of § 1011(4), see notes 258-67 and accompanying text infra.
240. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11004(2)(a) (Purdon Supp. 1980-81). The
certification requirement of § 1004(2)(a) provides greater protection to a
municipality than the Casey doctrine because, under this requirement, a
developer-challenger must certify that he does not know about "a particular
scheme of rezoning" including, but not limited to, an advertised proposal
amendment. For a discussion of the § 1004(2)(a) certification requirement, see
notes 242-57 and accompanying text infra. If the challenger fails to make
the § 1004(2)(a) certification or if the certification is not "true and correct,"
a court must deny relief to the challenger. See notes 252-58 and accompanying
text infra. For a discussion of § 1011(4), see notes 258-67 and accompanying
text infra.
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developer-challenger and that this protection would supersede the
municipal authority recognized under the Casey doctrine.
In short, while the state legislature may not override a developer-challenger's constitutionally based rights under Casey, the legislature may limit the municipal authority recognized in Casey. I
believe that the Pennsylvania Legislature intended to limit this authority when it enacted sections 602.2 and 1004 (2) (a). These sections reflect the legislative solution to the problem of the racing
developer-challenger and this solution supersedes the judicial solu241
tion fashioned in Casey.
B. Certification Under Section 1004(2Xa) and the
Casey Doctrine
1. The Certification Requirement of Section 1004(2Xa) and Its
Relationship to the Availability of Judicial Relief
Act 249 added a certification requirement to section 1004, the
MPC provision which sets forth the procedural requirements for
landowner challenges to the substantive validity of municipal zoning ordinances. 242 Section 1011 (4),243 another addition to the MPC
under the Act, links the availability of judicial relief to the certification requirement of section 1004 (2) (a). 244 In order to un241. See notes 233-40 and accompanying text supra. Section 609.2 may be
viewed as a limitation upon a municipality's power to amend under § 601.
See note 225 supra. Section 609.2 states, in effect, that a municipality may not
adopt an effective post-challenge amendment (at least insofar as the challenger
is concerned) unless the post-challenge amendment is a product of the § 609.2
self-cure procedures. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10609.2 (Purdon Supp.
1980-81).
242. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11004 (Purdon Supp. 1980-81). Section
1004(l) provides that a landowner challenge may be submitted to either the
zoning hearing board or to the governing body. Id. § 11004(1). A submission to either body is governed by the requirements of § 1004(2). Subsection
(a) of § 1004(2) requires that any submission under § 1004(1) shall include a
written request for a hearing containing "a short statement" of the grounds for
the challenge. Id. § 11004(2)(a). In turn this statement must
contain a certification that the landowner did not know at the time
of the application (i) that the municipality had resolved to consider
a particular scheme of rezoning by publication of notice of hearings
on a proposed comprehensive plan or proposed zoning ordinance or
otherwise, or (ii) that the scheme of rezoning would be inconsistent
with this landowner's proposed use; provided that the rezoning scheme
had reached sufficient particularity to disclose that, if adopted, it
would cure the defect in the zoning ordinance attacked by the substantive challenge.
Id. For a discussion of the § 1004 challenge procedures, see note 128 supra.
243. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11011(4) (Purdon Supp. 1980-81).
244. Id. Section 1011(4) provides that "[n]o court shall grant or enforce
relief with respect to a substantive challenge without first making an affirma-
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derstand the certification requirement and its relationship to the
provision of judicial relief, several ambiguities must be identified
and clarified.
a. The Nature of the Certification Requirement
A basic difficulty in interpreting section 1004 (2) (a) derives
from the legislature's choice to employ the disjunctive "or." Under this section, a challenger must certify that he was not aware
of the municipality's resolution "to consider a particular scheme of
rezoning" or of the inconsistency of that scheme with his proposed
use. 245 Presumably, the use of the disjunctive "or" means that a
certification would be inadequate if it failed to satisfy either of
246
these requirements.
The reason for the twofold certification requirement is unclear.
One might have expected a unitary certification requirement more
finely tuned to realize the apparent purpose of section 1004 (2) (a) to discourage racing challenges.2 47 But perhaps the twofold certification requirement reflects a legislative desire to guard against
the situation in which a landowner-challenger knows of the municipality's decision to consider a particular scheme of rezoning, but
attempts to maintain a state of blissful ignorance with respect to
the precise nature of that scheme. In such a case, the challenger
would be able to satisfy a unitary certification requirement 248 because he could certify honestly that he was unaware that the particular rezoning scheme would be inconsistent with his proposed
use.2 49

The challenger could not, however, satisfy the twofold

certification requirement of section 1004 (2) (a).
tive finding of fact that the landowner's certification required by section
1004(2)(a) has in fact been made and is true and correct." Id.
245. Id. § 11004(2)(a).
246. For example, at the time of his challenge a landowner might know
that the municipality had resolved to consider a "particular scheme of rezoning" but might not know that "the scheme of rezoning would be inconsistent with [his] use." A certification consistent with this state of knowledge
would satisfy the second part of the § 1004(2)(a) certification requirement but
not the first. See id.
247. Section 1004(2)(a) might, for example, have set forth the following
unitary certification requirement:
[s]uch statement shall contain a certification that the landowner did
not know at the time of the application that the municipality had
resolved to consider a particular scheme of rezoning, by publication
of notice of hearings on a proposed comprehensive plan or proposed
zoning ordinance or otherwise, which would be inconsistent with the
landowner's use.
248. For an example of a unitary requirement, see note 247 supra.
249. As a practical matter, however, it is difficult to envision a challenger
being aware of a "particularscheme of rezoning" without knowing whether
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There is additional ambiguity in the language of section
1004 (2)(a) which requires the challenger to affirm his ignorance
of a municipality's resolution to consider a specific rezoning scheme
"by publication of notice of hearings . . . or otherwise." 250

Al-

though the meaning of the first part of the italicized phrase is clear,
the meaning of the words "or otherwise" is not. For example, if
the challenger knew at the time of filing his challenge that the
members of the governing body had stated at a public hearing that
they would soon be proposing amendments to the municipality's
zoning ordinance which would cure a constitutional defect in the
existing ordinance, would such statements sufficiently indicate that
"the municipality had resolved to consider a particular scheme of
rezoning" by a means that fits within the "or otherwise" language? 251
b. The Effect of a Challenger's Failure to Meet the Certification
Requirement
Section 1004 (2) (a) provides that a request (i.e., a challenge)
to the zoning hearing board or governing body shall contain a statement of the basis for the challenge and that such statement shall
contain the certification previously discussed. 25 2 What is the consequence if a challenge fails to contain the certification required by
section 1004 (2) (a)?
It could be argued that, if a challenge fails to contain a section
1004 (2) (a) certification, the challenge is defective and therefore
may not be considered by the body to which it was submitted. This
argument is supported by a number of commonwealth court decisions which have held that a section 1004 challenge is defective, and
therefore may not be considered by the body to which it was submitted, if the challenge does not include the plans required by
253
section 1004 (2) (C).

"that scheme of rezoning was inconsistent with the landowner's proposed use."
See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11004(2)(a) (Purdon Supp. 1980-81).
250. Id. (emphasis added).

251. For further discussion of the nature of the § 1004(2)(a) certification
requirement and its relation to the Casey doctrine, see notes 258-67 and accompanying text infra.
252. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53,

§ 11004(2)(a) (Purdon Supp. 1980-81).
253. Cf. Ralph W. Connelly, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 19 Pa. Commw.
Ct. 110, 115-16, 340 A.2d 597, 600 (1975) (failure to include plans and materials with challenge procedurally defective). But see Appeal of H & K Materials, Inc., 43 Pa. Commw. Ct. 320, 322-25, 403 A.2d 134, 135-36 (1975) (failure
to submit plans and materials to zoning board with challenge to ordinance in
violation of § 1004 of MPC should not preclude challenger from submitting
them to court on appeal where board made no objection to the omission during hearing and landowner testified in detail about proposed use).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol26/iss2/2

58

Hyson: The Impact of Act 249 of 1978 upon the Casey Pending Ordinance Do
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 26: p. 322

In the alternative, it could be argued that section 1011 (4)
describes the only consequence of a failure to include in a challenge the certification required by section 1004 (2) (a) - no grant
of judicial relief. 254 By prohibiting judicial relief where there is
no section 1004 (2) (a) certification, section 1011 (4) seems to presuppose that a challenge might properly reach the level of judicial
consideration even though the challenge did not include a section
1004(2) (a) certification. To put it another way, section 1011 (4)
seems to state that the consequence of a failure to make a section 1004 (2) (a) certification is not rejection of the challenge at the
outset on the ground of procedural defectiveness, but rather the
denial of judicial relief if and when the challenge receives judicial
review.
While the particular language of section 1011 (4) suggests the
second of the preceding arguments should prevail, such a result
is, of course, illogical. Why should a zoning hearing board or
governing body be required to hear a challenge which does not contain a section 1004 (2) (a) certification when it is clear that the
challenger may not ultimately obtain judicial relief? 255 The legislature could not have intended such an absurd result. The more
sensible approach would have been to provide: (1) that a challenge
which failed to include a section 1004 (2) (a) certification was procedurally defective and, therefore, was not to be considered by the
zoning hearing board or governing body; (2) that if a challenge did
include a section 1004 (2) (a) certification, it would be considered
by the municipal body to which it was submitted; but (3) that if
there was judicial review, judicial relief would be provided only if
the court could make an "affirmative finding" that the certification
was "true and correct." 258 While this approach may appear to
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11011(4) (Purdon Supp. 1980-81).
255. On its face, § 1011(4) has no effect upon the initial consideration of
a § 1004 challenge by either a zoning hearing board or a governing board or
a governing body. See id. Since it simply precludes a court from granting
or enforcing "relief" without first making a finding that the challenger's
§ 1004(2)(a) certification is "true and correct," § 1011 (4) is not activated until
there is judicial review of the § 1004 challenge. See id.
It is at least questionable whether the statutory interplay of §§ 1004(2)(a)
and 1011(4) is logical in a situation in which a § 1004(2)(a) certification is not
"true and correct." See id. In this circumstance, it would seem that the
zoning board or governing body could not decline to consider the challenge
if all the procedural requirements of § 1004 had been satisfied, even though
upon judicial review, a court could not under § 1011(4) grant or enforce relief
with respect to the challenge. See id. Does it make sense to have a zoning
hearing board or governing body consider the merits of a challenge in such
a situation?
256. See id. This approach could be implemented by deleting from
§ 1011(4) the phrase "has in fact been made." See id; note 244 supra.

254. See
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be the more logical one, it nevertheless is not consistent with the
language of section 1011 (4) because that language, by also prohibiting judicial relief in the absence of an affirmative finding that the
section 1004 (2) (a) certification "has in fact been made," implicitly
authorizes initial consideration of a challenge which fails to contain
the certification.

257

c. The Nature of the Affirmative Finding Required by
Section 1011(4)
Section 1011(4) permits the granting of judicial relief only
upon an affirmative finding that a certification "has in fact been
made" and "is true and correct." 25 There is no difficulty in understanding the nature of the factual inquiry on the issue of whether a
section 1004(2)(a) certification "has in fact been made." The court
simply examines the documents filed with the challenge to determine whether they include the appropriate certification. It is less
clear, however, how a court would determine whether a certification
is "true and correct."
In order for a court to determine whether a section 1004(2)(a)
certification "is true and correct," it must understand the nature of
the required certification. Since section 1004(2)(a) requires the
challenger to certify that he "did not know" certain matters at the
time the application was filed, 259 the logical inquiry to be made
under section 1011(4) would be whether the challenger's assertion
that he "did not know" certain matters "is true and correct." It
follows, therefore, that the court must investigate what the challenger knew at the time of the application, and not what the facts
actually were.

Cutting against the preceding analysis is the fact that section
1011(4) mandates that, prior to judicial relief, there be a determination that the section 1004(2)(a) certification was both "true"
and "correct." 200 An inquiry with respect to the "truth" of an
asserted state of knowledge makes sense; an inquiry with respect
to the "correctness" of an asserted state of knowledge does not. In
other words, a court may logically consider whether an asserted
state of knowledge was "true" - that is, whether the asserted state
of knowledge in a certification truthfully sets forth what a challenger knew at the time of the certification. But, how may a court
257. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11011(4) (Purdon Supp. 1980-81).
258. Id.
259. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11004(2)(a) (Purdon Supp. 1980-81).
260. Id. § 11011(4).
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determine whether an asserted state of knowledge is correct? It is
possible to talk about the "correctness" of the underlying facts with
respect to which a challenger asserts a particular state of knowledge. 261 For example, a court could logically ascertain whether
there was, in fact, a publication of notice of hearings on a proposed
comprehensive plan at the time of the certification. But is it
possible to talk about the "correctness" of the asserted state of
knowledge itself?
There are two possible solutions to this problem of statutory
construction. First, it could be argued that the proper inquiry
under section 1011(4) is the state of knowledge of the challenger
at the time of the section 1004(2)(a) certification. Under this argument, the word "correct" would be assigned the same meaning as
the word "true." The problem with this interpretation is that it
imbues the word "correct" with a meaning that is inconsistent with
its ordinary meaning 262 and ascribes to the legislative draftsmen
the fault of redundancy.
An alternative view suggests that the word "correct" be given
its ordinary meaning.26 3 In that case, the appropriate inquiry
under section 1011(4) would not be directed to the challenger's
state of knowledge, but instead to the existence of the real facts
underlying the challenger's asserted knowledge at the time of the
challenge. This interpretation, however, is inconsistent with the
language of section 1004(2)(a), which requires a certification that
the challenger "did not know" certain matters, rather than a certification that certain matters did not in fact exist.2 64 Although use
of the word "correct" seems out of place in referring to an inquiry
into the state of a challenger's knowledge, 65 I believe, nevertheless,
that such is the appropriate inquiry under section 1011(4) because
section 1004(2) expressly requires a certification as to what the
challenger knew at the time of the certification. 26 6 Thus, I conclude that the term "correct" is used both inappropriately and
redundantly.
If the inquiry under section 1011(4) is to be directed to the
state of the challenger's knowledge at the time of the certification,
261.

The word "correct" means "conforming to or agreeing with fact:

accurate." WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICIONARY 511 (1976).
262. See id.
263. See id.
264. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11004(2)(a) (Purdon Supp. 1980-81).
265. See note 262 and accompanying and following text supra.
266. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11004(2)(a) (Purdon Supp. 1980-81);
text accompanying note 264 supra.
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Pennsylvania courts will encounter several difficulties in undertaking such an investigation. For example, the courts must determine who has the burden of proof with respect to whether the
certification was "true." Moreover, it is not clear whether a municipality may introduce proof of what the underlying facts
actually were at the time of the certification for the purpose of
2 67
demonstrating what the challenger knew at that time.
2. The Impact of Sections 1 0 04( 2 Xa) and 1011(4) Upon the Casey
Doctrine
The preceding examination of the nature, operation, and
effect of sections 1004(2)(a) and 1011(4) indicates that, technically
speaking, neither section impacts the Casey doctrine because neither
purports to dictate when a post-challenge amendment is relevant
to the determination upon the merits of an exclusionary challenge.
However, this technical point ignores the practical impact of
1004(2)(a) and 1011(4) upon the Casey doctrine.
a. The Impact of Section 1004(2)(a) Upon the Casey Doctrine
Although the language of section 1004(2)(a) does not focus on
the relevance of a post-challenge amendment to an exclusionary
challenge, it may be viewed as precluding initial consideration of
an exclusionary challenge by either the zoning hearing board or
the governing body where the challenger has failed to make a section 1004(2)(a) certification.2 68 Thus, if the certification requirements of section 1004(2)(a) prohibit any consideration of a challenge
267. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). In Arlington Heights, the United States Supreme
Court held that municipal zoning action does not violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the fourteenth amendment "solely because it results in a racially
disproportionate impact." 429 U.S. at 265. Instead, "[p]roof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required." Id. The Supreme Court commented further that "[d]etermining whether invidious discriminatory purpose
was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial
and direct evidence of intent as may be available" and that "[t]he impact of
the official [zoning] action . . . may provide an important starting point."
Id. at 266. Thus, the Supreme Court held that discriminatory purpose or
intent was the test of invalidity under the Equal Protection Clause and that
discriminatory impact was evidence, though not determinative, of discriminatory purpose or intent. By analogy, although § 1004(2)(a) makes the applicant's
knowledge (and not the underlying facts) the subject of certification, it might
be appropriate in determining the truth of the certified state of knowledge
pursuant to § 1011(4) to consider the underlying facts. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
53, §§ 11004(2)(a) and 11011(4) (Purdon Supp. 1980-81).
268. For a discussion of the effect of a challenger's failure to make the

certification required under § 1004(2)(a), see notes 252.57 and accompanying
text supra.
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which would have been successful under the Casey doctrine, then
section 1004(2)(a) effectively limits the Casey doctrine. The impact
of section 1004(2)(a) upon the Casey doctrine is perhaps best understood by examining separately the operation of each in a hypothetical situation.
For example, suppose that a landowner challenged a zoning
ordinance on the ground that it made no provision for apartments
and thus was invalid under Girsh.269 At the time of the challenge,
the existing ordinance was clearly invalid under Girsh and the
municipality had not advertised a proposed amendment which
would cure this defect. However, when the challenge was commenced, the municipality's governing body had published a notice
of hearings on a proposed comprehensive plan which called for
apartment zoning in the municipality and the landowner knew of
this publication. After the challenge was filed, the municipality
amended its zoning ordinance and map to provide for apartment
development on land other than that owned by the challenger.
If the certification requirement of section 1004(2)(a) is applied
to this hypothetical situation, the landowner will not be able to
certify truthfully that he was unaware, at the time of the application, that the municipality had advertised a notice of hearing on a
proposed comprehensive plan. 270

Because of his inability to file

this certification, the landowner's challenge may be viewed as pro27 1
cedurally defective and, therefore, not deserving of consideration.
If, however, the Casey doctrine is applied to the hypothetical
situation, the landowner would not have to contend with the certification requirement and would be entitled to have his challenge
considered on the merits. 27 2 Since there had been no advertisement
of a proposed amendment prior to the challenge, the landowner
would have the right to have his challenge evaluated as against the
ordinance in existence on the date of his challenge. 273 Moreover,
since that ordinance is admittedly unconstitutional under Girsh,2 74
the challenger would prevail on the merits.
269. See 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).

For a discussion of Girsh, see

notes 52-53 and accompanying text supra.
270. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11004(2)(a) (Purdon Supp. 1980-81).
271. See text accompanying note 253 supra. But see text accompanying
note 254 supra.
272. For a discussion of the Casey doctrine, see notes 48-64 and accompanying text supra.
273. See note 62 and accompanying text supra.
274. See 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970). For a discussion of Girsh, see
notes 52-53 and accompanying text supra.
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Even though a favorable decision on the merits of the challenge does not insure that a challenger will obtain site-specific relief,275 there is a significant difference in the results obtained when
the certification requirement of section 1004(2)(a) and the Casey
doctrine are applied to the hypothetical situation. Under the
certification requirement of section 1004(2)(a), the landowner's challenge is not even considered. 276 However, if Casey holds that a
landowner-challenger has a constitutional right in the hypothetical
situation to have his challenge evaluated on the basis of the ordinance in existence at the time of the challenge, 277 then the
certification requirement of section 1004(2)(a), in purporting to
27 8
negate that right, is unconstitutional.
b. The Impact of Section 1011(4) Upon the Casey Doctrine
The impact of section 1011(4) upon the Casey doctrine is likewise best illustrated by using the hypothetical situation described
above 279 with one modification - the landowner did not know at
the time of his challenge that a proposed notice of hearings had been
published.
Under these circumstances, the challenger will be able to file
a valid section 1004(2)(a) certification. 28 0 Furthermore, if he files
the section 1004(2)(a) certification and satisfies the other procedural
28
requirements of section 1004, his challenge must be considered. '
But the question remains whether, under the Casey doctrine, the
challenge must be determined in light of the original ordinance
or the ordinance as later amended. Under the Casey doctrine, the
challenge must be determined as against the original ordinance because the amendment was not advertised at the time of the challenge.2 8 2 There is nothing in section 1011(4) which contradicts
this conclusion because the language of that section is silent on the
issue of whether a post-challenge amendment should be considered
275. The question of whether a successful developer-challenger should obtain site-specific relief is distinct from the Casey doctrine issue. See notes 9-12
and accompanying text supra.
276. See text accompanying note 271 supra.
277. For a discussion of vested rights and special legislation considerations
as possible bases for this constitutional right, see notes 94-124 and accompanying
text supra.
278. See notes 123-24 and accompanying text supra.
279. See text accompanying and following note 269 supra.
280. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11004(2)(a) (Purdon Supp, 1980-81);
note 242 supra.
281. See note 242 and accompanying text supra.
282. See note 62 and accompanying text supra.
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in ruling upon the merits of a challenge.2 83 Therefore, the Casey
doctrine stands unaffected by the provisions of section 1011(4).284
V.

SOME THOUGHTS ABOUT

POLICY: POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

PROBLEM OF POST-CHALLENGE AMENDMENTS
INITIATED EXCLUSIONARY

TO THE

IN DEVELOPER-

ZONING CHALLENGES

The analysis to this point has been primarily legal in character. I have sought to determine the legal basis for the Casey pending ordinance doctrine 28 and have interpreted Act 249 in order to
28
demonstrate the extent of its consistency with the Casey doctrine.
I wish now to focus upon policy. I will consider first whether
the Casey doctrine is good policy.2817 Second, I will suggest possible
legislative solutions to the problem of post-challenge amendments
in developer-initiated exclusionary zoning challenges.28 8 Finally, I
will set forth some institutional and practical considerations which,
in my opinion, make it unlikely that there will be an ideal solution
28 9
to the problem.
A. A Policy Analysis of the Casey Pending Ordinance Doctrine
Casey is a poor decision because it is grounded, in

primary

part, upon policy considerations rather than law. Throughout the
decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court focused upon the policy
implications of considering or disregarding post-challenge amendments and was particularly concerned about the extent to which
consideration of post-challenge amendments would deter the initiation of developer challenges.2 90 Though this deterrence factor is
a legitimate policy consideration for a legislature to take into ac283. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11011(4) (Purdon Supp. 1980-81).
284. See id. Although § 1011(4) has no impact on the Casey pending ordinance doctrine, it is nevertheless questionable whether the Pennsylvania legislature may constitutionally limit the circumstances in which a Pennsylvania
court may award site-specific relief once it has determined that a challenged
ordinance is unconstitutionally exclusionary. See note 23 supra.
285. See notes 48-124 and accompanying text supra.
286. See notes 143-284 and accompanying text supra.
287. See notes 290-310 and accompanying text infra.
288. See notes 311-45 and accompanying text infra.
289. See notes 346-51 and accompanying text infra.
290. 459 Pa. at 228, 328 A.2d at 468. This concern is expressed most clearly
in the following language: "The municipality could penalize the successful
challenger by enacting an amendatory ordinance designed to cure the constitutional infirmity, but also designed to zone around the challenger. Faced with
an obstacle to relief, few would undertake the time and expense necessary to
have a zoning ordinance declared unconstitutional." Id.
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count in fashioning a solution to the problem of post-challenge
amendments in developer-initiated challenges, it is not a sufficient
foundation for a judicial decision which effectively negates a municipality's statutory power to amend its zoning ordinance. 91 But
though the adoption of the pending ordinance doctrine was bad
law, can it be said that it was good policy? To put it another way,
is the Casey pending ordinance doctrine the best legislative solution
to the problem of post-challenge amendments in developer-initiated
exclusionary zoning challenges?
The Casey doctrine is not a poor policy solution to the problem
of post-challenge amendments in developer-initiated challenges 292
if one approaches the problem with two assumptions: 1) that developer-initiated challenges are the only possible exclusionary zoning challenges and 2) that previously unadvertised post-challenge
amendments are either always to be considered or always to be
disregarded. These seem to be the assumptions which the Casey
court entertained, and for good reason.
The language of the Casey opinion reflects an assumption by
the court that only developers could initiate exclusionary zoning
challenges. In rejecting the trial court's interpretation of the old
stay provision of the MPC, 29 31 the supreme court noted that an interpretation which gave municipalities time to amend their exclusionary zoning ordinances after a declaration of invalidity would
penalize successful challenges and, thus, discourage challenges altogether. 294 While this is true in the case of developer-challengers
who are interested in building on a particular parcel of property,
it is not true with respect to challenges by persons who do not have
an interest in a particular parcel in the exclusionary municipality.2 95
The supreme court, therefore, must have assumed that non-landowners could not bring challenges. Given the state of the law at
the time of Casey, this assumption was justified. When Casey was
decided it had already been determined by the commonwealth court
that nonresidents could not bring exclusionary zoning challenges.2 9
In addition, the entire body of Pennsylvania substantive exclu291. See notes 75-81 and accompanying text supra.
292. See notes 42-47 and accompanying text supra.
293. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11009(2) (Purdon 1968) (repealed 1972). See
note 78 supra.
294. 459 Pa. at 228, 328 A.2d at 468. See note 79 supra.
295. For a discussion of the ramifications of legislative authorization of
non-developer changes, see notes 313-33 and accompanying text infra.
296. Lightcap v. Wrightstown Twp. Bd. of Supervisors, 25 Bucks County
L. Rep. 145 (C.P. 1974), aJ'd per curiam, No. 1625, C.D. 1973, Oct. 18, 1974
(Pa. Commw. Ct.). See note 7 supra.
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sionary zoning law had evolved solely in the context of developer297
initiated challenges.
The language of the Casey opinion also suggests that the supreme court assumed that it had to adopt an all-or-nothing approach
to post-challenge amendments in developer-initiated challenges.
Such an approach was implicit in the threshold question addressed
by the court - whether it should apply the pending ordinance doctrine to developer-initiated challenges.298 The Casey court perceived that if it applied the doctrine, all post-challenge amendments
which were not "pending" at the time of the challenge would be
disregarded; if it declined to apply the doctrine, all post-challenge
amendments (whether or not they were pending at the time of the
challenge) would be considered.
If one accepts, then, the assumptions entertained by the Casey
court, the Casey pending ordinance doctrine is not, as I have previously stated, bad policy. The only perceived alternative - rejection of the pending ordinance doctrine - would have totally
discouraged developer-initiated challenges, the only perceived type
of exclusionary zoning challenge. 9 This result would have nullified the significance of the extensive body of Pennsylvania substantive exclusionary zoning law.- °°

There are problems, however, with the Casey doctrine, particularly when it is considered in conjunction with the award of
site-specific relief, to which it is closely bound. The court in Casey
recognized that, in order to provide developers with an incentive
to bring exclusionary zoning challenges, they must not only be
protected against the effect of post-challenge amendments, but must
also have some significant hope of obtaining site-specific relief.8 01
The two issues are closely intertwined because a court is more
likely to reach the issue of site-specific relief if post-challenge
curative amendments are disregarded. 30 2 Thus, the adoption of
297. See cases cited at note 31 supra.
298. For a discussion of the treatment given to this issue in the briefs submitted by the parties, see Briefs for Appellant and Appellee; Reply Briefs for
Appellant and Appellee; Casey v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 459 Pa. 219, 328 A.2d
464 (1974); note 77 supra.
299. See text following note 295 supra.
500. See cases cited at note 31 supra.
301. 459 Pa. at 229-30, 328 A.2d at 469.
302. See notes 25-26 and accompanying text supra. If a post-challenge
amendment is considered, the amendment may eliminate the defect which is
the basis for the developer's challenge and thus cause the developer to lose his
challenge on the merits. Obviously, if a court decides against a developer's
challenge on the merits, it will not reach the issue of whether to award sitespecific relief. See id.
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the Casey pending ordinance doctrine, with its directive that previously unadvertised post-challenge amendments are to be disregarded,
made it much more likely that courts would be called upon to decide whether to award site-specific relief to a developer-challenger.
The issue of whether to award site-specific relief is difficult for
courts to resolve; indeed, the issue is on the fringes of justiciability. 803

Though Act 249's amendments to section 1011 of the MPC

clarified the factors which a court must consider in addressing the
question of site-specific relief,3°4 the nature of the factors specified
303. See, e.g., Ellick v. Board of Supervisors, 17 Pa. Commw. Ct. 404, 353
A.2d 239 (1975). In Ellick, the commonwealth court sought to explain how a
Pennsylvania court was to exercise the power, conferred by the 1972 amendments to the MPC, to award site-specific relief to a successful challenger. The
court stated:
[S]ection 1011 of the MPC permits one to conclude that the Legislature, through the 1972 amendments, has imposed upon the courts
of common pleas broad and burdensome duties and authority. In
effect, the Legislature has directed those courts to act as administrative
bodies (as super zoning boards of adjustment) which the appellate
courts in this Commonwealth have stated many times is not a proper
judicial function. .

.

.

[S]ocial and economic

problems of society

presented in zoning cases should properly be resolved by the legislative
and executive branches of government rather than by the courts.
Courts are intended to decide cases on the facts and the law presented,
and were never intended to dictate legislative matters . . . as may be

involved in challenging landowners' plans. Nonetheless, we may not
disregard the intent of the Legislature which is expressed in the MPC.
Id. at 414-15, 333 A.2d at 246 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). If the
court in Ellick truly believed that § 1011 directed courts "to act as administrative bodies," to perform what "is not a proper judicial function," and "to
dictate legislative matters," then the court could "disregard the intent of the
Legislature." See id. The legislature does not have the authority to require
that courts perform a non-judicial task. The legislature could not, for example,
require the Pennsylvania courts to prepare comprehensive plans or adopt zoning ordinances. Thus, if the court in Ellick believed that § 1011 sought to
impose a nonjudicial task upon the courts, the court could have refused to
accept the task.
Although the Ellick court was unwilling to "disregard the intent of the
Legislature" by refusing to carry out the responsibilities assigned to the courts
by § 1011, the court's language nevertheless supports the proposition that the
issue of whether to award site-specific relief in a particular case is one of
questionable justiciability.
304. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11011(2) (Purdon Supp. 1980-81). Prior
to the adoption of Act 249, § 1011(2) provided:
If the court finds that an ordinance or map or a decision or order
thereunder which has been brought up for review unlawfully prevents
or restricts a development or use which has been described by the landowner through plans and other materials submitted to the governing
body, agency or officer of the municipality whose action or failure to
act is in question on the appeal, it may order the described development or use approved as to all elements and refer other elements to
the governing body, agency or officer having jurisdiction thereof for
further proceedings, including the adoption of alternative restrictions,
in accordance with the court's opinion and order. The court shall
retain jurisdiction of the appeal during the pendency of any such
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and the authorization for a court to retain an expert reflect legislative recognition that judicial resolution of the issue requires
consideration of matters beyond the competence of the judiciary.30
A further difficulty with the Casey pending ordinance doctrine, and its concomitant facilitation of site-specific relief, is that
the award of site-specific relief may have a considerable negative
impact upon the zoning municipality. A basic premise of zoning
is that a zoning ordinance will reflect a plan for development which,
in the eyes of the municipality's governing body, best serves the
public welfare.8 0 6 The awarding of site-specific relief by a court,
however, introduces an arbitrary element, not the result of deliberate, comprehensive planning. Admittedly, a developer who
prevails on the merits of his challenge is not automatically entitled
to site-specific relief,3° 7 but the courts must, and undoubtedly do,
recognize that if such relief is consistently denied to successful challengers, they will discourage challenges by developers. Rather
than discourage such challenges, and thereby encourage municipalities to maintain exclusionary ordinances, courts understandably
may be inclined to entertain a presumption in favor of awarding
further proceedings and may, upon motion of the landowner, issue
such supplementary orders as it deems necessary to protect the rights
of the landowner as declared in its opinion and order.
Id. § 11011(2) (Purdon 1972) (amended 1978).
Although this provision authorized courts to "order the described development or use approved as to all elements" or to "order it approved as to some
elements," it did not provide any guidance to the courts as to when they should
order approval of all or only some elements of a challenger's described development. See id. However, Act 249's amendment to § 1011 (2) does supply this
guidance in the form of five factors which courts "shall consider" in issuing an
order under § 1011(2). See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11011(2) (Purdon Supp.
1980-81).

305. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11011(2) (Purdon Supp. 1980-81). A
cursory review of the enumerated factors reveals that courts are required to
consider matters that are beyond the traditional areas of judicial competence.
See id. For example, the first factor which a court must pass upon is "the
locational suitability of the [challenger's] site for the uses proposed including
the general location of the site with regard to major roads, sewer facilities,
water supplies, schools and other public services facilities or the comprehensive
plan and zoning ordinance of the municipality and the county if they exist."
Id. Moreover, in authorizing courts to "employ experts to aid the court to
frame an appropriate order," § 1011 (2) indicates that the legislature was aware
that the evaluation of the factors specified in that section required courts to
perform administrative and legislative tasks which were beyond their competence. See id.
306. See

PA. STAT. ANN. tit.

53, § 10105 (Purdon 1980-81).

307. See, e.g., id. § 11011(2). At no time has § 11011(2) required that a
court award site-specific relief to a developer who prevails on the merits of his
challenge. See id.; notes 304-05 supra.
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site-specific relief even when such relief is inconsistent with any
rational scheme of development.30 8
A final problem with the Casey doctrine is that it requires a
post-challenge amendment to be disregarded even when a challenge
has been filed before the municipality has had adequate time to
308. See, e.g., Casey v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 459 Pa. 219, 328 A.2d 464
(1974). In Casey, the supreme court came close to suggesting that a developer
who prevails on the merits of his challenge is entitled to site-specific relief.
Admittedly, the Casey court began its discussion with language that seems to
limit the availability of site-specific relief. The supreme court stated: "To
forsake a challenger's reasonable development plans after all the time, effort and capital invested in such a challenge is grossly inequitable." Id. at
230, 328 A.2d at 469 (emphasis added). This language would lead one to
believe that a developer-challenger should receive site-specific relief only when
his development plans are "reasonable" and that a determination of "reasonableness" would involve an inquiry into the many different factors, such as locational
suitability and possible adverse environmental consequences, which are presently
codified in § 1011(2) of the MPC. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §11011(2)
(Purdon Supp. 1980-81); notes 304-05 supra. However, the court culminated
its discussion of site-specific relief by simply directing "that the building permits
applied for [by the developer-challenger] be issued upon compliance by appellee
with all administrative requirements of the zoning ordinance in effect on the
date of the original application which are not inconsistent with this opinion."
459 Pa. at 231, 328 A.2d at 469-80. This language conveys the impression that
the only limitation upon the availability of site-specific relief to a developerchallenger is the requirement that his plans be in conformity with the unchallenged zoning requirements which were in existence at the time of the
challenge.
Of course, the 1972 amendments to the MPC were not applicable to the
challenge in Casey. See note 11 supra. These amendments revised Article
X of the MPC and, among other things, added § 1011(2), which specifically
authorized courts to award site-specific relief. The 1972 amendments to Article
X underwent comprehensive analysis in Ellick v. Board of Supervisors, 17
Pa. Commw. Ct. 404, 333 A.2d 239 (1975). In Ellick, the commonwealth court
stated that "the function of the court [under § 1011(2)] is to pass upon the reasonableness of the restrictions present in the record, including both the restrictions contained in the landowner's [§ 1004(2)(c)] plans and the restrictions
present in the ordinance which are applicable to the same class of usage or
construction." Id. at 416, 333 A.2d at 247. Although this language connotes
that, under the 1972 version of § 1011(2), a court was to undertake a wideranging "reasonableness" evaluation in determining whether to award sitespecific relief, the history of judicial application of the 1972 version of § 1011(2)
bespeaks an assumption by the courts that a developer-challenger who prevailed on the merits, was entitled to site-specific relief if, in accordance with
Casey, his plans conformed to the unchallenged land use restrictions in existence
at the time he filed his challenge. See, e.g., Board of Supervisors v. Barness, 33
Pa. Commw. Ct. 364, 382 A.2d 140 (1978); notes 20-21 supra.
As a result of the 1978 amendments to § 1011(2), a court must consider
various specified factors in fashioning an order of relief for a successful
developer-challenger. See notes 304-05 supra. The directive that a court
"consider" the specified factors suggests that a court is to deny site-specific
relief if its consideration of the challenger's proposed development in light of
the specified factors compels such a result. Thus, the 1978 amendments to
§ 1011(2) mandate that courts should not automatically award site-specific relief
to developer-challengers who prevail on the merits. See note 307 and accompanying text supra. To what extent the Pennsylvania Legislature may limit
the availability of site-specific relief remains an open question. See note 23

supra.
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respond to a new substantive zoning requirement. 309 For example,
a developer might file a challenge on the day after an appellate
decision which sets forth a new substantive requirement for municipal zoning ordinances. Although the municipality would
clearly not have had an adequate opportunity to bring its zoning
ordinance into conformity with this new requirement (or, as required under Casey, to advertise a proposed amendment), the Casey
doctrine would, nevertheless, mandate that the developer's challenge be decided in light of the ordinance in existence at the time
of the challenge. 810 Any post-challenge amendment, adopted in
response to the new substantive requirement, would have to be
disregarded.
Given its assumptions, then, the Casey court's adoption of the
pending ordinance doctrine is understandable. There are, however, difficulties with the Casey doctrine, particularly to the extent
that it increases the likelihood that courts will have to consider the
award of site-specific relief. The existence of these problems encourages an inquiry into whether there are solutions, better than
the Casey doctrine, to the problem of post-challenge amendments
in developer-initiated exclusionary zoning challenges.
B. Proposed Legislative Solutions to the Problem of Post-Challenge
Amendments in Developer-Initiated Challenges
I wish to consider at this point several possible legislative solutions to the problem of post-challenge amendments in developerinitiated challenges.8 11 I will proceed upon the assumption that
there are no constraints upon the legislature's power to adopt what
it considers to be the best solution.3 1 2 Under such circumstances,
309. See 459 Pa. at 227-29, 328 A.2d at 467-69. In Casey, the developer's
challenge was filed only two months after the Girsh decision upon which the
challenge was based. Id. at 223, 328 A.2d at 465. For a discussion of Girsh,
see notes 52-53 and accompanying text supra. It is at least arguable that
two months was not a sufficient period of time for Warwick Township to consider the many factors necessary to bring its zoning ordinance into conformity
with Girsh. Had the township been given sufficient time to determine, for
instance, the amount, location, and density of land it wished to zone for
apartments?
310. See 459 Pa. at 227-29, 328 A.2d at 467-69.
311. Since the legislature has more flexibility and freedom than a court
in fashioning remedies for problems brought to its attention, the suggestions
offered here are for legislative rather than judicial solutions to the problem of
post-challenge amendments in developer-initiated challenges.
312. This, however, does not alter the view expressed above that Casey is
constitutionally based. See notes 82-124 and accompanying text supra. The
constraints imposed by Casey hinder the formulation of an "ideal" legislative
solution to the problem. See notes 346-51 and accompanying text infra.
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the Pennsylvania Legislature might consider the following solutions
to the problem.
1. Legislative Authorization of Non-Developer Challenges
At the time Casey was decided, Pennsylvania law was clear in
providing that only developers could bring exclusionary zoning
challenges. 813 This also appears to be the present law. 314 Under
this law, there is a strong policy argument in support of the Casey
doctrine: post-challenge amendments must be disregarded because,
otherwise, the only permissible type of exclusionary zoning challenges will be discouraged. 15
Suppose, however, that the legislature were to authorize exclusionary challenges by non-developers - that is, persons who do
not have an interest in particular land in the zoning municipality.'1 6
This group would include nonresidents of the zoning municipality, fair housing organizations, and other organizations which
represent the varied interests of the housing construction industry. 1- Given such legislative authorization, the major policy
argument in support of the Casey doctrine is considerably weakened.
Consideration of post-challenge amendments in developer-initiated
challenges would discourage developer challenges, but a municipality with an exclusionary zoning ordinance would still be subject to non-developer challenges. Thus, the consideration of postchallenge amendments in developer-initiated litigation would not
discourage all exclusionary challenges.
Post-challenge amendments do not present a problem in the
context of non-developer challenges. In such challenges, there is
313. See notes 7 & 14 and accompanying text supra.
314. See cases cited at note 7 supra. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
has never held that only developers may bring exclusionary zoning challenges.
Such holdings are embodied in lower court decisions. Id. Furthermore, it
has been persuasively argued that non-developer challengers are preferable to
developer-challengers for remedying the problem of exclusionary zoning and
that nothing in Article X of the MPC precludes non-developer challenges. Krasnowiecki, supra note 7, at 1101-02.
315. See notes 290-310 and accompanying text supra.
316. Such authorization could be effectuated by amendment of §§ 1004 or
1005 of the MPC, or by addition of a new section which explicitly permits nondeveloper challenges.

317. Such challengers are common in New Jersey exclusionary zoning
litigation. See, e.g., Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J.
481, 371 A.2d 1192 (1977); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township
of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed and cert. denied,
423 U.S. 808 (1975). In Mount Laurel, the New Jersey Supreme Court held
that nonresidents of the zoning municipality had standing, under New Jersey
law, to bring their exclusionary zoning challenge. 67 N.J. at 159 n.3, 336 A.2d
at 717 n.3.
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not, as there is in developer challenges, an inconsistency between
the theory underlying the challenge and the relief sought by the
challenger.81 8 In developer challenges, the challenger attacks the
validity of an ordinance on its face, but seeks relief with respect
to the particular property in which he has an interest.3 19 The
developer-challenger is thus not content with a post-challenge
amendment which cures the defect asserted in the challenge, but
320
which does not benefit the property in which he has an interest.
In non-developer challenges, however, the challenger is satisfied
with any action, whether by a court or by the zoning municipality,
which cures the defect asserted in the challenge. The nondeveloper is not interested in particular property in the municipality and, therefore, does not seek relief directed to particular
property. A non-developer challenger will thus not be aggrieved
by a post-challenge amendment which cures the defect asserted in
his challenge, and judicial consideration of post-challenge amendments will not discourage such challenges. There is, to repeat, no
post-challenge amendment problem in non-developer challenges.
There are difficulties, however, with legislative authorization
of non-developer challenges. The first and most basic problem is
the fact that the Pennsylvania substantive law of exclusionary zoning has developed in the context of developer challenges 321 and,
on its face at least, is grounded upon federal and state constitutional protection of "property." 322 Non-developers would not be
able to assert that a zoning ordinance affected their "property" in318. For a discussion of the inconsistency between the theory underlying a
developer's challenge and the nature of the relief sought by a developerchallenger, see notes 31-41 and accompanying text supra.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. See notes 7, 14 & 31 and accompanying text supra.
322. See, e.g., Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 476 Pa. 182, 382 A.2d 105
(1977). Justice Nix's plurality opinion in Surrick embodies the most explicit

statement of the constitutional basis for exclusionary zoning decisions in Pennsylvania. Justice Nix declared:
Article I Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution protects the
citizen's right to the enjoyment of private property, and governmental
interference with this right is circumscribed by the due process provisions of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution. In reviewing zoning ordinances, this Court has stated
that an ordinance must bear a substantial relationship to the health,

safety, morals, or general welfare of the community.

Thus, without

expressly labelling it as such, this Court has employed a substantive

due process analysis in reviewing zoning schemes and has concluded
implicitly that exclusionary or unduly restrictive zoning techniques do
not have the requisite substantial relationship to the public welfare.
Id. at 188, 382 A.2d at 107-08 (citations omitted).
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Thus, if the legislature simply authorized non-developer

exclusionary zoning challenges, it is possible that, though such
authorization would allow non-developers to hurdle the statutory
"standing" threshold 3 24 they would lack a substantive basis for
challenging a zoning ordinance. Perhaps this problem might be
avoided if the legislature specifically authorized non-developers to
bring challenges based not only upon violations of their own constitutional rights, but also upon the violation of the "property"
rights of developers. In doing so, the legislature would effectively
confer upon non-developers "standing" to assert the rights of third
parties - i.e., developers.

s25

A second problem with legislative authorization of non-developer challenges is that it is unclear whether, even if granted the
right, there would be many non-developer initiated exclusionary
zoning challenges. This is a significant question once it is assumed that the Casey doctrine has not been judicially imposed.
323. Although non-developers could not contend that the zoning municipality's ordinance affects their use and enjoyment of property within the
municipality because, by definition, non-developers have no interest in property
located in the municipality, they might be able to assert that the zoning municipality's ordinance impinges upon their right under the Pennsylvania Constitution to "acquire" or "possess" property in the zoning municipality. See PA.
CONST. art. I, § 1. Such a theory appears to be the constitutional basis for the
New Jersey law of exclusionary zoning. See Southern Burlington County
NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 175 n.ll, 336 A. 2d 713,
725 n.ll, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
324. The statutory "standing" problem with respect to non-developer challengers is presented by the interpretation given to Article X of the MPC in
Lightcap v. Wrightstown Twp. Bd. of Supervisors, 25 Bucks County L. Rep.
145 (C.P. 1974), aff'd per curiam, No. 1625, C.D. 1973, Oct. 18, 1974 (Pa.
Commw. Ct.). This statutory limitation could be eliminated by an amendment
to Article X which explicitly authorized non-developer challenges. See note
316 supra.
While an amendment to Article X would eliminate any statutory "standing" problem with respect to non-developer challenges, it is possible that there
would still be constitutional problems with such challenges. For example, nondeveloper challenges might be held to be nonjusticiable. See note 7 supra.
In addition, the Supreme Court of the United States has held that, in most instances, non-developers do not have standing to bring exclusionary zoning challenges in federal courts. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 8 n.18 (1975).
Although the constitutional basis for the Warth decision, the "case or controversy" requirement of art. III, § 2 of the United States Constitution, is not
applicable to state courts, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court could, nevertheless,
adopt Warth-type standing requirements on state constitutional, or prudential,
grounds.
325. If the Pennsylvania Legislature were to authorize non-developers to
assert the constitutional rights of developers, the third-party standing issue
would be the converse of that discussed by the United States Supreme Court
in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977). In Arlington Heights, the Supreme Court considered whether,
and to what extent, developers could assert the constitutional rights of nonresidents. Id. at 260-64.
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In the absence of the Casey doctrine, post-challenge amendments in
developer-initiated challenges would be considered and, thus, developer challengers discouraged, thereby placing the brunt of exclusionary zoning litigation on non-developers. The question
remains whether there would be many non-developer challengers.
The answer, uncertain at best, would depend upon a number of
factors.
First, there would have to be legal services programs employing
litigators with the willingness and expertise necessary to initiate
exclusionary zoning challenges on behalf of non-developers. Second, construction industry associations would have to be inclined
to bring non-developer challenges. If it appeared that there would
be few non-developer challenges and, in the absence of the Casey
doctrine, few, if any, developer challenges, municipalities would
have little inducement to amend existing exclusionary ordinances.
If the legislature wished to provide an incentive for non-developer
challenges, it might, in addition to authorizing such challenges,
authorize courts to award litigation expenses to successful chal8 26
lengers.
A third problem presented by legislative authorization of nondeveloper challenges is uncertainty about whether, and to what extent, exclusive reliance upon such challenges would eliminate a
municipality's incentive to cure exclusionary zoning ordinances in
advance of a challenge. Casey and its treatment of the rights of
developer-challengers provided a strong incentive for municipalities
to remedy exclusionary ordinances in advance of a challenge. Under Casey, a municipality with an exclusionary zoning ordinance
learned to expect that a failure to effect a speedy cure of the exclusionary deficiency could produce a double disaster: 1) the initiation
of a developer challenge against which a post-challenge amendment
would be ineffective and 2) the likelihood that a successful developer-challenger would win, by way of site-specific relief, the right
to develop a high-density use in an area where the municipality
did not wish to have it.827 On the other hand, if a non-developer
challenge were the sole form of exclusionary zoning attack, a
326. The term "litigation expenses" in the present discussion refers to all
expenses related to the prosecution of exclusionary zoning challenges, not just
attorneys' fees. For a discussion of legislative authorization of the award of
litigation expenses to developer-challengers, see notes 334-38 and accompanying
text infra.
327. If a municipality were willing to accept a developer-challenger's proposed use, it could simply amend its zoning ordinance to accommodate the use.
If it did so, there would be no reason for the developer to bring his statutory
challenge. Thus, in any developer-challenge, the challenger seeks development

which the zoning municipality opposes.
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municipality would be inclined to maintain a patently unconstitutional ordinance on the theory that it could always adopt an effective post-challenge amendment if and when the ordinance were
challenged. Legislative authorization of the award of litigation expenses 828 to the non-developer challenger in this situation might
induce municipalities to adopt pre-challenge amendments. Thus,
the legislature might provide that any time that a non-developer
challenge produces a curative post-challenge amendment, the nondeveloper would be entitled to recover all his litigation expenses
from the municipality. But it is questionable whether the threat
of liability for litigation expenses is as strong an incentive for
municipalities to adopt pre-challenge curative amendments as the
threat of undesired site-specific relief.
A fourth and final problem with non-developer challenges is
the difficulty of fashioning a remedy should the challenge succeed.829
In developer-initiated litigation the court is asked only to award
site-specific relief to the challenger. The developer-challenger does
not seek, and probably does not want, 8 0 any further relief. In
non-developer challenges, however, the challenger does not seek
site-specific relief because he does not yet hold an interest in particular property. But though a non-developer challenge does not
present a court with the difficulties that are involved in determining whether to grant site-specific relief to a developer,88 ' these
difficulties pale in comparison to those which a court might face in
a non-developer challenge. Initially the non-developer challenger
wishes only a judicial declaration that the challenged ordinance is
invalid. However, the non-developer may ultimately seek judicial
supervision of any subsequent amendment or, even more troublesome, judicial imposition of a court-devised zoning ordinance upon
the municipality. 8 2 These remedial issues present fundamental
828. See note 326 supra.
329. See Hyson, supra note 7, at 22-27; Developments in the Law-Zoning,
supra, note 2, at 1700-07.
330. A developer-challenger, who is granted site-specific relief in his bid
for a right to build apartments on his property, has no reason to wish that the
municipality allow apartments on other property. Indeed, he may wish, as a
matter of economics, that his will be the only property in the municipality on
which there will be apartments.
331. For a discussion of the difficulties in fashioning site-specific relief, see

notes 303-08 and accompanying text supra.
382. See, e.g., Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J.
481, 371 A.2d 1192 (1977). In Oakwood at Madison, the New Jersey Supreme
Court recognized that judicial imposition of a court-devised zoning ordinance
lay at the end of the remedial road in a non-developer challenge. At the conclusion of the majority opinion, the supreme court provided the following
guidance to the trial court on remand:
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questions concerning the limitations of judicial power and competence in reviewing the validity of municipal zoning ordinances.33 3
In short, legislative authorization of non-developer challenges
would avoid the problems inherent in the Casey pending ordinance
doctrine and in the award of site-specific relief. Non-developer
challenges, however, present problems of their own and, thus, are
not clearly preferable to the present exclusive reliance upon developers to challenge exclusionary zoning ordinances.
2. Legislative Authorization of the Award of Litigation Expenses to
a Successful Developer-Challenger
The Pennsylvania Legislature might seek to resolve the problem of post-challenge amendments in developer-initiated challenges
by authorizing courts to award litigation expenses, payable by the
defendant municipality, to a successful developer-challenger.
A major policy argument in support of the Casey doctrine is
that, together with the availability of site-specific relief, it induces
municipalities to cure unconstitutional ordinances prior to the institution of any challenge. 33 4 If post-challenge amendments in
developer-challenges were considered, then the effect of the Casey
doctrine in inducing "voluntary" pre-challenge cures would be
lost.
The award of generous litigation expenses to a successful developer-challenger might be an adequate substitute for the incentives
offered by the Casey doctrine and the availability of site-specific
relief. For example, the legislature could permit courts to award
to a successful developer-challenger all costs involved in pursuing
the challenge.3 " In addition, the term "successful" challenger
The trial court shall have discretion, in the event of undue delay
[by the municipality] in compliance with this opinion or of a finding by
the court that any zoning revision submitted by the defendant [municipality] fails to comply with this opinion, to appoint an impartial
zoning and planning expert or experts. Such expert may be directed to file a report or to testify, as the court may deem appropriate, as to a recommendation for the achievement by defendant of
compliance with this opinion or with any further directions by the
court pursuant thereto.

Id. at 553-54, 371 A.2d at 1228. Presumably, such "recommendation," if it
were to have any practical effect, would be imposed upon the municipality by
court order.
333. For a thoughtful discussion of these fundamental questions, see the
separate opinions of Justices Mountain and Clifford in Oakwood at Madison,
Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 623-38, 371 A.2d 1192, 1263-71
(1977). See also authorities cited at note 329 supra.
334. See notes 290-310 and accompanying text supra.
335. "All costs" would constitute every expense incurred by a developerchallenger in the course of bringing his challenge. A successful developer-
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could be defined legislatively to include not only the developerchallenger who obtained a judicial declaration of invalidity, but
also the developer whose challenge prompted the municipality to
adopt a post-challenge amendment which cured the defect asserted
in the challenge. Under these circumstances, municipalities would
be motivated to cure a defective ordinance in advance of a challenge in order to avoid the litigation expenses that might be incurred by a successful developer-challenger. The award of litigation
expenses would similarly provide an incentive for developer challenges or, at the very least, tend to eliminate litigation expenses
886
as a disincentive to developer challenges.
It is questionable, however, whether legislative authorization
of the award of litigation expenses to a successful developer-challenger would operate as effectively as the Casey doctrine and the
threat of site-specific relief in stimulating pre-challenge municipal
cures of defective zoning ordinances. Perhaps, in order to provide
the necessary incentive, a "penalty" could be imposed upon a losing
municipality in addition to the obligation to compensate the successful challenger for his litigation expenses.
The award of litigation costs has one significant advantage
over the Casey doctrine and site-specific relief: the end product of
a successful challenge will never be the construction of the wrong
development in the wrong place.88 7 There will be no enduring
monument to the municipality's ignorance, or malevolence, in
maintaining an invalid ordinance. The only cost to the municipality will be the temporary, albeit possibly substantial, loss of municipal funds.888
challenger must receive compensation for all costs because, to the extent that
he is not fully compensated, there is a disincentive for a developer to bring a
challenge.
336. I do not intend to suggest, however, that a successful developer.
challenger should receive compensation for all litigation expenses in every
case. A court should not award such relief when a developer-challenger has
raced to file a challenge before a municipality has had an adequate time to
respond to a new judicial decision which is the basis of the challenge. See notes
309-10 and accompanying text supra.
337. Furthermore, the award of litigation expenses presents neither the
difficulties involved in fashioning site-specific relief nor a justiciability problem.
See notes 303-08 and accompanying text supra.
338. The existing availability of site-specific relief to a successful developer.
challenger has encouraged a "bounty hunting" mentality on the part of developers. The "outlaw" is the municipality with an exclusionary ordinance;
the "bounty" is site-specific relief. Legislative authorization of litigation expenses to a successful developer-challenger would simply transform the winning challenger's "bounty" into a more traditional monetary form. Of course,
a municipality faced with the possibility of a large monetary judgment might
settle a developer's challenge by offering some form of site-specific relief.
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3. Legislative Adoption of a Modified Casey Doctrine
Thus far, the suggested resolutions of the post-challenge
amendment dilemma have ignored and implicitly rejected the solution fashioned in Casey itself. But while the Casey solution is subject to criticism on policy grounds, 8s 9 I believe that legislative
adoption of a modified Casey doctrine would prove useful.
The chief problem with the Casey doctrine is that it requires
previously unadvertised post-challenge amendments to be disregarded in all circumstances.30 In particular, the Casey doctrine
requires judicial disregard of a post-challenge amendment even
when a municipality has had no reasonable opportunity to respond
to a judicial decision creating new obligations for zoning municipalities. I believe that in such circumstances it is not sound policy to
disregard a post-challenge amendment. A municipality should be
afforded a reasonable period of time in which to amend its zoning
ordinance in response to a judicial decision imposing a new obligation upon it. Any amendment adopted during this interval should
be effective against all challengers, regardless of whether the amendment is adopted before or after a developer has filed a challenge.
It would not be poor policy, however, to disregard a post-challenge
amendment when the amendment seeks to cure a defect which the
municipality has had ample time to correct prior to the filing of
the developer's challenge.
To implement these suggestions, the Pennsylvania Legislature
might limit the amendment power of municipalities conferred by
section 601 of the MPC841 by providing that a curative postchallenge amendment is not to be considered in resolving a developer's challenge unless the challenge was filed before the municipality had had a reasonable time to respond to the judicial decision
forming the basis for the challenge. 42 Alternatively, the legisla339. See notes 290-310 and accompanying text supra.
340. See text following notes 298 supra.
341. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10601 (Purdon Supp. 1980-81). For the
text of § 601 of the MPC, see note 76 supra.
342. Alternatively, § 601 might be modified to provide that a post-challenge
amendment which seeks to cure the defect asserted by a developer-challenger is
to be considered in resolving the developer's challenge unless the challenge
was filed after the municipality had had a reasonable time to respond to the
judicial decision which is the basis for the developer's challenge. I prefer the
anguage in the text because I believe it is appropriate to provide that, as a
general matter, post-challenge amendments are to be disregarded unless the
municipality satisfies the burden of proving that it had not had sufficient time
to respond to the judicial decision forming the basis for the developer's challenge. The language at the beginning of this note suggests, conversely, that,
as a general matter, post-challenge amendments should be considered unless the
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ture, after conducting hearings, might specify an appropriate specific
period of time in which a municipality would be free to fashion an
amendment in order to conform its zoning ordinance to a new
substantive obligation. The municipality would then be assured
that a developer challenge, filed within the specified period of time,
would still be subject to any amendment adopted within the time
period. Moreover, a specified time period would supply more
3 43
certainty than a general "reasonable time" provision.
There are at least two defects with the foregoing proposal for
a legislatively modified Casey doctrine. First, this modification,
like the Casey doctrine itself, contemplates that courts will be called
upon at times to struggle with the difficulties involved in determining whether to award site-specific relief to a developer-challenger
who prevails on the merits of his challenge.344 Second, it may prove
troublesome in a particular case to determine whether a developer's
challenge is actually based upon a recent judicial decision announcing a new substantive requirement which the municipality has not
had a reasonable opportunity to study and implement. 45
C. Institutional and Practical Obstacles to Resolving
the Casey Problem
Although the Casey doctrine does not provide the optimum
solution to the problem of post-challenge amendments in developerinitiated exclusionary zoning challenges, there are major institutional and practical obstacles that must be overcome before a better
solution is possible. The greatest obstacle is the apparent constitutional basis for the Casey doctrine.O The Pennsylvania Supreme
challenger satisfies the burden of proving that the defendant municipality, at
the time of the challenge, had already had a reasonable time to comply with

the requirements of the judicial decision upon which the challenge is founded.

Since a municipality has better access to proof on the issue of whether, prior
to the challenge, it has had reasonable time, the burden of proof with respect
to this issue should be placed on the municipality.
343. Moreover, the requirement of a specified period of time would eliminate the "burden of proof" problem. See note 342 supra.
344. See notes 303-08 and accompanying text supra.
345. In any judicial opinion setting forth "new law," a court typically
seeks to demonstrate that its decision is not "novel" in the sense that there is
no precedent to support it. Thus, for example, though the decision in Girsh
Appeal may seem to be the paradigm of a decision setting forth "new law,"
the plurality opinion seeks to persuade the reader that its conclusion follows
inescapably from previous decisions in which the supreme court had invalidated zoning ordinances that prohibited a particular use anywhere within the
zoning municipality. See 437 Pa. at 242-44, 263 A.2d at 397-98.
346. For a discussion of the possible constitutional bases for the Casey
doctrine, see notes 90-124 and accompanying text supra.
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Court's "constitutionalization" of the post-challenge amendment
problem has precluded the legislature from devising a different
47
solution to the problem.
The obstacle presented by the Casey decision would obviously
be removed if the supreme court chose to overrule the Casey doctrine. It would be relatively easy for the supreme court to conclude
that there was an inadequate legal basis for the Casey pending
ordinance doctrine.A48 Based on this conclusion, the court could
then rule that, subject only to a legislative decision to limit a
municipality's amendment power under section 601, a post-challenge
amendment moots a developer's challenge to the original unamended ordinance. Adoption of this position by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court would give the legislature freedom to develop an
appropriate solution to the Casey dilemma.

However, if the legislature had a free hand, how would it act?
Would it be likely to adopt a resolution of the post-challenge amendment problem which appropriately balanced the interests of developers, nonresidents, and zoning municipalities? Or would the
legislature, when freed from the constitutional constraints of the
Casey doctrine, resolve the post-challenge amendment dilemma in
a way which furthered only the interests of zoning municipalities?
In light of past events, it would not be unduly cynical to suggest
an affirmative answer to the last question - the Pennsylvania Legislature has not gone out of its way to remedy the evils of exclusionary zoning. The legislative action that has taken place has occurred
only after the supreme court has led the way.349 If the Pennsylvania Supreme Court simply overruled the Casey doctrine, it is
plausible to suggest that the legislature would be content with the
resulting status quo, in which post-challenge amendments always
mooted developer challenges.8 50 Legislative inaction in this case
347. See notes 121-24 and accompanying text supra.

348. See notes 65-81 and accompanying text supra.
349. Act 249 itself is an example of how legislative action has followed
the lead of the supreme court. As interpreted herein, § 609.2 (3) does not deprive a developer-challenger, who files a challenge prior to the initiation of
609.2 self-cure procedures, of the Casey right to have his challenge determined
in light of the zoning ordinance in effect at the time he filed his challenge.
See text accompanying notes 212-14 supra. However, I believe that, if the
legislature had a free hand, it would erase any developer-challenger's rights
conferred by Casey. Indeed, according to Mr. Ryan's construction of § 609.2,
this is precisely what the Pennsylvania Legislature did. See notes 172-211 and
accompanying text supra.
350. If the Casey doctrine were overruled by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, it is not totally clear what the "resulting status quo" would be. On the
one hand, it could be argued that § 609.2 (3) does not confer upon a developerchallenger, who files a challenge prior to the initiation of § 609.2 self-cure pro-
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would merely condone a "solution" which 1) eliminated the Casey
doctrine and the possibility of site-specific relief as an incentive
for developer-initiated exclusionary zoning challenges; and 2) provided no substitute incentive for exclusionary zoning challenges
either through legislative authorization of non-developer challenges
or the award of litigation expenses to successful challengers.
These institutional and practical considerations suggest that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court will not overrule the Casey doctrine
in spite of its inadequate legal foundation. While the continued
vitality of the Casey doctrine precludes legislative adoption of a
better solution to the problem of post-challenge amendments in
developer challenges, it also prevents legislative backsliding in the
3 51
area of exclusionary zoning.
VI. CONCLUSION

The Casey pending ordinance doctrine is not only bad law,
but also bad policy. The problem which the doctrine addresses the problem of post-challenge amendments in developer-initiated
exclusionary zoning challenges - is admittedly not an easy one to
resolve. The resolution set forth in Act 249 of 1978 is muddled,
far from ideal, and, to the extent that it deviates from the Casey
doctrine, ineffective. Indeed, there can be no effective legislative
solution to the Casey problem until the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania "deconstitutionalizes" it by overruling the doctrine. It
is unlikely that such action is in the offing because, if the legislature were free to solve the post-challenge amendment problem, it
might fail to perceive a problem and, thus, decline to fashion a
solution. Finally, though the Casey doctrine is indefensible on
legal grounds, the supreme court is unlikely to abandon a doctrine
which is so essential to the effectiveness of the Pennsylvania substantive law of exclusionary zoning.
cedures, a statutory right to have his challenge determined on the basis of the
ordinance in existence at the time of his challenge. See notes 172-211 and
accompanying text supra. Instead, § 609.2 (3), as interpreted herein, does not
seek to take away this right conferred by Casey. See notes 212-14 and accompanying text supra. On the other hand, it might be argued that § 609.2 (3)
implicitly confers this right. Even under the latter interpretation, if the Casey
doctrine were overruled, the legislature could simply amend the MPC to provide explicitly that post-challenge amendments were always effective in developer challenges.
351. I do not mean to suggest, however, that a desire to prevent legislative
backsliding in the area of exclusionary zoning is a justification for the continued vitality of a doctrine which lacks an adequate legal basis. See notes
65-81 and accompanying text supra.
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